David Lammy pledges peace and prosperity with the PRC
…while Xi extols the joys of ‘profound friendship’ with Putin
Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.
If you blinked you may have missed it, but David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, completed his first visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) last week. One of the key purposes of the visit was purportedly to urge Beijing to stop its political and economic support of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
However, only a few days later, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was in Russia for this year’s BRICS summit where he announced the desire for even more cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. It does not take a great expert in geopolitics to realise that Lammy’s urging was disregarded unceremoniously.
Though BRICS as an organisation is often over-hyped – it will not be replacing the United States (US) dollar any time soon – the fact that this year’s meeting was so well attended highlights the success the PRC and Russia have had among the so-called ‘middle ground’ countries. The summit, coming so soon after announcements of North Korean troops in Russia and US sanctions on Chinese firms directly aiding Russia’s war effort, proves that cooperation among the CRINK is a growing challenge.
Welcome back to Observing China!
1.1 Xi in Moscow for the BRICS summit
Attendance for this year’s BRICS summit was high following the expansion of the group in 2023. Leaders from 36 countries were in attendance, highlighting how the leading democracies have had limited success so far in truly isolating Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, from the rest of the world. Xi praised the ‘profound’ friendship between the two countries and Putin said he wanted to strengthen ties with the PRC, claiming ‘we intend to further increase coordination…to ensure global security and a just world order.’ Given the recent behaviours of both Russia and the PRC, this clearly translates into ‘we want to be able to bully our neighbours because we think we are stronger than them and we will find ways to help each other do that.’
1.2 Deal reached between the PRC and India on disputed border
India and the PRC have long clashed over disputed borders in the Himalayas, particularly since the 1962 Chinese-Indian War (a reminder for any who claim that ‘the PRC would never invade its neighbours’). Long standing arrangements for patrolling etiquette in the disputed areas had avoided major clashes since the 1970s, but tensions flared up again in 2020. This deal established fresh patrolling arrangements to ‘lead to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020’ according to Vikram Misri, Foreign Secretary of India. That the deal came shortly before the BRICS summit is no coincidence and does little to hide the divisions within BRICS.
1.3 PRC continues military exercises around Taiwan with live fire drills
Following on from the provocative military exercises held last week – which saw a record number of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military aircraft operating in the vicinity of Taiwan – the PRC has conducted a fresh set of exercises. Location was the key factor in these live fire drills as the exercise took place in and around Niushan island, just south of the Taiwanese controlled Matsu Islands. The Ministry of National Defence of Taiwan described these exercises as routine, but it is a clear reminder for the Taiwanese that the PRC is building up its military strength across multiple domains with which it could threaten unification by force.
1.4 PRC’s economic model no longer works, says International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF, said that the PRC faces ‘dangerously slower growth’ if it continues to rely on an export driven growth model rather than a consumer driven model. Recent attempts by Beijing to support exports have led to multiple trading partners, most significantly the US and the European Union (EU), to put up tariffs on many Chinese products. The PRC seems to be stuck between a rock and a hard place: stimulus efforts to bolster domestic consumer confidence are having little impact despite the great cost. There is also the impending cliff of demographic collapse, with the working age population of the PRC set to decline rapidly over the next two decades.
1.5 PRC warships visit Vanuatu
Two large People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, a Type 55 class cruiser and a Type 52D class destroyer, paid a port visit to the island nation of Vanuatu in the South Pacific. The Type 55 class cruiser is the largest of the PLAN’s guided missile warships and this was the first known visit by such a vessel to this region of the Pacific Ocean. Beijing has long aimed to build ties with South Pacific nations, in particular Vanuatu, which lies in between Hawaii and Australia. Though the visit was a ‘technical stop’ for fuel, water and food supplies, it serves as a reminder of the growing reach of the PRC’s naval fleet.
