<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Observing China]]></title><description><![CDATA[All the latest news and insights on British-Chinese relations, and China’s evolving posture on the world stage]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:52:47 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Geostrategy Limited]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[observingchina@geostrategy.org.uk]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[observingchina@geostrategy.org.uk]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Council on Geostrategy]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Council on Geostrategy]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[observingchina@geostrategy.org.uk]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[observingchina@geostrategy.org.uk]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Council on Geostrategy]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine will look ‘a little different’, Trump says ahead of expected meeting with Xi and Putin]]></title><description><![CDATA[Briton indicted for spying sought data on MPs critical of Beijing; His Majesty signals openness for first royal visit to the PRC]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/ukraine-will-look-a-little-different-trump-says</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/ukraine-will-look-a-little-different-trump-says</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 12:30:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg" width="1456" height="1092" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1092,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2280338,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/224593444?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dEU8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a195dfa-ab9e-4304-b569-57c43c2c43ed_2390x1792.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p>&#8216;The advance of humanity is not a zero-sum game&#8217;, Jensen Huang, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Nvidia, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c64g1gzy2vdzo">told</a> the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)<em> </em>in an interview last year when asked about the Artificial Intelligence (AI) race between Beijing and Washington, in which his company&#8217;s products fuel the contestants.</p><p>Last Sunday, Huang admitted to having an affair with someone from the rival superpower in the global AI race, who is also alleged to be spying on behalf of her homeland. There is no speculation at present that he was aware of Alice Huang&#8217;s alleged assistance of Beijing, and he has accepted an independent investigation by Nvidia.</p><p>However, Washington and Beijing do indeed appear to treat it as a zero-sum game, as seen by the former&#8217;s decision to ban exports of Nvidia&#8217;s most advanced products to the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC), and Beijing&#8217;s retaliatory controls.</p><p>Do such export controls curb &#8216;the advance of humanity&#8217;, or are they essential to national security?</p><p>Welcome back to <em>Observing China</em>.</p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/ukraine-will-look-a-little-different-trump-says">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[British spy agency says ‘China remains greatest threat’]]></title><description><![CDATA[China beats Britain and America in global education system rankings; MEPs ask Brussels to review Chinese EVs in sensitive government sites]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/british-spy-agency-says-china-remains-greatest-threat</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/british-spy-agency-says-china-remains-greatest-threat</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 13:00:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg" width="1456" height="970" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:970,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1654154,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/223617299?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r8q0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5895368a-5b56-44ba-9c46-6738bfd54a32_2528x1684.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p>The United Kingdom (UK) is back to going around in circles over its &#8216;China policy&#8217;. Parliamentarians are calling for a coherent strategy in Whitehall&#8217;s dealings with Beijing, accusing His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government of &#8216;making up its China policy as it goes on&#8217;.</p><p>But can Britain have one unitary policy for a country that intelligence services repeatedly warn could be plotting cyber attacks against it? A country that appears to be an indispensable trade partner for the UK&#8217;s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/clean-power-2030-action-plan">Clean Power 2030</a> target, alongside its long-held status as one of the largest sources of overseas students propping up the British higher education sector?</p><p>Andy Burnham, Prime Minister, has not yet set out his position on the UK&#8217;s relations with the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC). However, his Cabinet ministers are already working on the foundations on which his administration&#8217;s &#8216;China policy&#8217; may be built.</p><p>Jonathan Reynolds, Secretary of State for Business and Trade, has not <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/oct/16/uk-chinese-electric-vehicle-ev-tariffs-eu-made-in-europe-scheme">ruled out</a> following Brussels&#8217; suit in applying tariffs on Electric Vehicles (EVs) made in the PRC. However, he remained firm that should Britain do so, it would only be in the pursuit of its own interests &#8211; not to placate any third party.</p><p>Perhaps Whitehall is waiting to see to what extent its policies on the PRC may be shaped by its rapprochement in certain areas with Brussels. After all, Liam Byrne, Chair of the House of Commons Business and Trade Select Committee, stated that &#8216;Britain must shape its own relationship with China, or risk having that relationship shaped for us in Washington or Beijing.&#8217;</p><p>Last year, Brussels <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-PR-775469_EN.pdf?">expressed</a> a similar idea that it must develop its own &#8216;strategic autonomy&#8217; in the face of growing rivalry between Beijing and Washington.</p><p>Welcome back to <em>Observing China</em>.</p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/british-spy-agency-says-china-remains-greatest-threat">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can pickled fish tempt Taiwan towards unification? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Britain&#8217;s budget aims to secure AI data centre advantage; Brussels flexes its muscles on China trade deficit]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/can-pickled-fish-tempt-taiwan</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/can-pickled-fish-tempt-taiwan</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 14:15:07 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2732275,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/222645798?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nh5Y!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ccb942a-4b2a-4169-82f9-1fe463be6888_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p>Since my <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/south-korean-chipmakers-test-transfer">last newsletter</a> on 6th August, the United Kingdom&#8217;s (UK) <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8e36kyk1qx5o">signalling</a> of a pivot towards Brussels has stirred debate about what this might mean for Whitehall&#8217;s relations with Beijing.</p><p>In her annual &#8216;State of the Union&#8217; <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_26_1868">speech</a> last month, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, stated that the Brussels-Beijing trade deficit &#8211; at an eye-watering &#8364;1 billion (&#163;836 million) per day in 2025 &#8211; has reached a &#8216;tipping point&#8217;. Maro&#353; &#352;ef&#269;ovi&#269;, European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_26_2124">called</a> the situation a &#8216;mountain of a challenge&#8217;.</p><p>However, Britain appears <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/oct/14/uk-will-not-put-tariffs-on-chinese-vehicles-says-jonathan-reynolds">adamant</a> that it will not bow to pressure from Brussels to follow suit on tariffs applied by the European trade bloc on certain products from the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC), in its pursuit of reviving certain economic arrangements with the European Union (EU).</p><p>Meanwhile, during the Autumn Budget announced yesterday by John Healey, Chancellor of the Exchequer, His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government unveiled a &#8216;fast-track plan&#8217; for the construction of strategically important data centres in the UK, which includes regulations on local hires, among others. The aim is to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/uks-healey-offers-grid-access-incentives-critical-data-centres-2026-10-28/">maintain</a> Britain&#8217;s position as the world&#8217;s third-largest Artificial Intelligence (AI) market, behind only the United States (US) and the PRC, while restricting sensitive defence and healthcare data being processed abroad.</p><p>Elsewhere, a leading Chinese AI startup made global headlines last week in reports that its founders had participated in an earlier research project partly funded by an institute that MI5 has flagged as having links to Chinese state intelligence. The reporting does not establish whether the founders were aware of the institute&#8217;s alleged intelligence connections, nor of any potential intelligence-related use of the research.</p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/can-pickled-fish-tempt-taiwan">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[China’s integrated maritime coercion east of Taiwan]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Investigator | No. 12/2026]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/chinas-integrated-maritime-coercion</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/chinas-integrated-maritime-coercion</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Liao]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:00:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Investigator | No. 12/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1872354,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/222153943?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Gki8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83a7471f-d8f9-44be-a4e7-42b154f3cd9f_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image generated was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p>The People&#8217;s Republic of China&#8217;s (PRC) pressure east of Taiwan is acquiring a more complex civilian dimension. In October 2026, Apex Aviation, a private Taiwanese operator using modified civilian aircraft, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-militia-boat-spotted-first-time-off-taiwans-east-coast-patrol-finds-2026-10-08/">detected</a> fishing boat Minfudingyu 07902, a China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter 2502, and research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 more than 30 nautical miles off Hualien in mid-August. Taiwanese security officials identified Minfudingyu 07902 as a <a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/all-research/challenging-chinas-maritime-militia/">People&#8217;s Armed Forces Maritime Militia</a> (PAFMM) vessel and reported coordinated harassment drills with the CCG. In a follow-up report on 23rd October, Taiwan&#8217;s Coast Guard Administration said that the boat had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-china-using-militia-boats-expand-battlefield-preparation-western-2026-10-23/">approached</a> approximately 2.7 nautical miles outside Taiwan&#8217;s restricted waters on 16th August, assessing such coordinated activity as contributing to &#8216;battlefield preparation&#8217;. The combination suggests a division of labour: the militia creates friction, the CCG provides protection and an enforcement pretext, and researchers collect data with potential operational value.</p><p>Ethan Tu, founder of Taiwan AI Labs, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/cmeweg5eg7ljo/trad">noted</a> that the operating area overlapped shallow sections of intersecting east-west and north-south seabed ridges traversed by international cables. However, cable interference remains a possibility to investigate rather than an established purpose. The clearer significance is the PAFMM&#8217;s addition to a mixed deployment: Beijing can combine civilian presence, coercive backing, and information gathering to give practical expression to its claims of authority around Taiwan.</p><h4>Coordinating civilian and state power</h4><p>As <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/chinese-presence-east-of-taiwan">explored previously</a>, the PRC&#8217;s &#8216;special maritime traffic law enforcement&#8217; advances &#8216;near-seas governance&#8217;, using administration to press contested claims. Research vessels already contribute to this environment. In July 2026, the Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences&#8217; Lan Hai 201 <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/22/">surveyed</a> waters within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines.</p><p>Chinese research activity near undersea infrastructure has also <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-weaponization-dual-use-research-vessels-undersea-data-dominance">attracted</a> scrutiny. Hydrographic and seabed data can <a href="https://indsr.org.tw/focus?uid=11&amp;pid=3262&amp;typeid=34">support</a> submarine operations, uncrewed systems, and underwater installations. June&#8217;s deployment already combined maritime agencies; incorporating the maritime militia broadens civilian resources available to sustain such activity.</p><p>Rooted in &#8216;people&#8217;s war&#8217; and institutionalised in the 1950s, the PAFMM has gained greater prominence under Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), notably in the South China Sea. It also contributes to <em>qunfang qunzhi</em>, or &#8216;collective prevention and governance&#8217;: mobilising civilian participation in security and local control. Members can retain ordinary fishing identities while remaining available for mobilisation. This makes their commercial presence a resource for both routine governance and contingency operations.</p><p>The potential scale of the militia was <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/chinese-fishing-boats-assemble-in-vast-formation-near-taiwan">illustrated</a> in late December 2025, when approximately 2,000 Chinese fishing vessels assembled north-east of Taiwan in two parallel inverted L-shaped formations, roughly 400 kilometres (km) long and 80km wide. In January 2026, about 1,400 vessels <a href="https://www.jpost.com/international/article-884078">formed</a> a rectangle stretching some 320km across the East China Sea, forcing commercial ships to divert or weave through. Not every participant can be identified as militia, but such coordination demonstrates how civilian hulls can impose collective pressure. The immediate effect is to complicate navigation and force others to accommodate an organised Chinese presence.</p><p>The response problem begins with the PAFMM&#8217;s multiple identities. Civilian fishing vessels can act as naval or CCG auxiliaries while <a href="https://www.storm.mg/article/11099781#wholePage">remaining</a> difficult to distinguish from ordinary commercial traffic. Beijing can exploit this ambiguity to <a href="https://www.mnd.gov.tw/File/39494">obscure</a> military direction and political responsibility. Taipei therefore faces an asymmetry: the PRC can coordinate militia activity centrally while leaving Taiwan to justify intervention against individual boats. Dispersed incidents may consume scarce patrol capacity, while a firmer response may be portrayed as aggression against fishermen. Even successful identification leaves Taipei to decide whether the behaviour warrants a policing or military response. Attribution alone cannot resolve the choice of instrument, timing, or acceptable risk.