Taiwan faces Jaws-like encirclement from PLA
…And Vietnam cosies up to CCP; Labour stumbles towards a PRC strategy
Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.
It was like a creepy Valentine’s Day card from an obsessive stalker, dripping with saccharine menace. ‘Hey, sweetheart. This patrol is in the shape of my love for you’, the Chinese Coast Guard (CGC) scoffed on Monday as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew a record number of fighter jets and other warplanes around Taiwan. The goading words accompanied an edited photograph showing a line of red arrows in the shape of a heart encircling the island. Read our Taiwan Take section at the bottom of the newsletter for analysis.
In other less bizarre but no less serious developments since our last newsletter, the PLA incursions in the South China Sea are, by now, almost weekly occurrences. Such sabre-rattling, however, has not stopped Vietnam from forging closer ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), despite being a victim of the PLA’s maritime aggression.
In yesterday’s session of Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, stalled when asked about why his government ‘halted’ the foreign influence registration scheme which would monitor PRC influence in United Kingdom (UK) state affairs.
Welcome back to Observing China.
1.1 PRC sanctions Robert Tsao, Taiwanese tech billionaire for ‘pro-independence’ views
The PRC have sanctioned Robert Tsao, a 77-year-old tech billionaire, who founded one of Taiwan’s largest chip-makers, for his support of Taiwanese independence. His name is now on the list of ‘die-hard separatists’: The Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC – responsible for Beijing’s implementation of cross-strait relations – launched a website in August with a list of named separatists, encouraging citizens to report anyone they thought to be a ‘threat to national security.’ Authorities detained some of the Taiwanese individuals listed on the website, many of whom live in the PRC. Scholars believe prosecutions are sure to follow, in what the PRC hopes to be an emulation of the Hong Kong national security laws it has imposed.
1.2 Vietnam and the PRC sign additional ten deals on critical infrastructure and trade
On 13th October, Li Qiang, Chinese Premier, visited Vietnam, where the two countries signed ten deals in addition to the fourteen we mentioned in our August newsletter. They include commitments to bolster defence and security, as well as a new multi-billion dollar railway link to connect Vietnam and the PRC.
Talks of ambitious railway projects were ongoing for years, but often hampered by tensions over territorial disagreements in the South China Sea. The concern is that Vietnam will not be as outspoken over the actions of its belligerent neighbour for fear of jeopardising the deepening economic ties we have seen over the last few months.
On 6th October, a terrorist attack killed two Chinese citizens in Pakistan, carried out by the Balochistan Liberation Army who oppose the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) developing projects in the Balochistan region of Pakistan.
On 15th and 16th October, Islamabad hosted this year’s summit for the SCO, which is a CCP-led economic and security organisation positioned as a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The SCO was founded by the PRC and Russia, and most of its members are heavily aligned with Moscow in particular. Iran and Belarus are the latest countries to have joined.
1.4 Philippines doubts PRC’s sincerity to adhere to a maritime code of conduct
Your weekly South China Sea update: Following the Philippines spearheading the request for a code of conduct to be established in the disputed waters at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit last week, the PRC has agreed to enter discussions. But Gilberto Teodoro, Defence Minister of the Philippines, is unconvinced that Beijing will heed its agreement.
1.5 PRC cyber association throws oil onto the chip fire
Citing national security concerns, the Cybersecurity Association of China (CSAC) claims that certain chips made by Intel currently being sold in the PRC are defective and should be placed under review, and potentially recalled from the market. Intel’s shares dropped following the accusation. The claim comes as the United States (US) tries to restrict the PRC’s access to crucial chip-making equipment and components. Both sides say they want to avoid a tit-for-tat trade war, but perhaps that chip has sailed…
1.6 Former central bank governor of the PRC receives suspended death sentence
Fan Yifei, former Deputy Governor to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), is the latest government official to be caught up in the anti-corruption drive of Xi Jinping, Secretary General of the CCP. ‘Hunting tigers and swatting flies’ [(打虎拍蝇]) is the phrase used by Xi in his commitment to weed out corrupt CCP officials, from small provincial players to high-level figures. But many question the veracity of certain cases of alleged corruption and wonder if instead it is used as a pretext to remove anyone who does not subscribe to Xi’s vision, or who could also be a threat to his position.
2.1 A new report by Civitas speaks to the prominent issue outlined in this newsletter, namely the UK’s need to develop a coherent policy towards the PRC. Charles Parton, OBE, Dr Kevin Rowlands and Gray Sergeant, our experts and associate fellows, each contributed to the essay collection, alongside senior figures across the political and academic spectrum.
2.2 This report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies analyses the enforceability of the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law. It is a critical part of domestic legislation which provides a legal basis for military intervention to achieve Taiwanese reunification. This legislation was also cited by the Supreme Court of the PRC in their launch of the website with the public shaming of ‘die-hard separatists’ (see: 1.1, above).
2.3 Turqoise Roof analyses the important but often overlooked issue of the PRC’s ‘forceful diplomacy’. This report explains how and why the PRC has annexed approximately 2% of Bhutan’s territory to construct entire villages, where the CCP has sent thousands of people to settle them.