1.6 First US sanctions for a Chinese firm for supporting Russian war effort
The US has sanctioned two drone manufacturers based in the PRC. Chinese support for Russia through dual-use supplies has been a long-running problem, but these firms had crossed over that line. The two sanctioned firms had been supplying complete Garpiya long-range combat drones to Russia. The US has previously imposed sanctions on PRC entities providing critical inputs to Russia’s war machine, but these latest sanctions are the first imposed on (Chinese) entities directly developing and producing complete weapons systems for Russia.
2.1 Ahmed Aboudouh (Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House) has explored what Egypt’s recent decision to purchase the PRC’s J-10 fighter jet to replace its ageing fleet of US F-16 fighter jets means. Aboudah suggests that Egypt is looking to return to the ‘Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing’ to ensure it can get its military needs. Something the PRC was only too happy to help Cairo achieve. The move has also bolstered the prestige of the PRC’s military firms in the eyes of other customers potentially looking to do the same.
2.2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies has released a report on ‘Evaluating Current Arms-control Proposals: Perspectives from the US, Russia and China.’ The report explores the possibilities and potential pitfalls of a suite of arms-control and risk-reduction proposals between the US and Russia and the US and the PRC, and assesses the potential contributions of these proposals to regional and global stability.
2.3 UK-China Transparency has published data on leading staff from UK universities visiting the PRC in the last 18 months gathered through a Freedom of Information Request.
3.1 Foreign Secretary completes a two-day trip to the PRC
Lammy undertook his first visit to the PRC since Labour came to power. The readout from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) stated that the ‘UK is taking a consistent, strategic and pragmatic approach to China which prioritises the UK national interest’ and that the ‘Foreign Secretary will urge China to stop its political and economic support of the Russian war effort.’
As outlined in Lammy’s ‘Progressive Realism’ essay for Foreign Affairs shortly before the election, the readout stated that the UK approach was of ‘cooperating where we can, competing where we need to, and challenging where we must.’
That only two days after Lammy left the PRC, Xi was in Russia talking about how the two countries could deepen support for each other implies that Lammy must not have been persuasive in his urging.
It is also hard to see how pragmatic this visit was while His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s new ‘China audit’ (due to be published next year) is still underway. Surely it is better to wait for the outcome of the audit before trying to re-engage?
3.2 UK Minister for the Indo-Pacific, speaks at the South China Sea Conference
Taking place in Vietnam this year, Catherine West, Minister for the Indo-Pacific, reaffirmed the new Labour government’s strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific. West positioned ‘global maritime security’ as the premier topic of her speech, followed by climate change and finally, technology and economic growth. She reassured listeners of HM Government’s commitment to the British role in the region and in particular highlighted the hard work being conducted by the Royal Navy’s Offshore Patrol Vessels: HMS Tamar and HMS Spey.
3.3 UK participates in joint statement on human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet
H.E. James Larsen, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations (UN), delivered a statement on behalf of 15 nations, including the UK. The joint statement raised serious concerns about the PRC’s human rights violations in the regions of Xinjiang and Tibet and urged the PRC to ‘uphold the international human rights obligations that it has voluntarily assumed.’ The statement called on the PRC to create transparency by allowing ‘unfettered and meaningful access to Xinjiang and Tibet for independent observers.’
Welcome though these statements are, for as long as nations put economic interest above taking meaningful action to put pressure on the PRC, not much is likely to change for those suffering under CCP oppression.
4.1 Lammy pledges to work with the PRC towards ‘world peace and prosperity’
A statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC on 18th October pictured the meeting between Lammy and Ding Xuexiang, Vice Premier of the PRC, sitting in front of a grand artwork featuring the Great Wall of China. According to the statement, the words of the two senior figures seem to echo each other:
会见拉米时,丁薛祥表示,中英都是联合国安理会常任理事国和世界主要经济体,双方利益深度交融。习近平主席不久前同斯塔默首相通话,就增进中英各领域交往合作达成重要共识,为推动双边关系发展指明了方向。中方愿同英方一道,着眼战略和长远,发展稳定互惠的中英关系,推动各领域务实合作提质升级,更好造福两国和两国人民,为世界和平与繁荣注入更大动能。
拉米表示,英国新政府愿同中方加强建设性对话,坦诚交流,深化各领域合作,发展连贯的、相互尊重的双边关系,携手应对全球性挑战。
[During his meeting with Lammy, Ding Xuexiang expressed that as two permanent members of the UN Security Council, and two great global economies, the interests of the UK and China are deeply intertwined. During General Secretary Xi Jinping recent phone call with Prime Minister Keir Starmer, an important consensus was reached on enhancing exchanges and cooperation between China and the UK in various fields, thus guiding bilateral relations in the direction of further development. China hopes to work with the UK to develop stable and mutually beneficial bilateral ties based on a strategic, long-term perspective. China hopes that these ties will elevate practical cooperation in various fields which will bring benefit to both countries and their peoples, and therefore contribute to world peace and prosperity.