</p><p>Armed accompaniment sharpens this dilemma. CCG 2502, the roughly 5,000 tonne Daishan, has 76 millimetre (mm) naval guns and is reportedly <a href="https://k.sina.cn/article_2101918757_p7d48bc2502700np8y.html">equipped</a> with military-type search radar. Its formation had already <a href="https://www.news.cn/tw/20260704/caeefa50a7f0433b95d5ea50f46b100c/c.html">patrolled</a> east of Taiwan from June 2026. A militia vessel could provoke an encounter that the CCG then claims a duty to resolve. This creates a mechanism through which Beijing can manufacture both a dispute and a justification for administering it, with substantial force available behind an ostensibly civilian incident.</p><p>The institutional context helps explain why this combination is appearing now. The CCP&#8217;s <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/2026special/2026npcandcpcc/6979af4fc6d00ca5f9a08cd6">15th Five-Year Plan</a> reiterates the integration of party, government, military, police, and civilian resources in &#8216;modern border, maritime, and air defence&#8217;, an approach <a href="http://jl.people.com.cn/BIG5/n2/2026/1012/c349771-41719085.html">developed</a> since the 18th Party Congress. It connects central and local authorities, civilian and military resources, and peacetime administration with wartime mobilisation.</p><p>Within this framework, <em>qunfang qunzhi</em> supplies an essential social foundation: organised civilian networks support observation, reporting, and local control, with militia providing a readily mobilisable element. Local maritime defence planning explicitly combines <em>qunfang qunzhi</em> with intelligent surveillance and a coordinated response. Military writings similarly <a href="https://www.kepuchina.cn/article/articleinfo?business_type=100&amp;classify=0&amp;ar_id=697854">advocate</a> Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled and uncrewed systems. Together, these developments suggest a whole-of-society and information-centric approach to all-domain awareness, in which ordinary maritime activity can supply intelligence for security operations.</p><p>The strategic consequence follows from where Beijing applies this model. In waters where its claims are contested, frontier defence acquires both an outward and inward function. Armed forces deter external intervention, while enforcement, fishing, scientific research, and resource exploration enact the routines of domestic governance. Civilian activity provides both a reason for state protection and an everyday expression of the authority that the CCP claims.</p><p>The PAFMM connects these functions. It can contribute information and auxiliary capacity to Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) operations while helping civilian agencies to make contested jurisdiction appear normal. A policy framed as defending the PRC&#8217;s frontiers can thus become a means of extending its practical reach.</p><p>Read in this context, the August 2026 grouping suggests a further stage in the practices visible in June. State vessels establish the framework; militia fill it with a more persistent civilian presence. Joint operations test mobilisation, interagency coordination, and Taipei&#8217;s intervention thresholds, building usable routines before a crisis.</p><p>Taiwan&#8217;s eastern approaches also connect the island to Pacific reinforcement and resupply routes. Extending civilian coercion there could gradually constrain that access without declaring a blockade. The novelty lies in incorporating the PAFMM into this developing arrangement, enabling pressure to continue through activities that Beijing presents as ordinary administration.</p><p>Future operations could involve larger mixed formations, concentrations around shipping routes or in Taiwan&#8217;s contiguous zone, harassment of Taiwanese and foreign fishing vessels, and interference with official or research vessels. Dangerous manoeuvres or engineered collisions could threaten valuable assets while leaving responsibility contested. Alongside CCG, People&#8217;s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and maritime administration units, the militia could support surveillance and obstruction during a quarantine or blockade. The December 2025/January 2026 formations indicate the coordination available for such purposes, although they do not demonstrate the ability to seal Taiwan&#8217;s maritime approaches.</p><p>The cumulative risk is a gradual restriction of others&#8217; freedom to operate. Frequent incidents can exhaust Taiwanese crews and equipment, discourage commercial activity, and make Chinese intervention appear routine. Beijing could thus secure practical concessions through repeated encounters before seeking acceptance of any formal jurisdictional claim.</p><h4>The Taiwanese response</h4><p>Apex&#8217;s discovery shows why Taiwan needs to integrate civilian expertise into Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Contracted aviation, private maritime security and intelligence services, and commercial imagery could extend monitoring while easing pressure on naval and coastguard assets. The priority is sustained integration of airborne, surface, and undersea information. Governments should understand recurring associations between fishing boats and state vessels, shared movements, and changes of role &#8211; the pattern of cooperation may reveal more than any single vessel&#8217;s registration.</p><p>The warning of shared pressure on Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines strengthens the case for a standing maritime security coordination centre or equivalent physical platform involving regional partners. Shared vessel histories, common evidence standards, and regular contact between officials and civilian specialists would help to connect incidents across jurisdictions. Such a centre should link detection to agreed procedures for assistance and response, going beyond an information-sharing arrangement. Its value would lie in arranging cooperation before an incident so that requests for evidence, operational assistance, or diplomatic support need not begin from scratch each time. The PRC integrates different actors to create pressure; Taiwan needs cooperation that translates dispersed observations into a common assessment and timely action.</p><p>The harder question that remains is how to impose costs. &#8216;Escalate to de-escalate&#8217;, <a href="https://money.udn.com/money/story/7307/9814574">raised</a> at Taiwan&#8217;s 2026 international conference on sea lane security, recognises that habitual restraint can make coercion inexpensive. Militia involvement nevertheless complicates its application: action against a fishing boat may activate CCG protection, widen the confrontation, and strengthen Beijing&#8217;s claim to defend its citizens.</p><p>Taiwan and its partners thus need graduated responses tied to demonstrable behaviour, combining public attribution, protective escorts, lawful enforcement, and coordinated diplomatic pressure. Clear thresholds and conditions for restraint would preserve options for firmer action without treating every encounter with the PAFMM as a military confrontation.</p><p>The central task is to deny Beijing the political advantage of coordinating civilian and state power while disowning responsibility for the resulting pressure. Better MDA matters when it enables Taiwan and its partners to contest that arrangement consistently, before repeated interference hardens into accepted authority.</p><blockquote><p><em><strong><a href="https://www.csri.global/zack-liao">Zack Liao</a></strong> is a Research Associate at the China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI) and holds an MA in War Studies from King&#8217;s College London, with a research interest in strategic sealift. He is also the leading political risk consultant on the PRC at a private intelligence company in London.</em></p><p><em>This article is part of the <strong><a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/indo-pacific-project/">Indo-Pacific Unit</a></strong> and is supported by funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Council on Geostrategy has maintained full intellectual autonomy throughout the research process, as per our statements on <strong><a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/ethics-and-funding/">Intellectual Freedom and Funding</a></strong>.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this Analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Is the Chinese Communist Party exporting its politics?]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Investigator | No. 11/2026]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/is-the-chinese-communist-party-exporting</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/is-the-chinese-communist-party-exporting</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 10:00:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Investigator | No. 11/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/cb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1619311,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/220163117?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MB94!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcb543970-c592-41c7-8e02-47c06ee04bde_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p>This article follows on from a <a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/all-research/chinas-four-new-global-initiatives/">long Explainer</a> which considers the architecture laid out by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), for reform to global governance. The idea that the CCP might export elements of its political system is not an outrageous one. After all, earlier rising powers, such as France, England and later the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) did so.</p><p>Some commentators have denied that the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) would follow their example. In 2014, Xi himself <a href="https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-09/15/c_1124998129.htm">ruled out</a> transplanting political systems:</p><blockquote><p>No two political systems in the world are exactly alike, nor is there a single model of political system applicable to all countries&#8230;National conditions vary; every country&#8217;s political system is unique and determined by its own people.</p><p>Copying or mechanically transplanting another country&#8217;s political system will not work; it will be incompatible with local conditions.</p></blockquote><p>Xi was talking about the impossibility of foreign influence on the Chinese system, but his words appear to have universal application.</p><p>To cite this and other pronouncements as evidence of a lack of intention to export the CCP&#8217;s politics is to set up a strawman. Clearly, no country could establish a similar system with the structure and powers of the CCP. The Soviet Union&#8217;s attempts to spread its brand of Leninism failed, and Xi has never been an admirer of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#8217;s policies.</p><p>However, this does not mean that Xi is not intent on transplanting elements of the political system. Politics consists of far more than constitutions, political structures, parties, and forms of democracy or autocracy. They underpin a state&#8217;s relations; decisions; and allocations in economics, commerce, science, finance and taxation, education, defence, values, culture, and more fields. This underpinning also affects a state&#8217;s relations with the wider world.</p><h4>The &#8216;China model&#8217; for the world encompasses politics</h4><p>Over the last decade, Xi and the CCP have become bolder in mentioning politics as part of the exported Chinese model of modernisation. It is worth remembering that when an article appears in CCP-controlled media, it has been approved for publication and represents official policy. Below are some references from 2026 to politics as an element of the PRC&#8217;s model for others to imitate.</p><p>The future is to be socialist, and foreign political parties are to learn from the CCP&#8217;s leadership. The author is Liu Haixing, Head of the International Department of the CCP, whose role is liaison with foreign political parties. By nature, therefore, its dealings <a href="https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202601/08/content_30130488.html">are political</a>:</p><blockquote><p>The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics pioneered by the Communist Party of China not only effectively guides the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics toward continuous success, but also inspires progressive forces in all countries to unite and cooperate, struggle together, and jointly create a bright socialist future.</p><p>In recent years, in exchanges between our party and foreign political parties on experiences in governing the country, &#8216;party leadership&#8217; and &#8216;core role&#8217; have become frequently mentioned terms used by foreign counterparts, and are also key points they hope to learn from.</p></blockquote><p>Governance is political, and the PRC is <a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0115/c40531-40645710.html">contributing</a> its governance model to the world:</p><blockquote><p>This governance philosophy, which possesses both strategic initiative and risk defensiveness, demonstrates the CCP&#8217;s superb political wisdom in managing complex situations and contributes a Chinese governance solution of &#8216;comprehensive consideration and dynamic balance&#8217; to global governance.</p><p>Second, the theory of the Party&#8217;s leadership, the theory of Chinese modernisation, and the innovative theoretical achievements formed by the Party in various fields in the new era have gradually taken shape in <a href="https://www.qstheory.cn/20260520/49251bd272f34364a1b6d0e3274f1bd0/c.html">responding</a> to questions concerning the future of human development, such as disputes over modernisation paths and governance models, and have major world-historical significance.</p></blockquote><p>Whether or not &#8216;Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building&#8217; has really &#8216;provided useful reference for the development of political parties in the world&#8217;, as the <em>Study Times</em>, a Central Party School publication, claims, it <a href="https://paper.studytimes.cn/cntheory/2026-06/22/content_9975428.html">works</a> on the underlying assumption that Chinese wisdom and Chinese strength are contributing &#8216;to the progress of human <strong>political </strong>civilisation&#8217;, a view <a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0709/c40531-40756568.html">repeated</a> in the <em>People&#8217;s Daily</em>, the official newspaper of the CCP:</p><blockquote><p>Practice fully proves that Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building not only puts forward Chinese propositions for the development of world political civilisation, but contributes Chinese wisdom to the progress of human political civilisation, providing scientific guidance for steering the great changes in the world in a direction favourable to the progress of human society.</p></blockquote><p>As early as 2023, Zhao Leji, Chairman of the National People&#8217;s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230616/82fa81d6984f4172af076be210e4cfcd/c.html">offered</a> the PRC&#8217;s help to &#8216;work with developing countries, including Kiribati, to jointly [<em>sic</em>] promote the construction of democratic politics suited to their own national conditions.&#8217; This was in the context of Zhao &#8216;introduc[ing] China&#8217;s developing whole-process people&#8217;s democracy&#8217;, so any help would not have reflected &#8216;Western&#8217; ideas of democracy. Moreover, the CCP perceives a global contest between the systems of the PRC and the West:</p><blockquote><p>...the success of socialism with Chinese characteristics...[is] bringing about further major changes that are favourable to socialism in the historical evolution and contest between the two ideologies and two social systems of socialism and capitalism on a global scale.</p></blockquote><h4>Politics in practice</h4><p>The CCP has an active programme for training African political parties, both in Africa and in the PRC. In 2022, a &#8216;leadership school&#8217; was <a href="https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/la-chine-intensifie-la-formation-des-partis-politiques-en-afrique/">opened</a> in Tanzania with Chinese financing to serve six countries in southern Africa. In 2024, Kenya&#8217;s ruling United Democratic Alliance (UDA) party &#8216;reached out to China&#8217;s ruling party to transform itself into a formidable political outfit&#8217;. It sought &#8216;Sh1 billion [&#163;286,000] from the Chinese party to support its political activities&#8217;. The CCP &#8216;shared their ideology as a vibrant political Party&#8217;, while a visit by a delegation of top UDA party officials later in the year <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/why-president-ruto-s-uda-has-reached-out-to-china-s-communist-party-4558100">aimed</a> to &#8216;benchmark on the best tips for strengthening the political party&#8217;.