The Thinker | No. 01/2026
On 20th January, His Majesty’s (HM) Government is due to reveal whether it will permit the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build a new embassy on the site of the old Royal Mint. The deadline for the decision has been postponed three times. The issue has ignited heated – and at times emotional – debate.
This is understandable but, in countering the undeniable threat which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses to the United Kingdom (UK) and like-minded free and open nations, it is important to focus on the areas of real threat and not be distracted by an issue where the arguments for blocking Chinese intentions are not as strong as some portray.
The case against a new embassy on the Royal Mint site
Over the last year, press reports – and in particular a recent media ‘scoop’ and campaign – have highlighted the following issues:
Sensitive communications cables run within one metre of the perimeter. The security services ‘may not have been party to all the information, and ‘even the Secret Intelligence Service [SIS/MI6] appears to have blinked, reportedly conceding that a colossal spy base is the lesser of two evils.’ It is worth noting that SIS is not the agency responsible; rather that falls to the Security Service and its Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, and to Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and its National Cyber Security Centre.
It will be the biggest embassy in Europe, ‘a 5.5 acre [22,000 square metre] panopticon featuring more than 230 on-site flats for diplomatic personnel’, raising the question of ‘why would you need people living there overnight, unless they were up to no good?’.
‘Unredacted plans’ reveal 208 ‘secret underground rooms’, ‘clearly a national grade intelligence collection operation’, while a hidden chamber 40 metres long will be furnished with large extractor fans, indicating cyber attack facilities. The PRC intends to knock down an original underground wall and build a new one closer to the sensitive cables. ‘Large sections of the internal blueprints remain entirely shielded from scrutiny. When the UK Secretary of State asked for these rooms to be explained, China flatly refused.’
‘A huge spy bunker in the heart of London’, containing ‘an extra 200 spies in that embassy’.
The embassy will contain ‘clandestine detention facilities’, in which Hong Kong dissidents and others perceived as enemies of the PRC may be detained.
Embassy security measures may affect the quality of living of nearby residents. Future protests outside the site may cause disruption and public order issues for the police.
Difficulty of access to historic sites. Access to the site of a 14th century abbey will require Chinese permission. The site is also close to the historic Tower of London, creating a blot on a much-visited national monument and tourist attraction.
‘Seeking truth from facts’ – and probabilities
The cables are around one metre from the site. The Royal Mint telephone exchange is also adjacent. The precise nature of the communications passing through is not disclosed publicly for obvious reasons. The cables themselves are part of a large web; they are by no means the only carriers of communications to and from the City of London.
Sensitive traffic will be encrypted. The security service will know the extent of protection afforded by encryption and will understand the flows of data through different parts of London, and the extent to which that allows them to control risks of spying and sabotage. However, sabotage is highly unlikely, unless relations reach a pitch of considerable hostility, and then action would be easily attributable.
If their view is that they cannot manage the risks, then HM Government’s decision is easy: no Chinese embassy on the site. The security services will certainly have reported accurately on this. For a government whose most senior ministers continually reiterate that national security is their top concern, it would be a gross dereliction of duty to ignore the recommendations of the security services. It is also foolish, given the likelihood of a leak.
The size of the embassy is not as astonishing as portrayed. Currently, the PRC has six sites in London (chancery, commercial, education, culture, consular, and science and technology sections). Bringing those together on one site requires considerable space, but probably less than the total area currently occupied by their six buildings. Britain has perhaps 200 employees in its Beijing embassy (although the author last served there in 2017, so this estimate may be out of date and on the low side). That the PRC, as a bigger power, has more in London is not surprising.
Furthermore, whereas large numbers of those in the British embassy in Beijing are locally engaged Chinese citizens, the PRC’s embassies contain no local British staff. Security, ancillary staff, cooks, handymen and more come from the PRC. Finally, because they fear the ‘hostile special forces’ in many foreign capitals and like to control their own personnel tightly, the Chinese authorities want their staff to live on site. Thus, comparisons with the size of the United States (US) embassy, whose staff rent accommodation throughout London, or with Chinese embassies in other European capitals, are not apposite. No doubt if the PRC were to consolidate its buildings in Berlin, Paris or Rome onto one site, it would require a similarly sized footprint to that of the Royal Mint.
