What does Beijing’s declared interest in Ukraine mean for UK-PRC relations?
The Tangram | No 07.2025
This is the seventh Tangram from Observing China, where the leading China experts give a diverse range of succinct responses to key questions on the development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Recently, a senior official in His Majesty’s (HM) Government broke their characteristically balanced views on Beijing by expressing very firm and very genuine discontent with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) integral role in prolonging Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. I had asked the official, a senior figure in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), how HM Government aims to square the Russia circle in its rapprochement with Beijing. In their response, the official clarified that HM Government rebuts Beijing’s denial of its involvement in the conflict and quoted the then-fresh statistic that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had provided 70% of the machine tools and 90% of the legacy chips to aid Russia’s war machine.
The official in question assured me that the United Kingdom (UK) will not shy away from confronting Beijing on its military and technological support of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in future UK-PRC interactions. But what will happen in these relations now that Beijing is no longer hiding its interests in the conflict?
On 2nd July, Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, visited Kaja Kallas, the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in Brussels. Wang dropped something of a bomb by revealing that it is not in Beijing’s interests for Russia to lose in Ukraine.
According to the report in the South China Morning Post, Wang stated that the longer the conflict in Ukraine continues, the less the United States (US) can focus on the Indo-Pacific – the region which Pete Hegseth, US Secretary of Defence, has called the ‘priority theatre’ for Washington. The Pentagon’s wish to focus on the Indo-Pacific is largely born of a desire to contain the PRC’s regional military aggression.
The CCP had sworn neutrality in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and Wang’s words last week are uncharacteristically ‘candid’ and ‘frank’, to use the favourite words of the party.
So we asked the experts: what does Beijing’s admittance of its interests in Ukraine mean for the bilateral relationship with Britain? Or rather, what should it mean?
Charles Parton OBE
Chief Adviser, China Observatory, Council on Geostrategy
On 2nd July, Wang Yi told Kaja Kallas that Beijing did not want Russia to lose in Ukraine because it feared that the US would then concentrate its attention on the PRC. The surprise is Wang’s candour, rather than the content of his remark; its timing, three weeks before the EU-PRC summit; and its likely negative effect on the aim of detaching Europe from its American allies. Unsurprisingly, Wang went on to deny that the PRC was supplying the Russians with weaponry.
It is possible, if unlikely, that Wang, being human, lost patience. Whatever the explanation, it demonstrates the CCP’s extraordinary lack of understanding of the EU and UK positions, and of the importance of Ukraine to relations with the PRC. It also underlines CCP willingness to abandon its principles (in this case, on sovereignty) in pursuit of its geopolitical interests. Those interests centre on its long-term ideological and power struggle with the US for global supremacy. Support for Russia is to help ‘the enemy of my enemy’.
For Britain, this is yet another wake-up call on the hostile intentions of the CCP, even if David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, is right to say in his statement on the ‘China Audit’ that: ‘not engaging with China is therefore no choice at all.’ Noticeably, his statement did not include the word ‘Ukraine’.
In December 2023, the previous government put sanctions on three Chinese companies for helping Russia’s war industries. The current government added a further ten in February this year. It should build quickly and stalwartly on this baseline. It should also call the PRC out more loudly for its support for Russia. Quiet words fail to disquiet the CCP; megaphone diplomacy can be effective. The message should ring out loud and clear: ‘Mr Wang Yi, the UK desires good relations with the PRC, but they can only be built on respect for international law and norms, on acceptance that the future of Ukraine is integral to the security of Britain and the EU, and on a recognition that security will always be our government’s top concern.’
Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute
Wang Yi made an unusually explicit admission in private talks with Kallas: the PRC ‘cannot afford’ for Russia to lose in Ukraine. This statement – which diverges starkly from the PRC’s longstanding position of ‘neutrality’ – signals that Beijing’s strategic interests are invested in the outcome of the invasion of Ukraine. A protracted conflict which diverts US attention from the Indo-Pacific aligns with Beijing’s geopolitical priorities and reinforces the ‘no-limits’ partnership declared by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, in early 2022.
Despite its public denials, Beijing has been linked – via North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Ukrainian intelligence – to commercial entities enabling Russia’s war effort. The UK has emerged as a strong supporter of Ukraine, and last month’s National Security Strategy identified Russia as the primary military threat, labelling the PRC as a ‘persistent and systemic challenge’ to national security, economic integrity and democracy. British intelligence has repeatedly warned of Chinese espionage, cyber and sub-threshold operations.