</p><h4>Politics embedded in systems and technology</h4><p>&#8216;Politics&#8217; is a broad concept about the way a society is ordered. It encompasses decisions regulating the balance between the state and individuals; the provision of services; enjoyment of or restrictions on freedoms; the application of law, security, and monitoring of the people; values; education; and more. The CCP aims not to export or impose a simulacrum of its own system, but to replace the assumptions of free and open countries with its own views on how society should be ordered. Such political values come embedded in cooperation and exports, particularly of technology.</p><p>Many governments have imported Chinese surveillance equipment to ensure social stability and regime security. An important development is the PRC&#8217;s establishment of the <strong>Global Public Security Forum</strong> &#8211;<strong> </strong>part of the growth of training for police and military in developing countries. As a recent paper <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/11/chinas-foreign-police-training-a-global-footprint">makes clear</a>, the CCP is attempting to:</p><blockquote><p>...shape security institutions, practices, norms, technology use, and overall capabilities in recipient countries &#8211; thereby shaping those countries&#8217; capacity both to enforce the rule of law and to carry out repression and state violence.</p></blockquote><p>Police training in small countries in the Pacific, such as the Solomon Islands, has led to <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/09/09/a-giant-knife-fight-in-the-pacific">great concern</a> in Australia, and Beijing is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3323696/new-model-peace-china-takes-its-global-security-initiative-africa">engaging</a> with 40 African countries in the sphere of law enforcement and defence. The PRC also increasingly provides digital identity systems, surveillance architecture, smart-city technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI) used in public administration, online censorship systems, telecommunications networks, cybersecurity frameworks, and data-governance models, and it <a href="https://www.qstheory.cn/20260225/6b5cc9d10c3745a5a911aedb21d928c0/c.html">talks</a> of &#8216;jointly building a community with a shared future in cyberspace&#8217;.</p><p>All of these can influence how the receiving state itself operates. This is political.</p><h4>A glimpse into a possible future</h4><p>The importing of systems creates dependencies, which will give the CCP more leverage and thereby speed up political alignment and the adoption of what the Party parades as &#8216;common values&#8217; &#8211; perhaps Xi&#8217;s &#8216;core socialist values&#8217;, upon which he expounds domestically. Countries will be allowed to hold elections and cling to their different overt political systems, but where it matters to the CCP, their policies (which is what politics produces) will have to align with the CCP&#8217;s wishes.</p><p>This will not happen overnight. Many countries will try to align neither with Beijing nor the West, although the incremental absorption of political elements from the PRC will make such a stance increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the CCP does not need to convert every country if it wants to change global governance &#8211; just a majority, given that in most international organisations each country, irrespective of size, has one vote.</p><p>For those who point out that free and open nations did and do the same, including at times in violent and unacceptable ways, the question nevertheless remains: at the present time, which politics and values are preferable? Those of a regime which sets up concentration camps in Xinjiang, maintains a harsh colonial rule in Tibet, and routinely flouts international law? Or those of traditional (i.e., pre-Trumpian) free and open countries?</p><p>In the face of the CCP exporting its politics, free and open countries cannot be passive or inward looking. They need to compete not just in values, but in the concrete technologies and exports in which values are embedded.</p><div><hr></div><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p><p><em>The author would like to thank Sam Olsen for his pertinent and improving comments.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[China’s Military-Civil Fusion policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[No longer under wraps]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/chinas-military-civil-fusion-policy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/chinas-military-civil-fusion-policy</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 10:00:18 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Investigator | No. 10/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1655015,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/216872389?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8uBc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6bbb61fa-9b94-48c6-921c-91843cd37850_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>One advantage of the People&#8217;s Republic of China&#8217;s (PRC) Leninist system over free and open countries is its ability to conscript all elements of society behind the Chinese Communist Party&#8217;s (CCP) objectives. A prime objective is to build a &#8216;world class&#8217; military, or more baldly, to make the People&#8217;s Liberation Army (PLA) &#8211; the Chinese armed forces &#8211; the most powerful global force. The Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy is a major contributor to this aim.</span></p><h4><span>The rise of MCF</span></h4><p><span>In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, then Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC, intent on promoting closer cooperation between defence industries and the wider economy, launched a policy of Civil-Military Integration (CMI). CMI appeared regularly in national Five-Year Plans (FYPs), but in 2007, under Hu Jintao, then General Secretary of the CCP, a new expression gained currency: &#8216;Military-Civil Fusion&#8217;.</span></p><p><span>This denoted far closer relationships and sharing. The bottom line was that technology or processes which might improve the PRC&#8217;s defence capabilities were to be </span><a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/system-by-design-the-evolution-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy/"><span>shared</span></a><span>, including any obtained from foreign joint ventures, acquisitions, or academic research. In some cases, where security parameters allowed, technology could flow from the military to the civilian side. In 2008, to ensure that policy was transformed into action, the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) was set up under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.</span></p><p><span>While CMI appeared twice in the 12th FYP (2011-2015), MCF made four appearances. CMI disappeared from the 13th FYP (2016-2020), but ten mentions of MCF emphasised its </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinas-evolving-conception-civil-military-collaboration"><span>growing</span></a><span> significance. So did the establishment of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development in 2017. That Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, </span><a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/22/c_136004750.htm"><span>headed</span></a><span> the commission further underlined its importance.</span></p><h4><span>A return to reticence</span></h4><p><span>However, in the 14th FYP (2021-2026), all mention of MCF disappeared. In October 2022, Xi failed to use the term in his </span><a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf"><span>work report</span></a><span> to the 20th Party Congress, although he did make one brief reference:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>We will consolidate and enhance integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. We will better coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production factors between the military and civilian sectors.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>It seems that MCF was frightening the horses: free and open nations had taken notice and were more active in calling for measures to prevent the export of dual-use technologies to the PRC.</span></p><p><strong><span>MCF re-emerges untrammelled</span></strong></p><p><span>Such reticence disappeared two years later. At the March 2024 National People&#8217;s Congress, during his customary visit to the PLA delegation:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>Xi Jinping emphasised the need to build on the momentum, grasp the characteristics and laws of development in emerging fields, and promote the efficient integration and mutual reinforcement of new-quality productive forces and new-quality combat capabilities.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>In plain English &#8211; or rather Chinese &#8211; in detail, and at length, Xi called for vigorous implementation of the MCF policy in the new areas such as quantum technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and new communications. In strong affirmation of its importance, the report of Xi&#8217;s meeting with the PLA delegation appeared in the </span><em><span>Guangming Daily</span></em><span>, an organ under the Central Propaganda Department, and </span><a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2024/0407/c40531-40210558.html"><span>also in</span></a><span> the </span><em><span>People&#8217;s Daily</span></em><span>, the official newspaper of the CCP, online. Xi was clear:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>On one hand, certain emerging technologies from the civilian sector&#8230;can be introduced, absorbed, and further innovated for national defence purposes; their successful application in the defence sector fosters the generation of new-quality combat capabilities. This secures the initiative in future military struggles and opens a new chapter in the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces. The key to the efficient integration and mutual reinforcement of &#8216;new-quality productive forces&#8217; and &#8216;new-quality combat capabilities&#8217; lies in aligning demands, coordinating plans, and sharing resources.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>After its absence from the 14th FYP, MCF returned with a bang in the </span><a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/2026special/2026npcandcpcc/6979af4fc6d00ca5f9a08cd6"><span>15th FYP</span></a><span> (2026-2031) under the heading &#8216;Chapter 56: Consolidating and Enhancing the Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities&#8217;. Its opening few sentences give a taste:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>Strengthen military-civilian strategic planning coordination, policy and institutional convergence, and resource and factor sharing. Promote the simultaneous improvement of national defence strength and economic strength. Deepen cross-military-civilian reform. Build a working pattern that is clear in responsibilities, closely collaborative, and standardised and orderly. Accelerate the building of strategic capabilities in emerging fields. Promote the efficient integration and mutual driving of new-quality productive forces and new-quality combat forces.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>The phrase &#8216;the efficient integration of new-quality productive forces and new-quality combat forces&#8217; has become the new watchword. Any shyness around talking about the MCF policy has disappeared. In May 2026, Zhang Zhan, political commissar &#8211; an important official &#8211; at the National University of Defence Technology was explicit. That his musings were circulated by the Central Party School&#8217;s </span><em><span>Study Times</span></em><span> underlines not just the top-level push behind the joining of &#8216;new-quality productive forces and new-quality combat forces&#8217;, but also that this is a whole-of-nation approach, behind which Party committees within private companies, research institutes, and academia must mobilise.</span></p><p><span>The article should be read by foreign companies, research organisations, and anyone cooperating with the PRC in technological areas. Space prevents much quotation, but below are some </span><a href="https://paper.studytimes.cn/cntheory/2026-05/06/content_9956644.html"><span>representative excerpts</span></a><span>:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>This [MCF] is a strategic deployment by the Party Central Committee&#8230;an important guarantee for&#8230;accelerating the building of our military into a world-class force.</span></p><p><span>We must deepen military-civilian cooperation, mount systematic joint tackling efforts, pursue two-way transformation, and accelerate the formation of usable, effective new capabilities for defeating the enemy.</span></p><p><span>To defend territorial sovereignty and integrity, we must strengthen new-quality combat forces through all-domain coordination.</span></p><p><span>To advance the building of a world-class military, we must aim at the frontiers of world science and technology, focus on strategically contested domains, and promote the deep integration and aligned exertion of the innovation chain, industrial chain, capital chain, and talent chain&#8230;Military construction is at a critical period of upgrading quality and increasing efficiency, and emerging domains are the key handle for achieving leapfrog development. To enhance the effectiveness of combat systems, we must thoroughly implement the strategy of military-civil fusion development, give play to the advantages of the new-type whole-nation system&#8230;</span></p><p><span>&#8230;we should explore the establishment of a routinised coordination mechanism that integrates education, science and technology, and talent, applying integrated design and collaborative decision-making in the formulation of plans, project layouts, resource allocation, and performance evaluation, and strengthening institutional linkages on project management, fund use, and personnel flow.</span></p><p><span>We must deeply grasp the contemporary features by which new-quality productive forces and new-quality combat capabilities share technological origins, value orientations, industrial roots, and pathways of advancement, and coordinate the building of strategic emerging industries and new-quality combat forces, promoting the deep coupling of industrial competitiveness with military combat capability and achieving a virtuous interaction and efficient integration of high-quality development and high-level security&#8230;We must&#8230;establish efficient cross-military-civilian, cross-departmental, cross-domain coordination mechanisms&#8230;integrate the development of national defence science and technology into the overall layout of national scientific and technological development&#8230;</span></p><p><span>Seize the keys to fusion and bring out the role of enterprises as the principal actors of scientific and technological innovation. We must&#8230;raise enterprises&#8217; participation and voice in major national and military decisions on scientific and technological innovation&#8230;We must&#8230;improve &#8216;green channels&#8217; for the transfer of frontier scientific and technological results from civilian to military use, accelerating the conversion of innovation results into real productive forces and effective combat capabilities.</span></p><p><span>Only when Party committees (Party leadership groups) at every level genuinely play their role as fortress strongholds, fulfil their main responsibilities, coordinate relations across all parties, and build a governance pattern of top-down connection, left-right coordination, and military-civilian linkage can we break down the walls between military and civilian and overcome departmentalism.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>This is a call for a renewed and systematic effort to share all civilian technology with the military. Companies are to lead, and the Party committees within them and other organisations are to ensure compliance. It is to become &#8216;a governance pattern&#8217;, with no walls separating the military and civilians.</span></p><h4><span>Why the return to a lack of reticence?