Lammy said that the new British government hopes to reinforce constructive dialogue and frank exchanges with China. Through this, Britain hopes to deepen cooperation in various fields, develop a coherent and mutually respectful bilateral relationship, and work together to meet global challenges.]
In this context, Lammy’s words are bold. Because if there is one thing we have learned from other democratic leaders about holding conversations with the CCP, it is that they cannot be frank. If one dares mention sensitive topics such as the PRC’s dismal human rights record, or the intention to use military force against Taiwan, the exchange is shut down before it can become a conversation. Alternatively, it is met with accusations of hypocrisy or slander. So Lammy is to be congratulated for holding the CCP to account.
Gray Sergeant, Research Fellow in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy, writes:
Last week, reports emerged that parliamentary plans to host Tsai Ing-wen, the former Taiwanese president, this month were postponed after the FCDO sent a note.
According to one person involved in holding the event, the message asked for the visit to be delayed until after the foreign secretary’s ‘goodwill’ trip to the PRC.
There may well be more to the story than this, but it is hard to see, whatever might have happened, this situation being anything but regrettable.
It is not the FCDO’s place to discourage parliamentary engagement with Taiwan (at the same time, nor should Whitehall be expected to encourage it). The line between government and parliamentary business should not be blurred. For one thing, this can only encourage what officials appear to fear: Beijing crying foul and punishing the UK for the actions of its parliamentarians.
It is difficult to know if Chinese Communist Party officials are unable to comprehend a pluralistic political system where politicians do not simply obey top-down commands. Or if they, in fact, do understand how parliamentary democracies work, but simply choose to use such incidents to hold bilateral relations hostage.
Regardless, should, in the future, PRC diplomats kick up a fuss about interactions between British parliamentarians and Taiwan, they should simply be told that it is not the FCDO’s business to tell parliamentarians who they should host or, indeed, where they should visit (the Chinese Embassy in London’s opposition to parliamentary trips to Taipei is well known).
As said, regrettable. But is this incident a sign of British softening on Taiwan?
This seems like a stretch. HM Government’s core positions remain unchanged. As noted in last week’s newsletter (see Observing China from 17th October), the UK was quick to express concern about recent PLA drills around Taiwan and call, as they have done in the past, for cross-strait differences to be settled ‘without the threat or use of force or coercion.’
Discussions between Lammy and Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart, however, seem more consequential. According to Xinhua, Lammy, while in Beijing, said: ‘The UK remains steadfast in honouring its commitment on the Taiwan question since the establishment of diplomatic relations and will stick to it in the long term.’ The implications of this are unclear, but suspicions cannot help but be raised given Taiwan’s omission from the British readout of the very same conversation.
Lammy paid a ‘goodwill visit’ to the PRC and exchanged pleasantries with his Chinese counterparts. To give him his due, he mentioned some of the thorny issues he had promised to. But will Labour learn that in trying to keep everyone happy, it is unlikely to inspire confidence that it will hold the PRC accountable?
It has become clear that the PRC ignores all censure of its role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The ‘goodwill’ spirit is never reciprocated.
How will the promises of new friendships and the continued collaboration between Russia and the CCP affect the UK’s strategy and image in the PRC?
Read next week’s Observing China to find out.
Grace Theodoulou – Policy Fellow, China Observatory
Email: grace@geostrategy.org.uk
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