Wang’s statement thus exposed a stark division of fundamental interests: the UK is committed to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty while, economically, HM Government’s policy remains one of ‘progressive realism,’ recognising Beijing as an essential commercial partner. The rationale is that Britain cannot afford to cut itself off from Chinese markets, capital and supply chains – even as the risks of economic dependency grow more apparent through disruptions, such as the PRC’s rare earth export restrictions and predatory investments.
Managing this dissonance may itself turn into a geopolitical risk. On the one hand, the UK is consolidating alliances with other like-minded democracies, navigating ties with Washington, strengthening NATO and AUKUS, moving closer to the EU and redoubling efforts to reduce strategic vulnerabilities to authoritarian states. However, due to security concerns and the growing realisation of the PRC’s strategic intentions, the EU, for instance, has increasingly aligned itself with the administration of Donald Trump, President of the US, on the PRC. It has also sharply escalated its criticism, not just of Beijing’s support for Russia, but also of trade frictions and broader geopolitical concerns.
This may signal a growing strategic gap on the PRC between Britain and its closest allies. The explicit nature of Wang’s comment makes it even harder to manage the gap and continuing to bet on the PRC as the economic lifeline for the UK.
PhD Candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science
The implications of Wang Yi’s reported statement for UK-PRC relations will depend on how it is interpreted in Westminster. While some observers have understood the statement to indicate that Beijing desires a Russian victory, Wang’s emphasis was on Russia not losing. If, as reported, Beijing’s preference for the conflict’s outcome is driven by a desire for American resources to be tied up in Europe, there are reasons to question whether Beijing would welcome Russia coming out on top in Ukraine. The Trump administration is evidently interested in reaching a comprehensive settlement on European security with the Kremlin, believing that this would allow it to draw a line under its competition with Russia, reduce its commitment to Europe, and shift resources to the region it cares about most: the Indo-Pacific.
The main sticking point between the US and Russia so far has been the question of how to resolve the situation in Ukraine, but if the conflict were to end – even by a Russian victory – this issue would be taken off of the table. While many Europeans warn that a Russian triumph would lead Moscow to put NATO’s Article 5 to the test, the Trump administration clearly does not view this as a realistic scenario.
While we cannot be sure of the strategic logic behind Beijing’s thinking, the plausibility of the above scenario casts doubt on the idea that the PRC wants to see a Russian victory. Wang’s reported statement merely demonstrates what was already clear – that Beijing does not want to see Russia defeated – and British policymakers will therefore likely see no reason to rethink the UK’s recent cautious efforts to improve its relations with Beijing.
Freelance Security and Defence Consultant
Wang Yi’s statement pulls the PRC’s ambitions for not only Taiwan, but also the entire South China Sea, into imminent perspective. Although it has been hitherto rare for Beijing to make such strikingly partisan statements, the tide of neutrality has ebbed. The dynamics of international normativity shift, and any consensus on the rules-based international order deteriorates.
The PRC’s military behaviour is changing, but its underlying ethos is not. The steady thread of Chinese foreign policy is, and will continue to be, preservation of the PRC. Supplying Russia with defensive support – however material – is not done out of a sense of camaraderie, but rather due to a degree of existential concern. As stated, the motivation for Beijing’s current posture considers the warming contest with the US more than a sworn ideological position on Ukraine.
However, that does not dismiss the troubling implications of the PRC’s now-stated stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Even if Beijing’s motivations are not driven by an ideological stance, it enters a space of a wanton disregard for the international peace and stability upon which the PRC itself relies. There is a slight unpredictability to the Chinese military projection, as perceived threats are difficult to measure. Although Beijing’s core interests are in the Indo-Pacific, its wider interests lie in a shifting global order. Combined with the PRC’s disregard for established sanctions regimes, direct and indirect support to the Houthis in the Red Sea, and aggressive multifaceted espionage campaigns across Europe, Beijing aligns with an axis diametrically opposed to British interests.
After years of courting Moscow, Beijing’s intentions cannot be viewed as unexpected. What changes, however, and what the UK must navigate, is a regional alteration in a de facto balance of power, as well as new developments in proxy warfare. The PRC has gauged that its activity will be rewarding. Britain cannot influence this presumption through force. It can, however, maintain an informed relationship with the PRC, and get better at speaking Beijing’s language.
Grace Theodoulou – Policy Fellow, China Observatory
Email: grace@geostrategy.org.uk
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No any official document or declaration from any parts involved during Kallas-WngYi conversation. Read fully the SCMP article and you will find the baseless point. Such a long elucubration build upon nothing.