</span></h4><p><span>A major theme of the 15th FYP was coordinating development and security. It would be unnatural not to mention MCF in that context. Furthermore, the distinction between civil and military uses of technology is </span><a href="https://www.qstheory.cn/20260422/08a0ce1fd470408da91babe55c2dfa4c/c.html"><span>narrowing</span></a><span>:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>With the rapid advancement of science and technology, national strategic competitiveness, social productive forces, and military combat capabilities have become increasingly intertwined; new technologies, industries, and business models have emerged as vital drivers for enhancing the quality of economic and social development and strengthening national security capabilities.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>Additionally, it would be foolish to ignore </span><a href="https://paper.studytimes.cn/cntheory/2026-05/06/content_9956644.html"><span>technological developments</span></a><span>, which could be used in defence:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>Development in emerging domains is driving profound transformations in the forms of warfare and the mechanisms of victory, giving birth to entirely new modes of combat.</span></p><p><span>Furthermore, it [MCF] allows for the better integration of national defence and military development into the national economic and social system, accelerates the effective supply of advanced combat capabilities, leverages all high-quality social resources and advanced achievements to bolster military strength, and secures the strategic initiative in safeguarding national security.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>With international competition heating up, the CCP sees no choice but to pursue MCF:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>Against the backdrop of a new global wave of scientific, technological, and military revolutions, major powers are strategically positioning themselves in these emerging domains, vying to establish comprehensive competitive advantages. In this fiercely competitive landscape, success favours the proactive.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>A more centralised system lends itself to implementing MCF:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>The rapid advancement of strategic high-tech sectors is currently generating new momentum for industrial transformation and creating fresh opportunities for military revolution, making these technologies core elements in developing new-quality productive forces and combat capabilities.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>These reasons for the increased importance of MCF need to be transmitted to the Party members in order to promote implementation, hence the renewed trumpeting of the policy. Moreover, since the Covid-19 pandemic, Xi has been increasingly confident of the rise of the PRC and its technological advances &#8211; or he at least believes it necessary to present greater confidence and to downplay any worry about foreign reactions. Successfully </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/us-china-relations-after-trade-talks#:~:text=Combatting%20the%20rare%20earths%20weapon"><span>wielding</span></a><span> the rare earths weapon against the United States (US) has contributed to such confidence.</span></p><h4><span>What this means for free and open countries</span></h4><p><span>Foreign companies, research institutes, academics, and others must be more aware that if their science and technology research has any defence application, it will be fed into the Chinese defence establishment. That is the system. Governments too need to be clear about this. They must ensure that the message is received and acted upon at the operational, company, or research level.</span></p><p><span>While awareness of which Chinese organisations or individuals may have military connections is important, the CCP&#8217;s ensuring of a whole-of-nation approach means that the focus should be more on specific technologies: is it acceptable to risk this or that technology being shared with the PLA?</span></p><p><span>This makes it important that His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government sets up a central science and technology committee, made up of departmental (ministry) scientific advisers, and which can rule &#8211; quickly &#8211; on specific technologies and cooperation. Such a committee would need close contact with outside subject experts.</span></p><p><span>The seriousness of the MCF issue argues for a further strengthening of the Research Collaboration Advisory Team (RCAT), as well as the team charged with implementing the </span><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/25/contents"><span>National Security and Investment Act</span></a><span>, which regulates technological inward and outward investment. It is not clear what the recent </span><a href="https://www.civilserviceworld.com/news/article/burnham-merges-dbt-with-dsit-and-gives-digital-back-to-dcms"><span>merging</span></a><span> of the Department of Science, Innovation, and Technology with the Department of Business and Trade into the Department for Business, Innovation, Science, and Trade means for the United Kingdom&#8217;s economic security and national security. Six shufflings of the departmental pack for business and science in the last 25 years do not encourage confidence in a settled approach to one of the biggest challenges facing Britain.</span></p><p><span>Meanwhile in the European Union, a report from the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) </span><a href="https://merics.org/en/comment/europes-research-dilemma-balancing-security-and-scientific-cooperation-china"><span>suggests</span></a><span> that most European countries have &#8216;yet to find a consistently workable trade-off between scientific freedom and national security&#8217;. That might be putting it mildly, given that the report indicates that aside from the Government of the Netherlands, most European countries have done little.</span></p><h4><span>Conclusion</span></h4><p><span>The PRC has many excellent scientists. Global science has traditionally been open, with progress promoted by sharing ideas. Limiting cooperation on national security grounds will result in &#8216;lose-lose&#8217;. However, the alternative is &#8216;win for the PRC, lose for the rest&#8217;, as the CCP &#8211; systematically &#8211; harnesses scientific cooperation to its war chariots.</span></p><p><span>Given Beijing&#8217;s increasing support for the Kremlin in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the risk exists of British technology finding its way onto the battlefield in Europe. The chain is clear: sharing technology with a Chinese company, which shares with military organisations, which aid Russia.</span></p><p><span>Free and open countries can go along with some of Xi&#8217;s Panglossian prescriptions, as </span><a href="https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202604/22/content_30152584.html"><span>set out</span></a><span> by Liu Dongmei, Party Secretary of the Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development, in the </span><em><span>People&#8217;s Daily</span></em><span>:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>General Secretary Xi Jinping has further extended science and technology for the people to the global level, proposing &#8216;working hand in hand with all countries in the world to build an open, fair, just, and non-discriminatory international environment for sci-tech development, jointly responding to global challenges such as climate change, food security, and energy security, and making science and technology better serve humanity&#8217;.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>But note should be taken of the title of the piece: &#8216;Strengthening Scientific and Technological Innovation and Advancing Sci-Tech Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening&#8217;. For the CCP, science and technology are matters of &#8216;self-reliance&#8217; and &#8216;self-strengthening&#8217; &#8211; in essence, of ensuring that cooperation is minimised and that the PRC is militarily strong. Increasingly, the wolf does not bother to wear sheep&#8217;s clothing.</span></p><div><hr></div><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The question underlying trade and investment with China: Is it a threat?]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Thinker | No. 10/2026]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/is-china-a-threat</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/is-china-a-threat</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 10:00:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Thinker | No. 10/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png" width="1456" height="1005" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1005,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1563873,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/215630866?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3wsP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F57e3c6f2-bfa6-4fb2-88af-68d3fc08ab3b_1510x1042.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>Getting the United Kingdom&#8217;s (UK) relations with the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) right requires a thorough understanding of the Chinese Communist Party&#8217;s (CCP) domestic and global intentions. In the long run, national and economic security are the same thing. As Chen Yixin, the PRC&#8217;s Minister of State Security, </span><a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2025/1208/c40531-40619369.html"><span>put it</span></a><span>: &#8216;Economic security is the foundation of national security&#8230;Scientific and technological security is the guarantee of national security.&#8217;</span></p><p><span>The CCP is not, contrary to many assertions, </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-tangram-08-2025"><span>a black box</span></a><span>: for the benefit of its members it sets out its intentions clearly in authoritative and authorised speeches, statements, and articles in party-controlled media. Foreign governments must read and set them in context. Many quotations from leaders could have been adduced to reinforce the judgements in this article, but for reasons of length only a few have been selected.</span></p><p><strong><span>The CCP intends the PRC to become the leading global superpower:</span></strong><span> The deadline for this second of the PRC&#8217;s &#8216;two centennial goals&#8217; is 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. This envisages the country as a &#8216;modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, and culturally advanced and harmonious&#8217; &#8211; or, to expand these adjectives: scientifically and technologically advanced; ruled by the CCP; dominating the global economy; possessing the strongest military; respected for its values and ideology; and internally stable and Han-homogenised. The intended consequence is to change global governance so that it better promotes the PRC&#8217;s interests and values. This, and </span><a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/all-research/anti-americanism-will-remain-the-foundation-of-the-prcs-foreign-policy/"><span>anti-Americanism</span></a><span>, are the basis of all Chinese foreign policy &#8211; as well as much of its domestic policy.</span></p><p><strong><span>The CCP sees the United States (US) and its allies as &#8216;hostile foreign powers&#8217;:</span></strong><span> It believes their aim is to suppress the rise (&#8216;rejuvenation&#8217;) of the PRC. This motif is prevalent in official CCP statements:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>...the position of Western anti-China forces to pressure for urgent reform won&#8217;t change, and they will </span><a href="https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation"><span>continue</span></a><span> to point the spearhead of Westernising, splitting, and &#8216;Colour Revolutions&#8217; at China.</span></p><p><span>Various hostile forces will never allow us to </span><a href="https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2022-01/01/c_1128219233.htm"><span>realise</span></a><span> the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation smoothly.</span></p><p><span>In particular, Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-round containment, encirclement, and suppression against China, </span><a href="http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-03/06/c_1129417096.htm"><span>bringing</span></a><span> unprecedentedly severe challenges to our country&#8217;s development.</span></p></blockquote><p><strong><span>In the war between economic, political, and value systems, science and technology is the main battlefield:</span></strong><span> The trade war is less important, since victory there will follow victory elsewhere. In 2023, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, was clear on this:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>Fundamentally, we must rely on scientific and technological innovation. Whether we can fully build a modern socialist power as scheduled </span><a href="https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-06/15/c_1130162887.htm"><span>depends</span></a><span> on self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology.</span></p><p><span>The science and technology revolution and the game being played between the great powers are intertwined, and the high-tech field has become the front line and main battlefield of international competition, profoundly </span><a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/xi-jinping-cas-cae-conference-speech-2024/"><span>reshaping</span></a><span> the global order and the pattern of development.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>Two months later, these words were repeated by Yin Hejun, the PRC&#8217;s Minister of Science and Technology, who </span><a href="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-08/22/nw.D110000renmrb_20240822_1-09.htm"><span>added</span></a><span>: &#8216;The competition between countries is a competition of strength. What is crucial is the competition of scientific and technological innovation capabilities.&#8217; Mei Yonghong, a senior ex-official at the Ministry of Science and Technology and now a director of a major Chinese corporation, </span><a href="https://www.eastisread.com/p/bgis-mei-yonghong-on-chinas-past?hide_intro_popup=true"><span>put</span></a><span> it more starkly:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>The core of the US-China rivalry is the technology war&#8230;Many people talk about financial and trade wars, but the deadliest battle is the technology war. The technology war will ultimately determine the fate of both sides. Whether the US can defeat China or whether China can rise from adversity will depend on the technology war. I also believe that the technology war is not an encounter battle, but protracted.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>A commentary in the </span><em><span>People&#8217;s Daily</span></em><span>, the official newspaper of the CCP, </span><a href="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-03/19/nw.D110000renmrb_20240319_1-02.htm"><span>emphasised</span></a><span> the need for self-reliance:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>Core technology is an important weapon for the country&#8230;Only by holding key core technologies in our own hands can we fundamentally guarantee national economic security, national defence security, and other security.</span></p></blockquote><p><strong><span>The 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/15th-five-year-plan-a-geopolitical-reading"><span>announced</span></a><span> in March 2026, is the CCP&#8217;s policy answer to struggle with the US and its allies:</span></strong><span> To reduce its over 70,000 characters to the barest of bones, it advocates:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Becoming self-reliant in science and technology;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Dominating existing industries through modernisation based on new science and technology;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Dominating the new science and technology, and thereby the industries of the future;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Avoiding dependencies (science and technology, resources, and other areas); and</span></p></li><li><p><span>Creating free and open nations&#8217; dependencies on the PRC in these areas.</span></p></li></ul><p><strong><span>The 15th FYP also reaffirmed with vigour the long-standing policy of &#8216;Military-Civil Fusion&#8217; (MCF) &#8211; the sharing of research, technology, and innovation:</span></strong><span> Since 2019, mention of MCF had dropped out of speeches, documents, and plans &#8211; likely for fear of free and open nations placing restrictions on technology transfers. It was </span><a href="https://www.thewirechina.com/2024/09/22/chinas-military-civil-defusion/"><span>not included</span></a><span> in the 14th FYP. However, with the CCP&#8217;s burgeoning confidence, it has returned with a vengeance.