Challenging Beijing’s Co-option of the Global South
A look at how Beijing is gaining support for its ‘national reunification’ with Taiwan by ‘all means necessary’
The Investigator | No. 06/2025
If you picked up a copy of the People’s Daily last September, you would have been reminded of the Congolese government’s ‘firm commitment to the One-China principle’. That is their belief that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or as they would say an ‘inseparable part’. More concerning still was the following text from the reprinted joint statement issued by Brazzaville and Beijing:
‘Congo resolutely opposes any form of ‘Taiwan independence’ and external interference in China’s internal affairs. Congo also reaffirmed that it will not engage in any official exchanges with Taiwan and fully supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification.’
Really, ‘all efforts’? This presumably includes the use of military force then; action which Beijing refuses to rule out and which its military resolutely prepares for. Should the PRC ever choose to cross the strait they will no doubt argue that it does include military force. In fact, it will likely argue that dozens of similar statements do too.
Recently, Pakistan once again backed the PRC taking ‘all’ measures to achieve ‘national reunification’ (adding, no doubt to Beijing's delight, that the authority of United Nations (UN) Resolution 2758 remained unchallengeable).
Congo is not alone. In fact, as The Economist has recently reported, 119 countries have endorsed the ‘One China Principle’, 70 of whom have also backed Beijing using ‘all’ measures to achieve ‘reunification’. This includes virtually all Sub-Saharan Africa.
This is remarkable. Who would have thought so many nations, who regularly rail against imperialism, were so keen to restore the frontiers of the Qing Empire? For that, even if they may not realise it, is exactly what they are supporting.
The PRC has never ruled Taiwan. Aside from vague references to ‘since ancient times’, it is administrative developments under the Manchus which today’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) point to in order to justify their expansionist claims.
Debates about how effective this Qing rule actually was are by the bye, the point is that this should not be the basis for territorial expansion. And one would have thought that all these African nations, who secured their independence within living memory, would agree. After all, as Peng Ming-min, a Taiwanese democracy activist, explained to American audiences while in exile: ‘if historical connection becomes the basis of territorial claims, then England would have a claim upon the people of Massachusetts and Virginia, and Spain could revive claims upon the southwestern regions of the United States (US).’
Yet the number of countries backing Chinese empire-building continues to grow.
Implications
Winning on the narrative fronts gives Beijing’s expansionist goals international legitimacy, which has implications for the development of cross-strait relations and contingencies. As things stand, it is hard to imagine the UN General Assembly condemning a Chinese annexation of Taiwan like they did when Russia invaded Ukraine.
If Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, believes that he does not need to fear a backlash in global opinion against unilateral action, there is one less factor holding him back. If the international community is divided, efforts led by the US to counter an attempted blockade or invasion could be more easily delegitimised. Compliance with sanction efforts, to punish and degrade Beijing’s ability to prosecute its aggressive actions, would be even patchier than current efforts against Moscow. Critical resources could continue to flow into the PRC.
Admittedly, factors such as the regional military balance of power between the PRC and the US will be more determinative. Nevertheless, this is a front to be fought over and one which the United Kingdom (UK) Government could lead on.
Response
Challenging other countries' wholesale adoption of the ‘One China Principle’ seems an arduous, if not an entirely futile, task. Talk of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and transfers of sovereignty (or rather lack thereof) risks becoming esoteric.
Yet the impact of a war over Taiwan should resonate. The likely costs of a conflict for the global economy are well known, including Bloomberg’s eye-watering estimate, a price tag of US$10 trillion (£7.9 trillion).
Sub-Saharan states should know that they would be hit particularly hard if there is disruption in the Taiwan Strait. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the four countries most reliant on this waterway are in Africa. 48% of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s trade goes through the Strait; while for Angola the figure is calculated at 41% and for Gabon and Eritrea it is 44%. The percentage of trade going through the strait for many of their neighbours stands at a smaller, but nevertheless substantial, one tenth.
These countries not only need to be convinced that a cross-strait conflict is not in their interest but be convinced that they have a responsibility to discourage (or at the very least not encourage) such a contingency occurring.
Even if the vast majority of governments in Africa genuinely believe the PRC’s Qing-era claims to be legitimate, they should, nevertheless, be persuaded to make their support for Beijing conditional. For starters, they should be warned against signing up to statements which endorse ‘all’ efforts to secure ‘reunification’. Better still, they should be encouraged to assert that cross-strait differences must be resolved peacefully, preferably publicly, if not then behind closed doors.
Brunei Darussalam’s recent joint statement with the PRC could serve as a model. Despite reiterating that ‘Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC’, Brunei only committed to support: ‘the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the reunification of China.’
Going forward, at the next big bilateral between Britain and a Sub-Saharan African state, His Majesty’s (HM) Government should push for the inclusion of a line covering Taiwan in their joint statement, buried away perhaps in a paragraph underscoring the importance of uninterrupted maritime trade. ‘We reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’ is the UK and other Group of Seven (G7) nations current go to; other variations, to suit both sides, could surely be found.
But where to start? The three countries with Taiwanese representative offices seem like the best bet: Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and South Africa. Although, given the latter’s pernicious efforts to push Taipei out of their capital, Pretoria, goodwill is not guaranteed. To cast the net further, those countries, all 25 of them, who voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 could be pursued.
The prospects for such a pushback may seem dim. Yet the alternative is to stand back and allow territorial conquest to become legitimised. The UK cannot take comfort in internationalising the Taiwan Strait amongst groupings of like-minded nations, as has been achieved with the G7. There is a much bigger fight to be had in the Global South; a fight which, at this moment in time, Beijing is winning hands down.
Gray Sergeant is the Research Fellow in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy.
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