Beijing calls Manila a drama queen
PRC and Russia linked by gas pipeline; Pope Francis extends a holy, helping hand to Chinese Catholics
Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.
From increased economic and military cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, to a deepening scrutiny of the relationship between Brussels and Beijing, this week has seen a continuation of the current trends.
But elsewhere, different developments may be brewing; why did Lithuania expel three PRC diplomats?
Welcome back to Observing China.
On 3rd December, Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO, announced an intelligence-sharing plan to the foreign ministers of the military alliance. Rutte states that Russia and the PRC are increasing sabotage attacks on the critical infrastructure of NATO member states. This announcement follows the suspicion that Russia and the PRC cooperated on the severing of undersea data cables last month, although a Finnish Government transport agency stated the severing of the cables appeared to be an accident.
Last year, Finnish investigators linked the cutting of the Balticconnector natural-gas pipeline – which connects Estonia and Finland to mainland Europe – to the PRC and Russia.
1.2 Moscow and Beijing conduct joint nuclear bomber patrols over Japan
On 30th November, Chinese H-6K and Russian Tu-95МS strategic bombers, together with fighter jets, conducted an eight-hour patrol over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and the western Pacific Ocean. Russian aircraft landed and took off from an airfield in the PRC during these exercises.
This is the first time that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has used this model of strategic bomber (the H-6K). In a statement, the PLA said that this model ‘is emblematic of the strategic transformation of the Air Force and is capable of long-range operations.’
A joint statement issued last month by Jakarta and Beijing spoke of plans to develop projects together ‘in the overlapping waters claimed by the two countries’, sparking concerns in the international community that such projects would legitimise some of the PRC territorial claims in the region.
On 2nd December, Prabowo Subianto, President of Indonesia, said no decisive action has been taken on these projects. Analysts believe Indonesia’s agreement with the PRC last month could mark a reversal of its long-held stance as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea.
The translation of Pope Francis’ weekly teachings into Mandarin Chinese are part of his efforts to improve relations between Vatican City and Beijing in order to protect the ten to 12 million Chinese Catholics living in the PRC. Many Chinese Catholics find their beliefs to be incompatible with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology and as a result, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, has significantly cracked down on their religious practices in recent years.
1.5 PRC completes Power-of-Siberia gas pipeline
The 3,175-mile pipeline delivering gas from Siberia to Shanghai has been completed and delivers ten times the amount of natural gas compared to only five years ago. The PRC is now Russia’s top importer of natural gas – sanctions against Russia have seen Moscow divert its resources to Beijing at a considerable discount. The geopolitical implications of this are significant; the reliance on Moscow for cheaper resources, and on Beijing to purchase them, cement the foundations of an increasingly strong bond. While it may appear that the PRC has provided Russia’s oil and gas industry with a lifeline, such a dependence on Beijing is not without its concerns for Moscow.
1.6 European Union (EU) member states want European battery market safeguarded from reliance on the PRC
On 1st December, the European Commission began its new five-year term with a fresh team of representatives from each EU country. In its first 100 days, the new team intends to issue a framework of how the bloc can attain its climate targets while remaining economically competitive. France, Germany and Sweden have made strong requests that the Commission safeguard the European electric vehicle battery production industry and decrease reliance on the PRC.
1.7 CCP authorises the establishment of wholly foreign-owned hospitals in the PRC
The PRC’s National Health Commission (NHC) announced on 29th November that foreign-owned hospitals will be authorised to establish operations in nine cities across the country, in what is part of ‘a concrete action for China to fulfil its commitment to reform and opening up’, according to local sources.
Charles Parton, a PRC expert, explains that for Beijing, ‘opening up’ aims to: ‘meet the PRC’s needs and make good its deficiencies, but foreigners’ past experiences no longer incline them to view this as “win-win”.’ This is particularly true for science and technological development where the PRC still lags behind the United States (US) and the EU.
The requirements for the hospitals stipulate that servers storing medical records and equipment information must be located within the PRC, and must also ‘offer medical technologies and equipment at an internationally leading level’.
1.8 PLA Navy fires water cannons at Philippine maritime patrol in South China Sea
PLA Navy warships and China Coast Guard (CGC) cutters fired water cannons and rammed Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.
Ray Powell, Director of the SeaLight Project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Centre for National Security Innovation, says that the PRC ‘has cast itself as the legitimate law enforcement around Scarborough Shoal and the Philippine vessels as criminal trespassers…this is the steely edge of Beijing’s aggressive lawfare to justify its maritime occupation of key West Philippine Sea features’.
The Philippines is also on high alert after a Russian attack submarine was identified in the country’s exclusive economic zone. Moscow and Beijing carried out live-fire naval exercises in the South China Sea in July.