</span></p><p><span>The 15th FYP has a section entitled &#8216;Chapter 56: Consolidating and Enhancing the Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities&#8217;, whose first sentence urges the PRC to &#8216;Strengthen military-civilian strategic planning coordination, policy and institutional convergence, and resource and factor sharing.&#8217; A full-throated and full-throttle enlargement of that paragraph has come from Zhang Zhan, the CCP&#8217;s head at the National University of Defence Technology, in an article devoted to further </span><a href="https://paper.studytimes.cn/cntheory/2026-05/06/content_9956644.html"><span>integration</span></a><span> of MCF:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>&#8230;we should explore the establishment of a routinised coordination mechanism that integrates education, science and technology, and talent, applying integrated design and collaborative decision-making in the formulation of plans, project layouts, resource allocation, and performance evaluation, and strengthening institutional linkages on project management, fund use, and personnel flow.</span></p><p><span>&#8230;integrate the development of national defence science and technology into the overall layout of national scientific and technological development, strengthen the coordination of military modernisation with the country&#8217;s medium- and long-term development plans and the development plans for strategic emerging industries, establish efficient cross-military-civilian, cross-departmental, cross-domain coordination mechanisms, and design in a unified way the development positioning and strategic layout of innovation platforms of all kinds and levels, promoting the integrated linkage and resonance of economic development and national defence construction.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>MCF is particularly concerning given Chinese support for Russia in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The risk exists of British technology finding its way onto the battlefield in Europe via sharing with a Chinese company, which has no choice but to share with military organisations in the PRC, which in turn are aiding Russia.</span></p><h4><span>Conclusions</span></h4><p><span>There are two types of threat. The first is being overwhelmed by the Chinese economic model/system; the export of its &#8216;involution&#8217;/overcapacity. The CCP is looking to dominate the &#8216;fourth industrial revolution&#8217;, creating geopolitical leverage through dependencies.</span></p><p><span>Meeting this threat requires a vigorous coalition of allies to push back together against Chinese subsidies, the PRC&#8217;s deliberately repressed exchange rate, and CCP leverage of its control of critical supplies. It requires the drawing up of a new system of trade and investment rules, which would exclude those who refuse to play by them while protecting those who follow them, given that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is already compromised.</span></p><p><span>The second threat is the national security threat from the science and technology embedded in goods; components; and technologies exported, imported, or invested in. Here, four protective measures are urgently needed:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Ensuring that those in government, parliament, business, and elsewhere have a proper understanding of the vulnerabilities and the CCP&#8217;s methods of exploiting them. An audit of vulnerabilities is badly needed, as is greater coordination with experts outside of His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>An evaluation and reinforcement of the efficacy of legislation already passed,</span><strong><span> </span></strong><span>such as the National Security Investment Act, the Procurement Act (whose debarment list, intended to exclude from government procurement technologies endangering national security, remains empty), and the National Security Act, where the PRC should be placed upon the Enhanced Tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS).</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Reinforcement of such organisations as the Research Collaboration Advisory Team (RCAT), which raises awareness of dangers among researchers &#8211; perhaps giving it more teeth, as well as looking at whether the Advanced Technology Approval Scheme, which oversees the appropriateness of issuing visas to those seeking to research science and technology, could be improved.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Building institutions and structures within HM Government to ensure consistent policy and to reconcile different interests. It is not clear whether departmental scientific advisers meet on a regular basis to consider where the threat lines on technology must be drawn. Are mechanisms for disseminating scientific advice established, clear, and speedy (given that technology and business cannot wait)? Where national security and economic considerations are in opposition, is there a mechanism &#8211; at a sufficiently senior level &#8211; for deciding which should prevail?</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Both threats, if not resisted, would lead to the UK becoming a distant satrapy of the PRC &#8211; ultimately poorer and loosely administered, but subject to a degree of interference well beyond the already unacceptable level it is already experiencing.</span></p><div><hr></div><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p><p><em>This article is a republication of the submission to the House of Commons Business and Trade Committee&#8217;s <strong><a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/work/9660/china-and-the-uk-economy/">inquiry</a></strong>.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[South Korean chipmakers test transfer to Chinese equipment]]></title><description><![CDATA[Chinese robots arm British warehouses; European officials request stricter investment laws while courting Chinese business]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/south-korean-chipmakers-test-transfer</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/south-korean-chipmakers-test-transfer</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 15:15:07 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1551791,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/210086077?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!16-V!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68c97c8a-e7fc-45cb-af88-9608246922be_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>As Beijing&#8217;s political elites have been holidaying and strategising on their annual seaside </span><a href="https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/08/03/china-cues-start-of-leaders-secretive-beidaihe-summer-retreat"><span>retreat</span></a><span> to Beidaihe, Chinese robot factories have been churning out humanoids and other robotics faster than you can say &#8216;I&#8217;ll be back.&#8217; At the same time, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is trying to keep up with all the new products it aims to </span><a href="https://www.thetimes.com/article/a3bc57d1-923e-48bc-b299-7fe1dbe02831?shareToken=07c4d77f2ca61b01a450411ac6e29660"><span>ban</span></a><span> from the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) with the capacity to be remotely controlled by their manufacturing country, which includes robots, power inverters, and a plethora of other goods.</span></p><p><span>Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Japan </span><a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/08/04/japans-2026-defense-white-paper-digest"><span>published</span></a><span> its Defence White Paper, which made the case for its military build-up and described the PRC as a &#8216;challenge&#8217; to the international world order. Military experts expect policymakers in Tokyo to call for further increases in defence spending, aimed primarily at deterring the PRC from starting a conflict over Taiwan, which could implicate Japan into a long-term war. Beijing had a lot to say about this.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/south-korean-chipmakers-test-transfer">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Iran buys 400 missiles from China]]></title><description><![CDATA[Sweden designates mining a national security issue; Britain&#8217;s university links to Chinese defence revealed]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/iran-buys-400-missiles-from-china</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/iran-buys-400-missiles-from-china</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 15:30:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1885102,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/209128763?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z5qU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ba7bf28-c87c-49b4-93a2-3b44955254f4_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>If you&#8217;ve been reading the news, or only skimming the headlines over the past few months, you will have seen just how ubiquitous the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) seems to be.</span></p><p><span>Be it semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence (AI), numerous state visits to Beijing, trade wars with Brussels or Washington, it is clear that the PRC is shaping global trends. However, it can still be difficult to discern what powers this ubiquitous presence on the world stage.</span></p><p><span>Through my analysis, I hope to show that mostly, Beijing does indeed have a strategy linking its global engagement in these sectors, and often that becomes clearest in the developments which do not get the most attention in the headlines.</span></p><p><span>In the past week, Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, has met with his counterparts from Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan, respectively. He met with them as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led economic and security organisation positioned as a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) &#8211; an equivalence which members of the SCO vehemently disagree with. Beijing, as I </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/nato-a-warmonger-china-says"><span>wrote</span></a><span> in a recent newsletter, sees NATO as a &#8216;warmonger&#8217;, and itself as a peacemaker.</span></p><p><span>The SCO continues to morph into something beyond a sinocentric security organisation; as I explain below, it is a forum where Beijing &#8211; clearly the most powerful member &#8211; can soft-launch its foreign policy strategies to a group of friends before hopefully extending them beyond the bloc in the coming years.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/iran-buys-400-missiles-from-china">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[China-Thailand direct train link planned]]></title><description><![CDATA[Beijing and Washington to host official AI dialogue; China conducts live-fire exercise in Japan&#8217;s EEZ]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/china-thailand-direct-train-link-planned</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/china-thailand-direct-train-link-planned</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:00:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1721465,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/208208567?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!txfO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd39af17d-77b7-4582-8f8b-0b23421e0b8a_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>It has barely been a week since my last newsletter but a lot has happened.</span></p><p><span>Developments in the South China Sea reached explosive new heights last Sunday, when for the first time, Beijing conducted a live fire drill in Japan&#8217;s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) &#8211; just two weeks after test-firing its first ever dummy warhead from a nuclear submarine into the waters of the Pacific.</span></p><p><span>On Monday, Andy Burnham officially became the United Kingdom&#8217;s (UK) latest Prime Minister, prompting a rather anodyne congratulatory </span><a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202607/21/content_WS6a5eba05c6d00ca5f9a0c52e.html"><span>message</span></a><span> from Li Qiang, Premier of the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC), on his appointment. That said, more insightful analysis from Chinese think tankers on what Burnham&#8217;s premiership could mean for UK-PRC relations is included in section </span><strong><span>4.1</span></strong><span> below.</span></p><p><span>Last Friday, we obtained a clearer idea of what Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), was trying to say during a rambling speech about supposed election interference by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mark Warner, a US Senator and Vice-Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/16/trump-tv-address-thursday"><span>clarified</span></a><span> that while Beijing is a serious strategic competitor to Washington, and does pose threats, regarding foreign interference in the specific elections mentioned by Trump, &#8216;the facts have not changed&#8217;. It is more likely that the President is &#8216;distorting&#8217; these threats for political purposes.</span></p><p><span>This topic was apparently left unmentioned during the recent meeting between the American and Chinese foreign ministers during the sidelines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, which began in Manila on Tuesday.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/china-thailand-direct-train-link-planned">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Does Tokyo’s shifting defence posture change Beijing’s strategic calculus?]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Tangram | No 05.2026]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-tangram-05-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-tangram-05-2026</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Lena Stein]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:00:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>This is the 14th Tangram from </strong><em><strong>Observing China</strong></em><strong>, where the leading China experts give a diverse range of succinct responses to key questions on the development of the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC).</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1239382,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/208046072?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!f-Sa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3e69d97b-ace7-44c2-b181-4df6cc91ce47_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>Driven by the People&#8217;s Republic of China&#8217;s (PRC) opaque, sustained militarisation over the last two decades &#8211; as well as its growing assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific region &#8211; Tokyo&#8217;s relationship with Beijing has shifted. In response, Tokyo has embarked on a historic modernisation of the Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF), marked by a 9.4% defence budget increase, the deployment of missile launchers, and a rhetorical shift away from conditional pacifism. For the PRC, the suggestion by Sanae Takaichi, Prime Minister of Japan, that a Taiwan conflict could trigger Japanese military involvement poses a significant threat to Chinese ambitions. While both nations maintain deep economic interdependence, mutual suspicions have spiked.</span></p><p><span>The PRC has sought to denounce these defensive measures as &#8216;reckless new militarism&#8217;. Simultaneously, Beijing has intensified its pressure campaign by imposing dual-use export controls on dozens of Japanese companies, leveraging economic sanctions, and conducting joint bomber exercises near Japanese airspace. While diplomacy continues ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen in November 2026, the PRC&#8217;s risk tolerance over potential Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency &#8211; as well as its willingness to force a confrontation over its claims to the Senkaku Islands &#8211; remains uncertain.</span></p><p><span>Regardless of the immediate fallout, this friction serves as a test for the PRC&#8217;s regional military posture and its broader geopolitical vision. As Tokyo solidifies its deterrence capabilities, whether Beijing alters its assertive trajectory or further escalates its security policy warrants investigation.</span></p><p><span>This forms the basis of this month&#8217;s Tangram, where six experts weigh in with their observations to answer the following question: </span><strong><span>Does Tokyo&#8217;s shifting defence posture change Beijing&#8217;s strategic calculus?