‘A war over Taiwan will drag the Philippines, kicking and screaming, into the conflict’, Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines, stated last summer. His incendiary remarks resurfaced this week as Manila and Washington conduct their annual wargaming exercises in the Indo-Pacific.

The defence drills aim to prepare both militaries for two of the region’s most likely future conflict zones: the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. For the Strait, the drills are taking place north of the Philippines, facing the Taiwan Strait, fewer than 120 miles from the island’s coast. In the South China Sea, they are near a province which has seen repeated escalation of conflict between Philippine and Chinese forces and fishermen in recent years.

For the first time ever, Japan has joined these drills, days after signing a US$7 billion (£5.18 billion) deal with Australia, which will see the construction of 11 warships – Japan will build three, and Australia eight. Canberra is also participating in the aforementioned military drills, as it has done previously.

Guess which country feels targeted by all this?

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Heads of state or foreign ministers of Spain, Russia, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Vietnam have all flocked to Beijing in the past week. The density of foreign dignitary visits, although notable, is not as out of the ordinary as another visit that took place in the past few days – that of Cheng Li-wun, Chairwoman of Taiwan’s opposition party the Kuomintang (KMT).

‘Opposing Taiwan independence’ can help keep war at bay, she opined after meeting with Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Taiwanese security officials claim that while Cheng was in Beijing – the first such meeting between the two nations in a decade – the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nearly doubled the number of military vessels in the East and South China Seas that it usually has – a statement which Beijing denies.

The KMT have stalled the ruling Democratic People’s Party’s (DPP) efforts to increase Taiwan’s defence budget by US$40 billion (£30 billion), which would include substantial purchases of American weapons to develop its asymmetric advantage. Her trip to the PRC reportedly coincided with crucial defence budget talks in Taipei, with her absence drawing further annoyance from some of her opposition peers.

Cheng has stated that she does not believe her pursuit of ‘reconciliation’ across the Taiwan Strait should come at the expense of necessary support from Washington. In any case, Xi will be hopeful that the timing of her visit to Beijing – just one month before Donald Trump, President of the United States (US) is due to visit – will give him leverage.

The KMT in Taipei and the CCP in Beijing are mulling the implementation of a number of measures in the aftermath of the meeting, such as the establishment of a regular communication channel between the two parties, and pushing for the full resumption of flights between Taiwan and the PRC, which have been disrupted as relations deteriorated in recent years.

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Following on from last week, leading officials around the world continue to beat a path to Beijing. Pedro Sanchez, Prime Minister of Spain, will visit the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 11th-15th April for his fourth visit in as many years.

François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Finance of Canada, concluded his visit to the PRC last week, aimed at fostering a ‘pragmatic approach’ with Canada’s second-largest trading partner after the United States (US). Champagne met with He Lifeng, Vice Premier of the PRC, where both sides agreed to increase cooperation on financial services and hold a strategic financial dialogue later this year.

Champagne’s visit follows that of Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, in January, wherein a strategic partnership was signed between Ottawa and Beijing. This marks rapid progress in relations; before Carney’s visit in January, the last such Canadian visit to the PRC was in 2017. Relations deteriorated after Beijing detained two Canadian nationals in response to Ottawa’s extradition of a Chinese national to the US.

In March, a Canadian senator and Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) visited the PRC on a bridge-building mission, where, in light of improved bilateral relations, Beijing expressed its wishes that Ottawa will back its bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); a major Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between 12 economies in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Meanwhile, officials in Kabul have thanked the PRC for its mediation efforts in the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Beijing is also extending its diplomatic outreach to engage other partners in its peace efforts for Iran, as officials in Tehran assert that the PRC pushed them towards accepting the ceasefire deal agreed with the US.

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Last week, I wrote about how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan had engaged the British High Commissioner and the Chinese Ambassador to Islamabad to discuss the ongoing war in its neighbour Iran.

Then, it made an impression that this statement made the news. But a week later, this makes sense. Earlier this week, Ishaq Dar, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the second time in three months.

