Can China cross the strait?
Analysing the Pentagon's latest assessment of China's capabilities
The Investigator | No. 02/2025
‘Can does not mean will’ is a good starting point when discussing the future of cross-strait relations. It prevents a simplistically straight line being drawn between Xi Jinping’s call for his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027 and an invasion in two years’ time. A leader can wish to have an option without having a definite plan to pursue it. Moreover, even if Xi is confident he ‘can’, that is, have his troops physically land on and occupy Taiwan while defeating any American forces which may intervene, he will still need to ask himself: ‘at what cost?’ The answer to which will remain: ‘at a very high one’.
Still, ‘can’ is important. While Xi remains unconfident, Washington and Taipei can feel more assured that so long as they do not act in a way whereby Beijing can cry ‘provocation’, a crisis is unlikely. When he thinks the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – the PRC’s armed forces – is ready, however, the risk of a premeditated attack increases. So where do we stand?
The United States (US) Department of Defence offers us an authoritative report on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military capabilities on an annual basis. Last year’s review, which covers 2023 into early-2024, says little that is new. Beijing is able to seize Taiwan's small offshore islands, carry out a joint firepower strike, and employ an air and maritime blockade. While an amphibious invasion of the main island, we are once again told, would be ‘one of the most complicated and difficult military operations for the PLA’. One which would ‘likely strain the PRC’s armed forces’. So far, so sanguine…
Indeed, Ely Ratner, who served as assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific security affairs while the report was written, provides further reassurance about Beijing’s ability to execute a ‘short, sharp invasion … at acceptable costs’. ‘They’re trying to get there’, he told an audience of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, ‘but it’s not clear they’re getting any closer than they were over the last couple of years.’
Still, there are developments which should cause concern. On so many fronts the Chinese military is growing, including in its air and naval presence around Taiwan. Beijing’s naval build up including the continued commissioning and launching of amphibious assault ships, which the report highlights in relation to a cross-strait contingency, should also focus minds. Add to this the assessment that: ‘PLA training and exercises increasingly focus on military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait while simultaneously delaying or denying third-party intervention’.
Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal also has implications for developments across the strait. According to the Pentagon, ‘the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024’. Ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with multi-megaton yields, the PLA is predicted to have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.
If Beijing made a move against Taipei, Chinese nuclear forces could serve two key roles. First, they could bolster efforts to deter Washington and its allies from intervening. Second, they could help prevent US nuclear coercion by deterring America from using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland as well as deterring them from resorting to nuclear forces to defeat an invasion.
Finally, another separate section with implications for Taiwan is the one on corruption in the PLA. This is a new addition for these annual reports and is covered in detail as a ‘special topic’ – understandably so! As the report notes, between July and December 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defence industry executives were removed from their posts. This included the mysterious dismissal of Li Shangfu, former Minister of National Defence. And the military purges have only continued…
This development provides some short-term comfort as it suggests that Xi does not have confidence in the upper ranks of the PLA. That is, he does not believe they are fighting ready. At the same time these moves also send a chilling signal. Xi appears determined to create a military which can and will do as he says. And, crucially, a military whose ability to win in a large-scale contingency is not hampered by corruption. If successful, this, like much else in this ‘Taiwan Take’, does not bode well for cross-strait developments in the medium to long term.
Can does not mean will. But Beijing’s intentions cannot be gleaned only from what officials say (nor from what they do not). We need to watch how Xi walks, not just how he talks.
Gray Sergeant is the Research Fellow in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy.
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