According to insider reports, HM Government will not support the visit of Tsai Ing-Wen, former President of Taiwan, who had been invited to speak in parliament later this month. David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, is believed to have made this decision for fear of upsetting the CCP ahead of his visit to the PRC later this week.
Such kowtowing to CCP wishes is inconsistent with Labour’s claims earlier this year that it will maintain a ‘clear-eyed approach’ to its dealings with the PRC (a phrase which referred to the CCP’s human rights abuses and territorial claims).
Can we trust HM Government to heed its promise to ‘challenge’ the PRC where necessary when it makes a noticeable effort to preempt any criticism from the CCP?
Among other European countries, Tsai will visit Belgium and France in the same tour – which makes HM Government’s seeming lack of support for democracy all the more evident.
3.2 UK Trade Minister calls for more trade engagement with the PRC
Speaking on the sidelines of HM Government’s International Investment Summit, Jonathan Reynolds, Secretary of State for Business and Trade, said the UK must do more to boost its trade and economic ties with the PRC. While Reynolds decried the previous Conservative leadership for scaling back engagement with the PRC, he failed to explain how he would boost trade ties without undermining the previous government’s efforts to prevent the national security risks posed by the CCP.
3.3 PRC spends billions of dollars every year to promote state propaganda
Last week, the head of the Security Service (MI5) confirmed that the CCP conducts cyber attacks to steal data from thousands of individuals in the UK. This week, Tim Davie, Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), announced that the CCP is investing billions of dollars in foreign media to push their state propaganda.
4.1 Modernisation of the PRC is ‘improving the lives of millions’ globally
The CCP often claims, as in this piece, that its ongoing quest for modernisation benefits citizens worldwide through programmes such as the BRI. In particular, it likes to present itself as a benefactor to developing countries. But local people in the countries where BRI projects are underway consistently speak of the absence of any trickle-down effect – as in the case of Pakistan, for example (see: 1.3 of Observing China).
Many of the CCP’s global projects take place in countries with high levels of government corruption – meaning the average person rarely sees any benefit.
4.2 Patriotism ‘deeply infused in the blood of the Chinese nation’
An article in the latest edition of Qiushi Theory, the official theoretical journal of the CCP, emphasises the ‘need to sow the seeds of patriotism in the heart of the Chinese youth.’ The article says that the Chinese youth must follow the CCP’s guidance and ‘get ready to build a powerful China.’
These fervent words are no doubt intended to rouse a youth increasingly disillusioned with the ‘Chinese dream’. The CCP has outright lied about the country’s poor economic growth, but younger Chinese people feel the reality of the situation. Record youth unemployment has forced many young people to flock to the countryside to work in menial agricultural jobs – will these Qiushi Theory cliches succeed in reeling them back into the unpromising rat race?
Gray Sergeant, Research Fellow in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy, writes:
On Monday, Beijing launched military exercises, dubbed Joint Sword 2024B, around Taiwan as a warning against ‘separatist acts’. The moves followed the National Day address of Lai Ching-te, President of Taiwan. No surprises here (see: the Observing China from 10th October).
Lai’s speech contained nothing new. Richard Bush, former chair of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) described it as ‘moderate.’ Seemingly, this matters little in Beijing.
Joint Sword 2024B was shorter than previous drills and was not operationally innovative. Live-fire exercises and no-fly zones were also not announced. Yet, the exercises are still notable.
Taipei reported that a record number of military aircraft took part in these drills, 153 in the space of one day. This was alongside maritime activity aimed at demonstrating the PLA’s ability to, amongst other things, blockade key Taiwanese ports. CCG ships also entered Taiwan-controlled ‘restricted waters’ around the Matsu Islands and conducted so-called ‘law enforcement inspections’ in the waters around Taiwan.
Also of significance is the location of the drill zones. These zones, which the PLA mapped out, were closer to Taiwan than in previous exercises. And for the first time, all encroached into Taiwan’s 24-mile contiguous zone. Twenty-five of the 36 Chinese naval and coastguard vessels involved, it is reported, sailed to the edge of Taiwan’s contiguous zone (24 nautical miles off its coast). This follows years of PLA salami slicing in which the PLA has edged closer and closer towards the main island.
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has expressed its concern. In doing so, it reaffirmed HM Government’s ‘clear interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait’ and underlined the areas ‘critical importance to global prosperity.’ HM Government does ‘not support any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.’
This is welcome. Let us hope that, while in Beijing, the foreign secretary will take the opportunity to be equally clear (and, perhaps, a little more robust) with his Chinese counterparts.
The next week, once Lammy completes his visit to the PRC, will be critical for us to see how the new Labour government sets the tone for its dealings with Beijing. Will the foreign secretary raise the sensitive human rights topics he has promised to? So far, the leading figures of the Labour government have ping-ponged from saying they will challenge the PRC, to giving into its demands and promising closer ties amid national security threats. Which will it be?
Subscribe to Observing China to find out.
Grace Theodoulou – Policy Fellow, China Observatory
Email: grace@geostrategy.org.uk
If you would like to explore any of the Council on Geostrategy’s PRC-focused research papers, click here to visit the China Observatory.