The two sides released a joint statement outlining what has been described as a five-point peace plan for ending the conflict in the Middle East. Some analysts suggest that it was Islamabad which approached Beijing, also with the possibility of sounding out the PRC’s willingness to act as a guarantor in a peace deal. The latter would be to make the deal more palatable to Iran, which is close to the PRC. Islamabad is unlikely to have done this without some prior behind-the-scenes conversations with Beijing, Washington, and other important powers, which possibly explains the diplomatic outreach Islamabad has done recently, including with Britain.

This is a complicated situation for Beijing. On the one hand, the PRC would delight in having the opportunity to present itself as the more conciliatory and diplomatic of the two global superpowers in its great power competition with the United States (US). But precisely because of this potential advantage it would gain, Washington may be reluctant to support a significant involvement of Beijing in such a deal.

And also, Beijing’s hitherto cautious response to the conflict has not gone unnoticed, particularly in the Middle East when many of its close partners (not just Iran) have been battered by the conflict. So a prominent role in a peace deal would help the PRC save face. Especially as for years now, Beijing has promoted itself as a more reliable and peaceful partner than Washington to countries around the world.

An offshoot of Beijing’s efforts in mediation has received less media attention than the potential Iran peace deal. A senior Pakistani official announced that, during Ishaq Dar’s trip to the PRC this week, a delegation met with Afghan officials of the Taliban regime in Urumqi, the capital of the PRC’s Xinjiang province. Pakistani officials suggested that it was Beijing that requested the two sides meet. Although a mere initial meeting, the Pakistani officials hope it will set a basis for a ‘full-scale dialogue’ to end months of conflict between Kabul and Islamabad.

Beyond arms sales, the PRC does not typically offer the same level of expeditionary military security guarantees as the US. Beijing plays a different tactic. A crisis hits, and Beijing can paint itself as the sage, diplomatic counterpart to Washington.

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The China Development Forum concluded on Monday in Beijing. The annual two-day forum is when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents its economic priorities and investment opportunities to foreign business leaders as well as Chinese officials, economists, and academics.

During the forum, Li Qiang, Premier of the PRC, announced that Beijing intends to increase its imports of high-quality foreign goods in order to promote more balanced trade after a record trade surplus in the PRC’s favour. In January, Beijing noted the world’s largest-ever trade surplus, at an eye-watering US$1.19 trillion (£890 billion) for 2025.

The record proved that the PRC managed to divert its goods away from the United States (US), with whom it was embroiled in a trade war for most of last year. But Beijing managed to soften the blow of the trade war by diverting many of its goods to Latin America, Europe, and Africa, and now many governments in these regions are facing pressure from local manufacturers to decrease imports from the PRC in specific sectors. This spurred Li Qiang to address the trade balance at the global-facing forum in Beijing.

Other news over the past week on the PRC’s foreign policy largely feature Iran and amendments to the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong, which I discuss below. However, an amendment was also made to the equivalent NSL in Macau, which local lawyers claim goes against the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration that saw Macau handed over to the administration of the PRC in December 1999.

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In an attempt to coax Beijing to pressure Tehran into opening the vital trade route, Washington claims that 90% of the People Republic of China’s (PRC) oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In reality, the Strait only accounts for approximately 40% of Beijing’s oil supplies.

While Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), has been stealing the limelight over the past few weeks – most recently by requesting a delay to his state visit to Beijing over the conflict in Iran – the PRC has been doing some important foreign policy work of its own in the background.

The PRC will now provide solar energy to Cuba as the Latin American country faces total power outages, and has also offered emergency humanitarian assistance to a number of Middle Eastern countries affected by the ongoing strikes in Iran and Lebanon. Meanwhile, last week, I wrote that direct trains will resume from Beijing to Pyongyang after a six-year hiatus – this will now be matched by a direct flight between the two capitals.

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As the United States (US) and European nations send warships to the Middle East, Beijing is perched on a hill far away like a lofty older cousin looking down at the playground squabbles unfurling before it. Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), called for an ‘immediate ceasefire’, stating that Beijing supports the Gulf countries in ‘taking the future of the region into their own hands’.

For the PRC, its stance on Iran fits into its discourse on Taiwan – the definitive issue in its foreign policy, and a country which the PRC considers its own. Beijing expects reciprocity on this issue when it says ‘the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the Gulf Arab countries should be respected’.