</span></strong></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><span>Prof. Nobukatsu Kanehara</span></strong></p><p><em><span>Executive Director, Sasakawa Peace Foundation; Professor, Reitaku University; and International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy</span></em></p><p><span>The Pacific region after the Second World War has been an almost exclusive sphere of influence of the United States (US). The PRC is the first challenger to America, and has an ambition to carve out its own sphere of interest, as well as to annex the free and democratic island of Taiwan.</span></p><p><span>The US has only five allies in the region; Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. Japan&#8217;s role is important to engage America in the Indo-Pacific region, all the more so as the US now represents only 25% of the world economy and Donald Trump, President of the US, is anti-globalist and increasingly inward looking. Japan should thus bear the larger burden.</span></p><p><span>The biggest issue for America and its allies in the region is to prevent a Taiwan contingency involving the PRC. Such a conflict would devastate the frontline players like Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines. The East and South China seas would be closed for the merchant ships as they would become battlefields. Maritime trade with the PRC would be cut off totally. In the short term, investment in dollars and euros would desert East Asia. A Taiwan contingency would involve the world&#8217;s biggest national economies, and would have a huge impact upon the global economy. It must be prevented.</span></p><p><span>In 2015, Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister of Japan, changed the constitutional interpretation so that Japan could participate in regional contingencies, i.e., the ones that could involve American forces in Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines. Under the </span><a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&amp;a/ref/1.html"><span>Japan-US Security Treaty</span></a><span> signed in 1960, If the US intervenes in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Japan has to let American forces use their bases in its territory. Abe declared that, in addition to this, Japan could also join the fighting in the context of collective self-defence.</span></p><p><span>The JSDF are almost 250,000 personnel strong, with roughly 300 combat aircraft, 50 destroyers, and more than 20 submarines. This is a substantial amount to help the US. Fumio Kishida, former Prime Minister of Japan, decided to double the defence budget, and Takaichi will accomplish the goal this year. It will be more than </span><a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html"><span>JP&#165;11 trillion</span></a><span> (&#163;50 billion), although it seems smaller than expected in dollar terms because of the yen&#8217;s drastic depreciation: US$1 is JP&#165;160 today; it was JP&#165;110 at the time of Abe.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://esil.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/experts/athena-tong/?lang=en">Athena Tong</a></strong></p><p><em><span>Visiting Researcher, Research Centre for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST), University of Tokyo</span></em></p><p><span>Japan&#8217;s defence transformation is reshaping the regional security landscape, but Beijing has yet to revise its own strategic calculus fundamentally. The 2026 defence budget exceeds the 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) benchmark two years ahead of schedule. Type 12 and Type 25 standoff missiles are beginning to enter service across the Southwest Islands, defence equipment transfer rules have been liberalised, and Takaichi has stated more explicitly than her predecessors that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a survival-threatening situation for Japan. Together, these developments mark the continued normalisation of Tokyo&#8217;s conventional deterrent rather than a fundamental departure from its post-war security policy.</span></p><p><span>Beijing, however, has incorporated these developments into its longstanding narrative of Japanese remilitarisation and strategic encirclement, rather than treating them as a reason for restraint. Its response has remained consistent with that assessment. Psychological, legal, and information pressure has increasingly focused on Takaichi personally. Joint bomber patrols with Russia continue to test Japan&#8217;s air defence posture. At the same time, two rounds of export control listings have named around 80 Japanese entities, including four defence research institutions, extending economic coercion into the sectors that underpin the country&#8217;s long-term defence industrial base.</span></p><p><span>This reflects the PRC&#8217;s assessment that Japan&#8217;s trajectory matters more than its current capabilities. While Tokyo has committed unprecedented resources to defence, many of its most significant capabilities will only become operational over the coming decade. Munitions stockpiles remain limited, missile defence capacity continues to face pressure, and sustainment remains an area requiring further investment. From Beijing&#8217;s perspective, this leaves a window in which coercion below the threshold of armed conflict can impose political and economic costs on Japan before its military modernisation reaches full effect.</span></p><p><span>That window, however, is not indefinite. If Tokyo holds the line at 2% and resists pressure to overreach towards the higher targets now under debate, deepens interoperability with Washington, and closes the gap on sustainment, the deterrent value becomes far harder for Beijing to discount. At that point, the strategic balance underpinning the PRC&#8217;s calculations over the First Island Chain begins to shift more fundamentally.</span></p><p><span>For now, Japan&#8217;s changing defence posture has not deterred the PRC from increasing pressure. Instead, it has prompted Beijing to intensify coercive measures designed to slow or raise the domestic costs of Tokyo&#8217;s strategic shift. Whether Japan ultimately changes the Chinese calculus will depend less on the scale of today&#8217;s budget increases than on its ability to sustain the reforms already underway and to translate political commitments into operational capability.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><span>Dr I-Chung Lai</span></strong></p><p><em><span>President, The Prospect Foundation</span></em></p><p><span>Since late last year, Beijing has noticeably intensified its diplomatic and rhetorical attack against Tokyo. Initially, the PRC focused its criticism on Japan&#8217;s growing willingness to support Taiwan during a specific cross-strait contingency scenario. However, this has recently escalated into more aggressive direct accusations of &#8216;new militarism&#8217; &#8211; a provocative charge that Shinjir&#333; Koizumi, Minister of Defence of Japan, firmly and publicly </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8p4ejy8ppo"><span>refuted</span></a><span> during his remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.</span></p><p><span>Interestingly, Beijing remained relatively quiet when Tokyo first announced its historic arms buildup and defence policy overhaul in 2022. This sudden, sharper reaction indicates a fundamental shift in the PRC&#8217;s strategic assessment of Japan. This recalibration was likely triggered by the country&#8217;s rightward political turn and the Takaichi administration&#8217;s more explicit, public support for Taiwan. Anticipating a much more hawkish stance in Tokyo&#8217;s upcoming defence documents, Beijing has proactively reformulated its strategic posture toward its neighbour.</span></p><p><span>While Japan&#8217;s public alignment with Taiwan will not alter the core determination displayed by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to achieve unification during his tenure, the &#8216;Takaichi factor&#8217; forces Beijing to recalculate its military options. The PRC can no longer plan solely for possible American military intervention in a Taiwan scenario; it must now seriously factor in a more responsive and substantial Japanese involvement.</span></p><p><span>Compounding the PRC&#8217;s security anxieties is Japan&#8217;s fundamental transition from passive, post-war self-defence to a more proactive, potentially pre-emptive posture. This is underscored by Tokyo&#8217;s planned deployment of long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of striking targets directly within Chinese territory. Furthermore, Japan has expanded its regional security profile by providing critical defence capacity building assistance to the PRC&#8217;s maritime neighbours, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. This defence initiative has significantly enhanced Japan&#8217;s security cooperation with countries surrounding the PRC, causing visible anxiety in Beijing.</span></p><p><span>Ultimately, Beijing structurally objects to Tokyo assuming a leadership role in East Asia, just as it opposes India&#8217;s dominant position in South Asia. The PRC views its competition with both nations as an immutable reality dictated by strategic geography, largely independent of their specific positions on Taiwan. Even if Tokyo and New Delhi remained entirely passive on cross-strait issues, Beijing would still view them as strategic competitors in a region where it believes it should enjoy exclusive hegemony. The PRC&#8217;s heightened diplomatic offensive and high-profile criticism this year reflect its deep concern over Japan&#8217;s increasingly competitive regional trajectory.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://x.com/alyssachen_cyx"><span>Alyssa Chen</span></a></strong></p><p><em><span>Indo-Pacific-focused Journalist and Independent Researcher</span></em></p><p><span>Japan&#8217;s deployment of long-range counterstrike missiles and its decision to lift restrictions on lethal arms exports mark a fundamental recalibration of its post-war defence posture. Koizumi has even </span><a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/07/19/japan/politics/koizumi-japan-nuclear-weapons-debate/"><span>called</span></a><span> for an open debate on nuclear weapons &#8211; something once unthinkable given Japan&#8217;s post-war pacifism. For the PRC, these developments introduce uncomfortable complications into its strategic calculation regarding Taiwan.</span></p><p><span>Tokyo&#8217;s expanding military capabilities now force Beijing to contemplate a genuinely multi-theatre conflict scenario. Long-range missiles positioned along Japan&#8217;s south-western islands can cover the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and some parts of the Chinese mainland. Perhaps more troubling for Beijing is how the loosening of arms export restrictions enables regional partners, such as the Philippines, to acquire advanced systems.</span></p><p><span>When these countries operate compatible Japanese-sourced equipment and have trained alongside the JSDF, the PRC must plan not for isolated contingencies but for coordinated responses across multiple potential flashpoints simultaneously. This represents a dramatically more complex operational challenge than previously faced.</span></p><p><span>These defence developments cannot be easily reversed, and Beijing is aware of this reality. That is why it has stepped up accusations of Japan attempting to revive militarism while reacting fiercely. Yet, the implications extend beyond immediate military calculations. Chinese scholars now largely believe that the deterioration in bilateral ties, coupled with Tokyo&#8217;s evolving defence posture, represents not another cyclical downturn but systemic structural decline. The 2014 APEC model &#8211; when Xi and Abe&#8217;s handshake broke the ice between the two nations &#8211; appears unlikely to be replicated in Shenzhen in November.</span></p><p><span>If Chinese strategists conclude that Japan&#8217;s military modernisation and regional security network will only strengthen with time, the logical implication is to act before that transformation becomes mature and interoperability becomes deeply embedded. Rather than deterring Chinese action, Tokyo&#8217;s evolving posture may compress Beijing&#8217;s perceived window of opportunity.</span></p><p><span>The uncomfortable reality is that Japan&#8217;s shifting defence posture does change the PRC&#8217;s strategic calculus, but not necessarily in ways that enhance stability or deterrence. Whether this ultimately accelerates or delays Chinese action remains an open question, which will require time and access to Chinese strategic thinking to answer.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/owen-au-01oa/"><span>Owen Au</span></a></strong></p><p><em><span>Founder, Strategic China Policy Group</span></em></p><p><span>Tokyo&#8217;s changing defence posture does not fundamentally alter Beijing&#8217;s strategic calculus, but it does make that calculus considerably more complicated.</span></p><p><span>For much of the post-war period, Asian security rested on a &#8216;hub-and-spokes&#8217; system of bilateral alliances centred on the US. Although regional institutions and minilateral groupings have since proliferated, American security guarantees remain the foundation of the region&#8217;s security architecture. The so-called &#8216;</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/17/world/americas/trump-latin-america-monroe-doctrine.html"><span>Donroe Doctrine</span></a><span>&#8217; under the second Trump administration points towards a different worldview, in which major powers exercise greater control within their respective spheres of influence and US commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere become more selective and transactional.</span></p><p><span>Having long sought to expand its regional primacy without triggering a direct military confrontation with Washington, Beijing sees uncertainty over American commitments as a strategic opportunity. In this context, Japan&#8217;s changing posture complicates Chinese calculations in at least two ways.</span></p><p><span>Firstly, stronger Japanese capabilities may reinforce the US presence in the region. Trump has repeatedly portrayed American alliances as unequal burdens and </span><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/04/japan-trump-tariffs-negotiation-security-trade#:~:text=Yet%20shortly%20after%2C%20Trump%20called%20the%20alliance%20%E2%80%9Cone%2Dsided%E2%80%9D%20in%20favor%20of%20Japan%2C%20a%20claim%20he%20repeated%20in%20an%20April%20Cabinet%20meeting."><span>criticised</span></a><span> the US-Japan security relationship as &#8216;one-sided&#8217;. By increasing defence expenditure and modernising its military, Japan is seeking to establish itself as a more capable &#8211; and therefore more valuable &#8211; ally. If Tokyo can demonstrate that it is shouldering more of the regional defence burden, Washington may have a stronger incentive to maintain its forward presence despite its increasingly transactional approach. Any Chinese operation involving Taiwan or the East China Sea must therefore account for a more resilient alliance and a wider network of launch sites, sensors, and defensive assets.</span></p><p><span>Secondly, a Japan more committed to regional security could help build a denser network of partnerships less dependent on shifts in US policy. Its expanding cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, and South East Asian partners includes joint exercises, defence equipment transfers, reciprocal access agreements, and maritime capacity building. Although these initiatives remain far short of a formal alliance system independent of the US, they nonetheless point towards a regional order less vulnerable to sudden changes in Washington and better able to raise the political and operational costs of Chinese coercion.</span></p><p><span>Japan&#8217;s defence buildup is unlikely to match the scale or pace of the PRC&#8217;s in the near future, but it is making it harder for Beijing to assume that uncertainty over American commitments would automatically translate into Chinese predominance.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://x.com/william_freer">William Freer</a></strong></p><p><em>Research Fellow (National Security), Council on Geostrategy</em></p><p><span>Japan&#8217;s rearmament efforts, which have been both physical and cognitive, will have a real impact on Beijing&#8217;s strategic calculus. It is important to recognise however, that this rearmament is not unprecedented since the end of the Second World War.</span></p><p><span>Through the 1960s and 1970s, Japan underwent a comprehensive rearmament effort which resulted in a highly capable Self-Defence Force designed to deter and, if necessary, fight the Soviet Union in the Pacific. Tokyo&#8217;s more modern &#8216;security renaissance&#8217; has been a slow burn at first, with post-Cold War peace dividend thinking slowly put to bed owing to the enormous and sustained military buildup and modernisation of the Chinese military.