China’s National People’s Congress 2025: Putting the politics into perspective
What will be Beijing’s policy focus points for 2025?
The Investigator | No. 11/2025
This ‘Investigator’ looks at political aspects of the ‘Two Sessions’, the annual plenary meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), held between 4th-11th March this year. This piece follows on from George Magnus’ ‘Investigator’, which looked at the economic focus of the ‘Two Sessions’.
Some commentators have described the ‘Two Sessions’ as the equivalent of a typical parliament found in a democracy, and one of the most important political meetings of the year. The first statement is misleading, the second untrue.
The role of the ‘Two Sessions’ is fivefold:
To boost national morale by laying out the achievements of the previous 12 months;
To reinforce instructions on important issues and policies for the coming year;
To allow the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to consult widely and take the temperature of the party and people;
To confirm and pass important legislation; and
To promote the image of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its policies to the world.
It is not a parliament. True parliaments debate, argue, alter and decide. In the PRC, policy making and politicking happen elsewhere; in CCP meetings. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, has increased Leninist control, rendering the divide between party and government almost meaningless. Important decisions are taken in Politburo Standing Committee and Politburo meetings, and ratified at party meetings such as congresses, plenums and the annual Central Economic Work Conference. Li Qiang, Premier of the PRC, made it clear in the Government Work Report (GWR) where policy is decided:
‘In particular, we took firm actions to implement a package of new policies that was decided on by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at a meeting on September 26.’
That the ‘Two Sessions’ is less important to the party under Xi is evident from its reduced length. Until 2019, it lasted 13-14 days. Since 2020, it has been seven to eight days. In years following a party congress, two days are added for voting on (pre-decided) government arrangements.
The past and the present: similarities and differences
There are three main work reports: the GWR, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) report, and the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF) budget report. Three other reports are also delivered at the NPC: those of the Supreme People’s Procurate, the Supreme People’s Court and the NPC Standing Committee. These reports follow a set form. Many elements are ‘cut and paste’ from the past. But, across the decade of 2015-2025, the similarities, differences and order of topics are interesting for an indication of priorities (although length constraints prevent a complete comparison).
Some interesting similarities
On support for the private sector, in his GWR, Premier Li said that:
The non-public sector is an important component of the PRC’s economy. We will remain firmly committed to encouraging, supporting and guiding the development of this sector, work to enable entrepreneurs to give full expression to their talent, put into effect all policies and measures encouraging the development of the private sector…
He spoke of cutting through the administrative interference and other hindrances to their development suffered by private companies. But the extract comes from the GWR of Li Keqiang, former Premier of the PRC, in 2015. Similar promises from this year, from Li Qiang, the current premier, largely repeat what the party has failed to implement over the last ten years.
Furthermore, this repetition underlines a consistent truth: the CCP cannot allow the private sector a significant degree of independence, no matter what Xi has been saying recently – ‘I have always supported the private economy’ was the title of an article expressing his words in the People’s Daily, the official CCP newspaper, published the day before the ‘Two Sessions’. But a Leninist system must control the economic levers, because following in the tracks of wealth come demands for representation (‘no taxation without representation’). Hence, five years after Li Keqiang’s GWR, Jack Ma of Alibaba and other private company heads were taught a painful lesson. And the private sector, where 70% of innovation occurs, must act in line with Xi’s instructions on innovation and the domination of new technologies. Its freedom is further constrained: in 2017, 73% of private companies had party cells or branches. A subsequent big campaign will have raised that number. Support for the private sector comes with ‘special Chinese characteristics’.
Science and technology (S&T) remains a big theme this year in the section titled ‘Major Tasks for Economic and Social Development’, just as it was in 2015, where it featured at fifth place in the NDRC report. It rose to first place in 2024, and was third this year: priority was given to rectifying economic imbalances, consumption, investment and demand, followed in second place by the promotion of ‘new quality productive forces’ – in other words, science and technology put into practical production.
This emphasis on S&T is one of the two pillars of policy supporting the CCP’s intention of becoming the leading global power. Essential to that aim is dominating the new technologies and the new industries depending on them. But also essential – not least from a national security perspective – is continuing to be the leading manufacturer across the widest possible front of industries. As a leading Chinese economist recently said, even Adam Smith with his free market ideas insisted that Britain should retain the ability to manufacture its own warships. The CCP has taken to heart, and widened the application, of Smith’s wisdom.
Military-civil fusion has long been at the heart of CCP policy. In the 2015 NDRC report, the links were stated plainly: ‘We will advance the development of national defence-related science, technology, and industries by integrating the military and civilian sectors.’
However, unease in free and open countries led to attempts to prevent the transfer of technologies to the PRC which could have military or repressive uses. This in turn has led the CCP to use more opaque language. The equivalent reports from 2024 speak of a need to ‘refine the system and layout of defence-related science, technology, and industries’ and ‘enhance military-civilian coordination on major infrastructure construction, and consolidate and enhance the integration of national strategies and strategic capabilities’. Those of 2025 use the same wording, also speaking of a need to ‘strengthen mutual support between civilian sectors and the military’.