Interestingly, the two issues recently converged; the PRC claimed it helped to repatriate 93 Taiwanese who were stranded in Turkey, unable to catch their connecting flights to return home as conflict raged in the Middle East. But Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated it was not made aware of this specific incident by any of its representative offices (de facto embassies) abroad. Is one side being entirely dishonest, or is the truth muddled somewhere in between the two?

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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the world’s largest oil importer, sourcing approximately half of its crude oil from the Middle East.

In a prescient move, Chinese oil refiners purchased record amounts of Iranian (and Russian) crude oil before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also stockpiled significant amounts of resources. The United States (US)-Israel-Iran conflict has cut off nearly all shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a conduit for 20% of global oil supplies.

Although the PRC has, in recent years, been the largest purchaser of Iranian crude oil, it buys even more from Saudi Arabia. Beijing’s investments in Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also far exceed those in Tehran.

Onto more fiscal and less fiery matters, the CCP has just set its lowest economic growth target since 1991. The target of 4.5-5% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was announced at this year’s ‘Two Sessions’ series of meetings.

Every year, the National People’s Congress (NPC) – the CCP’s legislative body – and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) – an advisory body – hold concurrent but separate meetings to outline the key points of focus for the party over the next year, known as the ‘Two Sessions’. Legislation is typically ratified in these meetings, alongside personnel changes and setting the budget.

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During the past week, the United Nations (UN) has been a prominent forum for Beijing’s foreign policy, from nuclear arms control talks with Washington and Moscow, to its denial of any involvement in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on the four-year anniversary of the invasion.

But perhaps the most colourful comments of them all were made at the UN Human Rights Council by Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In a thinly veiled attack at the United States (US), he warned against any single country assuming the role of a ‘human rights teacher’, further elaborating that these rights should not be used to ‘whitewash hegemony’ or be ‘exploited to adorn democracy’.

Tensions between the PRC and the US are now taking on additional dimensions. Human rights and tariffs have long been bones of contention, but Beijing’s nuclear arsenal is increasingly in the spotlight – as is its logistical support for other authoritarian regimes around the world.

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While the world’s biggest annual migration, which took place in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the travel rush of the Lunar New Year – celebrated on Monday – may have captured global headlines, significant geopolitical developments took place behind the scenes. At the Munich Security Conference, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State of the United States (US), and Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, gave their speeches, in which they tried to reassure the European Union (EU) that they had not forgotten Brussels.

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Beijing didn’t take too well to the United Kingdom’s (UK) expansion of a visa scheme that opens the door for many Hong Kongers to live and work in Britain. In a statement issued by the Chinese Embassy, a spokesperson claimed that many of the Hong Kongers who relocated to the UK over the past few years have found themselves treated as ‘second class citizens’, facing discrimination and difficulties in making ends meet.

As illustrated in the statement, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) interprets the British National Overseas (BNO) visa scheme as a manipulation in its internal affairs, which will ‘only bring shame’ to the UK and cause it to ‘suffer the consequences of its own actions.’

The change to the visa scheme comes after Beijing sentenced Jimmy Lai, one of the world’s most well-known pro-democracy activists from Hong Kong – and a British citizen – to 20 years in prison.

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The visit of Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to Beijing yielded little more than ‘the Labubu doll in his suitcase’ according to Kemi Badenoch MP, Leader of the Opposition.

In the week since his visit, further details of bilateral investment have emerged, including a smattering of Chinese investments in the United Kingdom (UK). But, thus far, none are on the same scale as the AstraZeneca deal to invest US$15 billion (£10.9 billion) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by 2030. In the company’s own words, this will strengthen its ‘contribution to China’s high-quality development’.

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How many British businesspeople does it take to get Beijing to invest in the United Kingdom (UK)? The correct answer is a Prime Minister bearing a gifted football and around 50 business executives. And even then, it seems Britain may have given more than it got.

The visit of Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), concludes tomorrow. Among his delegation is Jonathan Powell, National Security Adviser, who met with Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, on Wednesday.