</span></p><p><span>In the physical realm, Japan has been playing catch-up, made difficult by an ageing population and stagnant economy. Yet, Tokyo is responsible for the world&#8217;s tenth largest defence budget, with plans to raise it further in the coming years. Japan also gets serious &#8216;bang for its buck&#8217; with its budget. It has more than 20 conventional submarines, over 50 major surface combatants, over 300 combat aircraft, and a capable suite of both offensive and defensive missile capabilities.</span></p><p><span>The JSDF are both growing and modernising, and are well designed to contribute to a potential fight against the PRC in the Western Pacific. Japan&#8217;s growing capabilities will weigh heavily on the minds of Chinese military planners. Tangled with American military forces and well versed in training for local contingencies, the JSDF would make a significant contribution if drawn into a conflict.</span></p><p><span>Almost as important as the growing capabilities has been the mindset shift. Where in previous decades Beijing may have calculated that Tokyo would be more likely to try and avoid intervention in a regional conflict due to internal political debates, this assumption is no longer as certain. This cognitive rearmament has included legal changes which now allow Japan to join conflict in defence of allies and reduced export controls on defence equipment. The activities of the JSDF have also become bolder, including plans for forward deployment of anti-ship missiles on Yonaguni Island (the closest Japanese island to Taiwan), and joining US-Philippines exercises as combatants for the first time as opposed to observers.</span></p><p><span>Beijing now has to assume that the full weight of an increasingly capable Japan must be factored into any potential plans for military aggression in the Western Pacific, seriously bolstering deterrence against the PRC.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong>If you would like to explore any of the Council on Geostrategy&#8217;s PRC-focused research papers, <a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/china-observatory/">click here</a> to visit the China Observatory.</strong></p><h6>The image at the top of this page has been generated using AI.</h6><div><hr></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[China offers AI training to developing countries]]></title><description><![CDATA[Manila outraged at monkey video; Record exports from PRC]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/china-offers-ai-training</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/china-offers-ai-training</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 16:15:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1563839,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/207446473?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tD3q!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2035d45d-4631-463f-be3b-383c793d1f04_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>Endless names of forums and acronyms can become tiresome, to the point that their significance is lost. But today, an Artificial Intelligence (AI) forum opens in Shanghai &#8211; hosted annually by the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC), previous guests have included Elon Musk.</span></p><p><span>This year, for the first time since the conference began in 2018, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), appeared in person and gave a keynote speech. He has announced measures which promote the PRC&#8217;s use of AI as a force for good &#8211; some of which are sure to entice new and emerging partners.</span></p><p><span>At the same time, others continue to point out areas where Beijing could do more to exert its influence to achieve peace.</span></p><p><span>Last week, I </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/nato-a-warmonger-china-says"><span>wrote</span></a><span> how during a meeting with Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, his counterpart Espen Barth Eide </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/nato-a-warmonger-china-says"><span>applied</span></a><span> pressure for the PRC to use its influence with the Kremlin to convince Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, to enter into negotiations over a peace deal with Ukraine.</span></p><p><span>Last Friday, Lindsey Graham, United States (US) Senator, echoed the same sentiments during a visit to Kyiv, </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-can-help-end-ukraine-war-by-pressuring-russia-us-senator-graham-says-2026-07-10/"><span>stating</span></a><span> that the PRC has an &#8216;oversized&#8217; influence over Putin, even going so far as to say that &#8216;the road to ending this &#8288;war, the road to peace, passes through Beijing more than it does (through) Washington, Kyiv, or Moscow.&#8217;</span></p><p><span>Just a couple of weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Beijing and Moscow signed their &#8216;no limits&#8217; strategic partnership.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/china-offers-ai-training">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The ‘China Audit’ one year on: Clarification, procrastination, or obfuscation?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 4: Any the wiser, continued]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-4</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-4</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:00:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Thinker | No. 09/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:477389,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/207139299?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B-A1!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6a7f041b-203b-4ee3-81b8-632adca6df40_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><em>This article is the fourth and final part of a mini-series analysing the &#8216;China Audit&#8217; one year after the publication of His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government&#8217;s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-2025-security-for-the-british-people-in-a-dangerous-world">National Security Strategy</a>. Part 1 can be read <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-1">here</a>, Part 2 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-2">here</a>, and Part 3 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-3">here</a>.</em></p><div><hr></div><p><span>The intended outcomes &#8211; or &#8216;deliverables&#8217; in Whitehall speak &#8211; of the &#8216;China Audit&#8217; were mutually contradictory. How could guidance to business, academia, and others be clear if no audit document was published? David Lammy, then Foreign Secretary, declared, &#8216;Honourable Members will understand that much of the audit was conducted at high classification.&#8217; However, Honourable Members did not understand. As Dame Emily Thornberry, Chair of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, </span><a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/78/foreign-affairs-committee/news/208240/china-audit-we-are-operating-in-the-dark/"><span>commented</span></a><span>:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>We were promised a &#8216;full and comprehensive audit on the breadth of the UK&#8217;s [United Kingdom] relationship with [the People&#8217;s Republic of] China [PRC]&#8217;. Instead, we were given three paragraphs on page 39 of the </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-2025-security-for-the-british-people-in-a-dangerous-world"><span>National Security Strategy</span></a><span>&#8230;We haven&#8217;t seen the Audit and we don&#8217;t know what&#8217;s in the strategy &#8211; which should apply to government, local government, business, universities, and particularly the technology sector.</span></p><p><span>Surely, we all need to know this so that we can act together in our approach towards [the PRC]. The Government says the purpose of the Audit was to ensure that we have a consistent attitude towards [the PRC] &#8211; how can we do that if we don&#8217;t know what it is?</span></p></blockquote><p><span>The addition of three &#8211; anodyne &#8211; paragraphs in the National Security Strategy (NSS) hardly constitute clear guidance. Worse, perhaps, is that the &#8216;Strategic Framework&#8217; for guiding departments within His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government, presumably classified as secret, must be off limits to most civil servants &#8211; a very small percentage of whom are vetted to that level.</span></p><p><span>The proof of a strategy fit for purpose lies particularly in reconciling economic and trade policy with environmental and security concerns, in particular, those brought by the advance of science and technology. The silence from Lammy (and the NSS) on the Chinese science and technology threat is extraordinary &#8211; just a short mention of a joint commission on science, nothing on how or where the boundaries of cooperation with a hostile power are to be set.</span></p><p><span>An example of this failure is the contrast between the March 2025 </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-china-clean-energy-partnership/uk-china-memorandum-of-understanding-2025"><span>signing</span></a><span> by Ed Miliband, Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, of a Memorandum of Understanding for a Clean Energy Partnership with the PRC&#8217;s National Energy Administration in Beijing, which included offshore wind, and the decision not to allow Chinese company Ming Yang to invest in production of offshore wind turbines in Scotland. A thought-through strategy should surely have already decided the parameters for investment in the UK&#8217;s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).</span></p><p><span>This same lack of clarity is evident in investment by Chinese Electric Vehicle (EV) manufacturers. Concerns about eventual dependency and control of the British automobile industry, or the ability of the Chinese to switch off trucks, vans and cars (i.e., the UK&#8217;s logistics) via the cellular module or to extract data have yet to be addressed. Even less edifying is the muddle at the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which on the one hand bans Chinese vehicles from certain sites, and advises its people not to talk in Chinese cars for fear of eavesdropping nor to plug in their smart phones, which allows data copying; yet at the same time has </span><a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/spy-mod-china-cars-8hbdbvtsf"><span>over 1,700</span></a><span> Chinese vehicles in its transport fleet.</span></p><p><span>There is scant evidence that HM Government collectively &#8211; both across government departments and in consultation with outside expertise &#8211; has worked up a plan to establish a set of trade and investment rules which defends Britain against the systemic attack of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) model and reinforces the economic system and values in which we believe. To its credit, HM Government has mildly reinforced the National Security and Investment Act and the Research Collaboration Advice Team (which advises academia and others on science and technology collaboration), both 2021 legacies of the previous Conservative administration.</span></p><h4><span>A coherent strategy requires better government structures and better international coordination</span></h4><p><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-2"><span>Part 2</span></a><span> of this mini-series considered the need for top level and regular government meetings on the PRC, with lower-level meetings to monitor implementation of policy as well as regular collective agreement on science and technology policy by departmental scientific advisers through the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee. A prerequisite for a clear PRC policy is clarity about who &#8216;owns&#8217; or is ultimately responsible for such a policy.</span></p><p><span>HM Government should adopt a whole-of-society approach to combat the much-used CCP tactic of going around the back of central governments and dealing directly with local governments, which are often less aware of CCP issues and methods. In the light of the &#8216;Manchesterism&#8217; championed by Andy Burnham, presumed incoming Prime Minister, this assumes greater importance.</span></p><p><span>There is scant evidence that the UK is working more closely with its allies, the &#8216;Five Eyes&#8217; countries, the European Union (EU), and major Asian economies. To return to EVs, no account appears to be taken of the American &#8216;Connected Vehicle Rule&#8217;, which bans Chinese connectivity software and hardware in vehicles, even though the United States (US) is the market destination of over 15% of British vehicles. If the EU takes serious measures against Chinese vehicle exports, the UK will become a dumping ground.</span></p><p><span>The current government would surely not quarrel with the 2023 </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world"><span>Integrated Review Refresh</span></a><span> and its emphasis on &#8216;Shape the international environment &#8211; Shape, balance, compete, and cooperate to create the conditions for an open and stable international order&#8217;. Yet, the current PRC policy, which one senior official described at a non-attributable briefing in early 2025 as &#8216;say more internally, say less externally&#8217;, is hardly designed to give Britain a leading role in shaping the current most important geopolitical issue. Others cannot follow if they do not know where they are being led.</span></p><h4><span>Conclusion</span></h4><p><span>Publishing a strategy is not beyond a Labour government. In January 2009, Gordon Brown, then Prime Minister, issued an official PRC strategy paper: &#8216;The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement&#8217;.</span></p><p><span>Despite its urgency, the current prime ministerial and subsequent ministerial reshuffles will delay work on building a PRC strategy &#8211; or &#8216;strategic framework&#8217;, HM Government&#8217;s preferred term. The economic and national security threats from the PRC&#8217;s science and technology, industrial policies, undervaluation of the currency, and more are already being felt; jobs and prosperity are already being eroded. These effects will be felt even more keenly in the lifetime of this government.</span></p><p><span>A year ago, Lammy said, &#8216;The Audit has painted a complex picture, but it has provided us with a clear way forward. The UK&#8217;s approach to China will be founded on progressive realism&#8217;. This sounds more like an art movement than a political guide. Caspar David Friedrich&#8217;s famous painting &#8216;Wanderer above the Sea of Fog&#8217; comes to mind.</span></p><h4><span>Appendix: Actions to ensure clarity on PRC policy</span></h4><p><span>Without the will to resource or implement, there is no strategy. Below is a selection of actions which would show that the new Prime Minister is more serious than their predecessor about implementing a thought-through strategy. This is by no means an exhaustive list.</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Recognise that the PRC is a threat by including it on the &#8216;enhanced tier&#8217; of the </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/foreign-influence-registration-scheme"><span>Foreign Interests Registration Scheme</span></a><span> under the National Security Act.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Set out in detail those areas where Britain can cooperate with the PRC and within what limits (hitherto much has been said about cooperation on &#8216;global goods&#8217;, but no coherent guidelines have been produced).</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Issue a coherent policy on Chinese investment in the UK, which protects long-term economic and national security and starts with the automotive industry.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Put forward measures to reduce Britain&#8217;s supply chain dependency.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Under the recently passed National Security (State Threats) Act, designate the </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-investigator-03-2024"><span>United Front Work Department</span></a><span> of the CCP as a hostile organisation.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Allot greater funding for the National Security Strategic Investment Fund, to ensure that startup companies with dual-use or emerging technologies do not sell out to Chinese funding.