Secret underground rooms are common to many British houses. Their owners call them ‘cellars’ or ‘basements’. Those at the Royal Mint are hardly secret: they have been there since 1810, presumably to store minted coins. ‘Unredacted plans’ sounds worrying, but plans of a building over two centuries old have presumably always been available.
It is normal for embassies to keep to themselves how they use their space. The British, Americans and others are not open with host countries about where and how they locate their communications, defence sections, intelligence officers, and sensitive functions and equipment. The insistence that the Chinese bare all on plans is unrealistic. Meanwhile, it should not come as a surprise that large computer suites and extractor fans are put in the basement: it is a big embassy, requiring commensurate facilities. These are usually kept underground where it is cooler.
The new underground wall reported to be under consideration by the PRC is likely to be defensive in purpose. It is standard practice for all nations to protect their embassy computer and communication suites from external attacks.
Talk of the embassy as a spy centre is exaggerated. While there will be Ministry of State Security (MSS) and military intelligence officers in the embassy – many countries post intelligence officers to their embassies – modern technology and surveillance capabilities militate against recruiting and running agents from an embassy. MSS officers in the embassy will be feeding back information about potential targets, but recruitment and running of agents take place most often in third countries, away from the eyes of the security services of the target’s home nation.
Recent attacks on Parliament bear this out: Christine Lee, the Cash/Berry affair and the recent Linked-In recruitment attempts have not involved the Chinese embassy. Abroad, arrested Chinese spies have also not operated from an embassy.
It makes little sense to use the embassy for transnational repression and detention facilities. As with espionage, were the PRC to kidnap dissidents – something it has not done on UK soil since 1898, when the Qing dynasty attempted to render Dr Sun Yat-sen to China – incarcerating them in the embassy would make little sense. It would become a centre of protest, unlike a safehouse well away from attention.
Embassy security may cause disruption. The site is situated on a busy and important intersection; not ideal for policing protests. Policing may require more resources than at the current embassy site. HM Government has taken the view that policing issues and the inconvenience to local residents are not sufficient reasons to ban the embassy. Whether that is a correct call will emerge if, and after, it begins operation.
Access to the historic site of the abbey has been described as ‘the most horrific part’. This seems exaggerated. Few welcome the idea of controlled access to part of Britain’s historical legacy; few will enjoy the sight of a big embassy across the street from the Tower of London. But this hardly seems sufficient reason for turning down the application.
HM Government’s approval of the embassy plans is likely to provoke a judicial review. This may hold up the building work for a year or more.
The UK’s allies have expressed concerns. However, some of their legislators and others who have spoken up will not have been fully informed. In particular, it is inconceivable that the relevant American security authorities have not been advised of measures to reroute cables or otherwise protect communications.
Buildings and sites do not spy, bully or interfere, but people do
The main issue is the security of communications. If cables can be rerouted and otherwise protected, arguments for withholding permission for the new embassy to go ahead are weak.
This does not mean that HM Government should be complacent about the threat posed by the CCP, or should not take strong measures to stop espionage, transnational repression and bullying on Britain’s streets, as well as other forms of interference. It has the power to control the number of Chinese staff – a power granted by the Vienna Convention – which also confirms the power to request that individuals are withdrawn.
This appears to have happened in the case of six Chinese officials from the Manchester consulate, who were quietly withdrawn after the embassy was called in to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Except in the case of flagrant espionage or serious criminal behaviour, all governments prefer not to declare someone ‘persona non grata’, but rather to make it clear that relations would be strained unless the offender is withdrawn.
HM Government has a difficult task in its relations with the PRC. It must reconcile four often contradictory factors: national security, economic prosperity, climate change objectives, and public and parliamentary opinion. Its handling of the new embassy has been less than adroit, particularly the announcement of repeated delays on a decision (it is not clear why, but it may well be because the PRC has linked its new embassy to the rebuilding of the British embassy in Beijing, and reaching agreement has been difficult).
But on this issue, the current government was not dealt an easy hand. In 2018, Boris Johnson, then Foreign Secretary, agreed to the PRC buying the Royal Mint site for conversion into a new embassy. Whether he fully consulted the relevant experts and came to a considered view before he made that decision is beyond the scope of this article.
Charles Parton OBE is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy.
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