The two sides signed an agreement on services trade, which ‘aim to help grow the £13 billion-worth of services sold by UK firms to China annually.’ This is not an insignificant amount. But what of the other sectors? At the time of writing, it appears that much of the quantified investment is, yet again, outbound. For pharmaceuticals, Sir Pascal Soriot, the chief executive of AstraZeneca – Britain’s most valuable publicly listed company – announced an investment of CN¥100 billion (£10.4 billion) in the PRC by 2030.

The series of agreements also saw Beijing’s agreement to halve whisky tariffs to 5%, as well as visa-free travel for British citizens for up to 30 days in the PRC. On more cooperative matters, the two sides agreed to share intelligence on people-smuggling in the English Channel.

Elsewhere around the world, the United States (US) unveiled its new National Defence Strategy (NDS). Taiwan was not mentioned explicitly in the latest NDS, but it was in the previous one, in 2022.

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The fourth time’s the charm. The long wait is over; approval for Beijing’s largest embassy in Europe is now granted. His Majesty’s (HM) Government delayed the decision three times as it sought to buy time to conduct thorough security reviews and listen to the concerns of nearby residents.

The embassy caused an increasing amount of diplomatic disquiet between London and Beijing over the past few years. Friends in the diplomatic service told me that Beijing would raise the ‘embassy issue’ in nearly every bilateral meeting, regardless of its relevance to the main topics at hand. In fairness, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) purchased the site for this purpose nearly eight years ago, greenlit by Boris Johnson, then Foreign Secretary – so why did it take longer than the Brexit negotiations?

A major reason why the CCP is so eager for this large embassy is to consolidate its six sites across London (one for each major sectoral focus of the diplomatic mission) into one premises. When I worked at Taiwan’s de facto embassy in London, the mission also had separate sites for each of its functions throughout the capital, and also recently merged them all into one site.

The approval of Beijing’s ‘mega embassy’ is not really a surprise. The British public has been primed for this decision for some time now. Last November, Richard Moore, former Head of MI6, published an op-ed in The Telegraph, wherein he wrote that it was ‘right and proper’ that the new embassy go ahead. But relevant authorities are not saying that this decision is wholly without risk.

The heads of MI5 and Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) clarified that it will not be possible to nullify every potential threat emanating from the new supersized embassy. The security services have developed a ‘“proportionate” package’ of national security mitigations for the embassy’s site. It has also been decided to move the sensitive data cables which currently pass one metre from the site.

What did the rest of the world have to say about the embassy? And what is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) saying about the growing tensions between the United States (US) and European nations?

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The expected approval of Beijing’s ‘mega-embassy’ in London will be a welcome win for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as the new year has ushered in some headache-inducing complications.

The PRC enjoys near-monopsonistic leverage as the primary buyer of both Iranian and Venezuelan oil. Over the years, sanctions on both of these countries were a large factor in the PRC becoming the dominant buyer of their oil. A few days after Nicolás Maduro, the now deposed President of Venezuela, was captured, commodity traders stated that the PRC would likely replace some of its purchase of Venezuelan oil for Iranian crude. However, on 12th January, Donald Trump, President of the United States (US) asserted that any country doing business with Iran will pay a tariff of 25% ‘on any and all business being done’ with the US.

Will the PRC be subjected to these tariffs, when a tentative truce was recently reached in the trade war between Washington and Beijing?

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Being a China watcher in the United Kingdom (UK) today is particularly fascinating. Analysing the media discourse, you gather rather quickly that bilateral relations between Britain and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and how they should be, is something of a battleground. His Majesty’s (HM) Government stated that the PRC amounts to the UK’s ‘most complex bilateral relationship’, because Beijing both poses a threat to Britain’s democracy but also a lucrative economic opportunity, all while being an increasingly unignorable diplomatic player on the world stage.

What often feels bizarre but is somewhat understandable is that HM Government, under the leadership of Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, often does not publish the interactions of its officials with their Chinese counterparts, knowing that it will likely draw ire from those who vouch for cooler ties with Beijing. Whitehall is also keen to allay vociferous criticism, which also sounds from across the Atlantic. This is why, as a China analyst, I often find out about meetings of British and Chinese officials from PRC state media.