Some interesting differences
Reform was the big theme of the 2015 ‘Two Sessions’, unsurprisingly since the 3rd plenum in 2013 had launched a massive set of reforms of the economic and social model. 87 mentions of reform compare to 44 and 43 in 2024 and 2025 respectively. Neither of the recent ‘Two Sessions’ make any serious attempt to address the most important reforms identified earlier and still not implemented despite deadlines. These include reforms to state-owned enterprises, rural land ownership, the imbalance between local and central government for service provision responsibilities and for sharing revenue, and more.
The one area of reform which is highlighted in the last two years is the construction of a unified national market – an attempt to get around the problems of local protectionism and practices detrimental to economic growth. This reform was foreshadowed in 2015, where plans such as ‘Jing-Jin-Ji’ (Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei) aimed to break down regional barriers. This has been a consistent theme for Xi. In 2015, focus was on ‘Jing-Jin-Ji’ and the economic development belt along the Yangtze River. Now included are the Yangtze River Delta, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and the Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone.
Agriculture and food security have been a concern for the party for decades. In 2015, food security figured only briefly:
‘We will establish a sound system by which provincial governors are accountable for their provinces’ food security. We will make local governments strengthen their grain reserves systems.’
But, in recent years, agriculture and food security have achieved greater prominence. The addition of a section in the NDRC plan on national security sees food security as the first – and therefore most important (the party’s survival in power excepted) – element listed (‘We will consolidate the foundation for food security on all fronts’).
Social governance and the ‘Fengqiao model’ (a Maoist term revived by Xi in 2013 and shorthand for ensuring that localities stamp on potential sparks which might cause prairie fires of protest and unrest) are noticeably absent in the GWR of 2015. But, particularly since protests about banks restricting access to accounts, Covid-19 lockdowns in 2022, and a stuttering economy, stability has been moved to centre stage. ‘Safeguarding national security and social stability’ now appears with its own heading, and the 2025 GWR promised to:
apply and further develop the Fengqiao model for promoting community-level governance in the new era and facilitate well-regulated development of integrated governance centres in local communities.
Yet, while the party may feel more threatened, the increasing powers of technological totalitarianism make it unlikely that it cannot control possible outbreaks of unrest, at least in the foreseeable future.
Foreign affairs do not feature greatly in the reports and meetings of the ‘Two Sessions’. However, Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, held press conferences in 2015 and 2025. Li Keqiang, the former premier, also held a press conference in 2015, during which he answered questions on foreign affairs (a further sign of the downgrading of the importance of the ‘Two Sessions’ is that the current premier, Li Qiang, does not hold press conferences). Comparing press conferences in 2015 and 2025, the contents are similar and largely pro forma. Here is the language on the invasion of Ukraine:
On the issue of Ukraine, China has adopted an objective and just position. We respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We hope that there will be a negotiated settlement of this issue through dialogue…there are complex causes behind this issue…
2015 or 2025? Li Keqiang in 2015. In 2015, when discussing relations with Russia, Wang Yi talked of ‘strong strategic trust between the two sides’, ‘a strong foundation for strengthening strategic cooperation between the two sides’, and a cooperation which has ‘enormous internal impetus and room for expansion’. He promised that the two countries would ‘continue to carry out strategic coordination and cooperation to maintain international peace and security’. Free and open countries cannot complain that they were not warned on how the CCP would react to a second invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Primus inter impares
The age of CCP collective leadership, of the General Secretary as first among equals, is dead. In 2015, it was still necessary to say that the party would ‘take as our guide Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development; and fully implement the guiding principles from General Secretary Xi Jinping’s major speeches.’ Now, adherence to the ‘Two Establishes’ (establish Xi as the core of the Party and establish Xi Jinping Thought as the guide) featured throughout the ‘Two Sessions’ and particularly in party media afterwards, as it drew out the lessons to be studied. Numbers tell the same story. In the GWR of 2015, there were five mentions of Xi; in 2025 this rose to 38. On the last day of the ‘Two Sessions’, delegates vote to approve the reports. The number of those daring to vote against passing the reports has fallen sharply. In 2015, the figures for the government, NDRC and MoF reports were, respectively: 24, 151 and 391. In 2025, they were: 1, 18 and 27. Showing opposition to Xi is not career enhancing.
Looking to the future
The most important task for 2025 is the drawing up of the next Five Year Plan, which will be unveiled at next year’s ‘Two Sessions’. The role of the NPC and CPPCC, of the government ministries and departments, is to provide ideas and materials. But the decisions will be made in party commissions and leading small groups, following guidance from the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, which will also give its final approval to the plan. This is consultation with a small ‘c’ and Leninism with a big ‘L’.
Charles Parton OBE is Chief Advisor to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy.
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