2.1 A commentary by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies looks at the PRC’s significant diplomatic and economic investment in Latin America in recent years, and how the US should formulate a foreign policy strategy to compete.
2.2 A piece by the International Institute for Strategic Studies analyses the swathe of recent policies that the CCP has introduced in recent months to counter slow economic growth.
3.1 His Majesty’s (HM) Government confident that military base on Chagos Islands will remain secure
Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, believes that his move to secure Diego Garcia – the US and UK military base in the British Indian Ocean Territory – on a 99-year lease will be successful in the upcoming deal to return the archipelago to Mauritius. Reports of doubts have circulated that the incoming administration of Donald Trump, President-elect of the US, will not support the handover to Mauritius, out of security concerns stemming from deep Mauritian-PRC economic ties.
3.2 British enterprises in PRC pessimistic about business conditions for 2025
The annual survey by the British Chamber of Commerce in China has revealed that UK companies operating in the PRC have been impacted by the country’s stagnating economic growth since the Covid-19 pandemic.
4.1 On 29th November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania expelled three members of staff of the PRC’s diplomatic mission on account of ‘activities that violate the Vienna Convention and Lithuanian legislation.’ Bilateral relations have deteriorated since 2021, when Lithuania opened a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, which operates as a de facto embassy for Taiwan.
While the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry gave no more details, the PRC’s ongoing support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may be a possible motivation for the expulsion, given Lithuania’s obvious unease at the notion of Russian expansion. This diplomatic move may also have been triggered by the suspected involvement of the PRC in the severing of an underwater sea cable which linked Sweden and Lithuania.
A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC has said that ‘on issues concerning China’s Taiwan region, Lithuania has been acting in serious violation of the one-China principle’ and hopes that ‘the upcoming new government of Lithuania will follow the prevailing international consensus’.
There is no ‘international consensus’ on Beijing’s one-China principle; most countries’ acknowledgement of the PRC’s claim to Taiwan is ambiguous.
4.2 An opinion piece in the Global Times has dismissed the PLA Navy and CGC’s maritime aggression in the South China Sea (see above 1.8) as nothing more than ‘self-directed drama’ by the Philippines. The piece claims that video footage released by the Philippine Coast Guard was ‘maliciously edited’, and that Manila is acting so egregiously only because of ‘perceived support’ by the US. Washington’s support for Manila is not ‘perceived’; the US recently pledged US$500 million (£393 million) worth of military aid to the Philippines.
Gray Sergeant, Research Fellow in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy, writes:
Last week, Catherine West, Minister for the Indo-Pacific, clearly stated that in the UK’s view Resolution 2758, which seated the PRC at the United Nations (UN) in 1971, ‘made no separate or additional determination on the status of Taiwan and should not therefore be used to preclude Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN or the wider international system’.
West noted ‘a misconception’ around this point (this is, presumably, a diplomatic way of saying that the PRC has deliberately misrepresented the resolution to give credence to its expansionist aims and has attempted to export this distortion). Moreover, she committed HM Government to oppose such efforts to ‘rewrite history’.
Yet, this is not the only attempt of this kind. Following last week’s parliamentary debate, the Chinese Embassy in London called on HM Government to abide by its commitments in the 1972 UK-PRC joint communique in which they claim: ‘the UK government clearly recognised the Chinese government’s position that Taiwan is a province of China’.
This is not the first time PRC representatives in the UK have pushed this point. It is, however, incorrect. HM Government never agreed that Taiwan was a province of the PRC. Rather, in 1972, in accordance with its view that Taiwan’s status was undetermined, Britain merely acknowledged Beijing’s claim.
The problem is the UK is unwilling to articulate its view. Parliamentarians are repeatedly told that the longstanding position of HM Government on Taiwan has not changed. But it is not exactly clear what that position is – particularly when Beijing is given a free pass to push its narrative. It would come as no surprise if other countries believed the Chinese account or were, at the very least, confused about where Britain stood (even I am beginning to doubt myself!)
Last Thursday’s ‘Taiwan Take’ (see Observing China from 28th November) highlighted the problems with allowing Beijing to set the narrative and establish the rights and wrongs around Taiwan, particularly if a crisis across the strait was to break out. Ministers West’s clarification on Resolution 2758 is a welcome one. However, there is much more to do if Britain wishes to push back against the rewriting of history.
Perhaps by next week we may have more details as to the expulsion of the three PRC diplomats from Lithuania. While in recent years, leaders of the small but strategically significant Baltic state have been cautious towards the PRC, it seems that the tides may turn in the future in Beijing’s favour. Stay tuned to find out.
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Grace Theodoulou – Policy Fellow, China Observatory
Email: grace@geostrategy.org.uk
If you would like to explore any of the Council on Geostrategy’s PRC-focused research papers, click here to visit the China Observatory.