The case of Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong media tycoon convicted of national security offences by Beijing, will add further complications to the bilateral relationship, as Lai is a British citizen. Calls for his release have received bipartisan support in the UK since his arrest in 2020. Sir Keir is due to visit the PRC next month, and 32 organisations around the world, including the Committee to Protect Journalists, have called for him to request Lai’s release while in Beijing.

Whitehall’s statements on Jimmy Lai have already stoked Beijing’s furore. Meanwhile, significant bilateral cooperation continues, in ways which signal a mutually held long-term vision. As an example, earlier this month, Maritime London, the UK’s industry-led body for maritime professional services, held the inaugural UK-China Shipping Forum in Shanghai as part of Pudong International Shipping Week 2025. Shipping is a key sector for both countries, and features heavily in the blueprint for the PRC’s latest Five-Year Plan.

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According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the dates that Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, will visit Beijing next January have not been finalised. It is a significant visit – the United Kingdom (UK) has not sent a prime minister to the PRC since Theresa May in 2018. It is thought that the upcoming visit is a reason as to why Whitehall’s decision about whether or not to approve Beijing’s request for a ‘mega-embassy’ has been delayed yet again, to around the expected time of Sir Keir’s visit (the end of January).

Perhaps His Majesty’s (HM) Government does not want the Prime Minister’s trip to be preceded by vociferous criticisms of the expected approval? More news in the UK-PRC relationship from the past week continues to show that Beijing takes any criticism (or even pointing out wrongdoings) rather personally.

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Whitehall is expected to approve Beijing’s request for a ‘mega-embassy’ in London, a move which would see the development of Europe’s largest embassy. The deadline for an official decision has now been moved for the third time, to 20th January next year. But the British public have been primed that this decision will likely go ahead for some weeks now. Last month, Richard Moore, former Head of MI6, published an op-ed in The Telegraph, an outlet known for its sober stance on Beijing, wherein he stated that it was ‘right and proper’ that the new embassy go ahead. Concerns over security issues remain, but Downing Street is now saying that the supersize embassy could actually be a benefit in that all of Beijing’s diplomatic operations will now be consolidated into one site; currently, the embassy has several buildings scattered around the capital.

The embassy is considered to be a crucial cog in bilateral relations between the United Kingdom (UK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Recently, Beijing warned of ‘consequences’ if the embassy did not go ahead. Meanwhile, it is now officially confirmed that Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, will visit the PRC next month, marking the first British prime ministerial visit to Beijing in seven years.

The China debate shows no sign of abating, however; vociferous opposition to Whitehall’s desire to develop a more ‘consistent’ approach to bilateral ties than the previous Conservative government persists.

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The sins of LinkedIn are no longer limited to self-aggrandisement and an alarming infiltration of cat videos: British parliamentarians and their staff are now being targeted by suspected spies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), according to Ken McCallum, Director General of MI5.

Think tankers, and anyone else deemed to have valuable information or connections within government are also targeted, as the security services warn that the threshold for information considered ‘valuable’ by Beijing is low. It is no longer an attempt to gather state secrets; parliamentary staffers do not have access to this information anyway. It is about network mapping (knowing who is influential and a prudent target for lobbying) and knowing where the power lies.

Again, the messaging from Whitehall and Westminster is a bit confusing on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s relationship with it. How can the public be assured that engagement and trade with the PRC is wise (as is outlined in the current government’s manifesto) when the front page of BBC News is plastered with news of Parliament as a consistent espionage target by the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘third largest trading partner’? Should there perhaps be a clarification (and acknowledgement) of the various degrees of severity of espionage?

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‘When it comes to manipulating footage and malicious editing, the BBC is among the most “experienced” Western media outlets.’ In a rare instance of public agreement with Washington, Beijing has joined the backlash against the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The ongoing high-profile case in the news with regards to the BBC concerns edits made to a speech by Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), which allegedly changed the meaning of his words to a misleading degree.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has piled in, even stating that the BBC has been ‘repeatedly singled out by [the PRC’s] Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ for its attempts to ‘discredit and vilify’ Beijing. Another bump in the road for bilateral relations.

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