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Populate the &#8216;debarment list&#8217; of the Procurement Act with those Chinese companies the adoption of whose technologies represent a threat to national security (over two years since the Act was passed, the debarment list remains empty).</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Work with the EU and other free and open countries to establish arrangements for trade and investment, similar to those envisaged for the </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-uk-and-the-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnershipcptpp"><span>Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership</span></a><span>.</span></p></li></ul><div><hr></div><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The ‘China Audit’ one year on: Clarification, procrastination, or obfuscation?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 3: Seeking truth from acts]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-3</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-3</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 12:00:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Thinker | No. 08/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:730111,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/207002410?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!iGTU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa0114c68-758e-4a1a-b77d-88ac59287af8_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence</figcaption></figure></div><p><em>This article is the third part of a mini-series analysing the &#8216;China Audit&#8217; one year after the publication of His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government&#8217;s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-2025-security-for-the-british-people-in-a-dangerous-world">National Security Strategy</a>. Part 1 can be read <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-1">here</a>, Part 2 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-2">here</a>, and Part 4 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-4">here</a>.</em></p><div><hr></div><blockquote><p><span>Strategy and tactics are powerful weapons with which our Party leads the people in transforming the world, changing practices, and driving historical progress.</span></p><p><span>&#8211; Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), </span><a href="https://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2023-09/30/c_1129890528.htm"><span>7th February 2023</span></a></p></blockquote><p><span>Labour&#8217;s 2024 general election manifesto </span><a href="https://labour.org.uk/updates/stories/labour-manifesto-2024-sign-up/"><span>promised</span></a><span> to &#8216;improve the UK&#8217;s [United Kingdom] capability to understand and respond to the challenges and opportunities [the People&#8217;s Republic of] China [PRC] poses through an audit of our bilateral relationship.&#8217; A year later in June 2025, David Lammy, then Foreign Secretary, presented the results to Parliament, </span><a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-06-24/debates/63984F18-8D5A-47DF-9B98-9AE010A726BC/ChinaAudit"><span>declaring</span></a><span> that &#8216;the audit is less a single act than an ongoing exercise which will continue to guide the UK&#8217;s approach to China.&#8217; On the anniversary of the &#8216;China Audit&#8217;, how continuous and clear is that guidance?</span></p><h4><span>Aims and intended outcomes</span></h4><p><span>The Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO), charged with carrying out the Audit, spoke of promoting four aims in the conduct of Britain&#8217;s relations with the PRC (discussed at an FCDO briefing on 23rd January 2025):</span></p><ol><li><p><span>Secure growth of the UK&#8217;s economy;</span></p></li><li><p><span>National and international security;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Climate change and energy issues; and</span></p></li><li><p><span>Encouraging the PRC to play a responsible role in the international rules-based order.</span></p></li></ol><p><span>These form a knotty nexus. Trade and investment can cut across security concerns, and climate change emission targets may contradict long-term economic or national security considerations. These contradictions exemplify why the UK needs a PRC strategy &#8211; more so than it does for dealing with the United States (US), the European Union (EU), or Russia. Britain shares interests, values, and history with the first two, while relations with Russia are uncomplicated, if antagonistic. Lammy spoke of Chinese &#8216;attacks on the rules-based order&#8217;, begging the question of how to encourage the PRC to play a responsible international role, given its very different values and interests.</span></p><p><span>The audit was to have four outcomes:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>A public document about the China Audit and British interests. This would be limited in scope;</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>A non-public &#8216;Strategic Framework&#8217;, guiding government departments (ministries) in how to pursue the UK&#8217;s interests;</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Clearer guidance to business, academia, Parliament, and society on how to engage with the PRC; and</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>A review of PRC expertise, both inside and outside government, consideration of how better to ensure that His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government could benefit from outside expertise, and how to ensure longer-term resilience.</span></p></li></ul><h4><strong><span>HM Government&#8217;s progress report card</span></strong></h4><p><span>Space prevents a comprehensive look at all aspects of UK-PRC relations since the China Audit. Those mentioned by Lammy in his statement to Parliament have seen some limited progress.</span></p><p><strong><span>&#8216;On security, the audit described a full spectrum of threats&#8217;</span></strong></p><p><span>Domestically, Lammy mentioned espionage, cyber attacks, transnational repression, and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI); internationally, the PRC&#8217;s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan, and support for Russia in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.</span></p><p><span>Lammy noted that &#8216;We are updating our state threats legislation, following Jon Hall&#8217;s </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/independent-reviewer-of-terrorism-legislation"><span>review</span></a><span>&#8217;, the need for which became obvious when HM Government could not bring itself to deem the PRC a threat for the </span><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ceq057734w1o"><span>espionage trial</span></a><span> of Chris Cash and Chris Berry later that autumn. However, whatever the final National Security (State Threats) Act says (it is still before Parliament), whether the PRC is recognised as a threat and whether action is taken will remain a question of political will.</span></p><p><span>Other responses to the security threats included an increase in funding for the intelligence services of &#163;600 million. This covers the spending review period up to 2028-2029, </span><a href="https://industrialcyber.co/threat-landscape/uk-spending-review-2025-backs-ai-cybersecurity-and-intelligence-modernization/"><span>translating</span></a><span> into an annual increase of below 15%. HM Government has tightened and made more precise the National Security and Investment Act, and has increased sensitive sectors of CNI from 17 to 19.</span></p><p><span>There has been a small uptick in calling out the PRC over cyber attacks. The CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has said that it </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/jun/17/uk-critical-infrastructure-cyber-incidents-ncsc"><span>managed</span></a><span> over 200 incidents in 12 months, 75% identified as coming from state actors. Assuming that a third of those might be Chinese, this is not a vigorous policy of shaming, although there may be operational security reasons for not calling out each and every attack.</span></p><p><span>HM Government has also not been loud in calling out the extent of Beijing&#8217;s support for the Kremlin, although it has started to sanction Chinese companies &#8211; around 20 since the China Audit.</span></p><p><strong><span>Trade and investment</span></strong></p><p><span>Critics of HM Government&#8217;s policy on trade should acknowledge the Audit&#8217;s intention to promote exports. It commends Joint Economic and Trade Commissions and &#8216;the launch of a new online hub bringing together detailed and specific business advice&#8217;. Speaking of &#8216;the important role China can play in delivering UK growth&#8217; may be optimistic, given CCP policies of self-reliance, dual circulation, and &#8216;</span><a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/notice-of-the-state-council-on-the-publication-of-made-in-china-2025/"><span>Made in China 2025</span></a><span>&#8217;, which increasingly result in falling imports. It is also pertinent to ask whether the difficulties of exporting to the PRC mean that HM Government should be putting more effort into supporting exports to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as these collectively add up to around the same as exports to the PRC. While ministerial support and visits are welcome, the efforts of businesses themselves are what determine exporting success.</span></p><p><span>Ministers and officials continue to say that Chinese investment is crucial to British growth prospects. Yet, according to most recent figures from the Office of National Statistics (ONS), of the stock of foreign investment in the UK over the last 25 years, only 0.1% is Chinese (the ONS methodology almost certainly understates the figure, but even at 1% or 2%, it is not high). The future may not be different: a failing Chinese economy is likely to invest less than in the past. Meanwhile, Chinese companies invest not to dispense charity, but to obtain technology. Others &#8211; connected vehicle manufacturers would be an example &#8211; would introduce technology to the UK. In both cases, security grounds suggest rejecting the investment.</span></p><p><strong><span>Values and the rule-based order</span></strong></p><p><span>The China Audit claimed that HM Government would continue to confront the PRC on destabilising activity in the South China Sea, abuses of freedom of navigation, human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet, and commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong. It would not change Britain&#8217;s position on Taiwan.</span></p><p><span>Ministers claim that they raise these issues in meetings with opposite numbers. No doubt they do, although the terms and vigour are not known. However, the CCP no longer listens, no matter which country speaks. Actions are what count, such as sanctioning those responsible for human rights abuses, or making it clear in advance that an invasion or blockade of Taiwan would lead to a panoply of economic sanctions.</span></p><p><span>Domestically, actions such as excluding Confucius Institutes from universities, ensuring that the Chinese Students and Scholars Association acts as a normal university society and not an arm of the CCP and its </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-investigator-03-2024"><span>United Front Work Department</span></a><span>, and full reciprocity over visas for journalists, would make good the China Audit&#8217;s claims of protecting British values.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><em><span>The </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-4"><span>final part</span></a><span> of this mini-series looks at the failure of HM Government to live up to the aims of the China Audit, and offers some recommendations for filling the gaps.</span></em></p><div><hr></div><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[NATO a ‘warmonger’, China says]]></title><description><![CDATA[Beijing goes ballistic in the Indo-Pacific with nuclear submarine; DeepSeek plans to build its own inference chip]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/nato-a-warmonger-china-says</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/nato-a-warmonger-china-says</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 15:00:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:625680,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/206303751?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TqU0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed90277b-e578-4452-a8c9-f63c439baf24_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>Earlier this week, a typhoon </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c79ygnv9e93o"><span>churning</span></a><span> over the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) caused 60,000 people to be evacuated from their homes, prompting the country&#8217;s leadership to call for an &#8216;all out rescue&#8217; effort. As these efforts were underway, facing warnings of the incoming Typhoon Bavi, leaders of member countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) met for an annual summit in Ankara. A tacit </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/08/nato-leaders-world-cup-donald-trump-ankara-summit"><span>agreement</span></a><span> was reportedly made between some to omit mentioning the World Cup red card fiasco to the responsible alliance member, who also happens to be its largest benefactor &#8211; the United States (US).</span></p><p><span>On more serious matters, Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO, </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLM-g-YC-DI"><span>stated</span></a><span> that the alliance cannot afford to be &#8216;naive&#8217; about the PRC, in reference to the recent missile test Beijing conducted only on Monday (see </span><strong><span>2.1</span></strong><span> below).</span></p><p><span>The PRC keeps a watchful eye on NATO. For a long time, the alliance did not solicit emotive analysis from Beijing, although the tone has </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/how-china-now-talks-about-nato-and-why-it-matters-for-the-asia-pacific/"><span>hardened</span></a><span> in the past few years, with an op-ed from state media </span><a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202607/1365401.shtml"><span>published</span></a><span> just yesterday claiming it is &#8216;a Cold War relic that should have long since been consigned to the dustbin of history&#8217;.</span></p><p><span>Beijing&#8217;s concern is whether the alliance may seek to expand its remit to the Indo-Pacific, an anxiety frequently mentioned in international-facing state media. NATO has signed Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes with Japan, and other partnerships with Australia and New Zealand, which the PRC sees as evidence of the alliance &#8216;stirring up conflict and instability&#8217; on its doorstep.</span></p><p><span>As the NATO leaders </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg4e3lwzqzo"><span>agreed</span></a><span> upon a &#163;37 billion missile acquisition, the PRC and Russia held their </span><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/5/china-and-russia-to-hold-annual-joint-naval-drills"><span>annual joint military drills</span></a><span> in the waters and airspace off the coast of Qingdao.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/nato-a-warmonger-china-says">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The ‘China Audit’ one year on: Clarification, procrastination, or obfuscation?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 2: Fostering China knowledge and exchange in the broader community]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-2</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-2</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 09:00:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Thinker | No. 07/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1002999,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/206015282?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-YZb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffe8b9d91-25ad-448a-9a24-60f2eb9013ad_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><em>This article is the second part of a mini-series analysing the &#8216;China Audit&#8217; one year after the publication of His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government&#8217;s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-2025-security-for-the-british-people-in-a-dangerous-world">National Security Strategy</a>. Part 1 can be read <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-1">here</a>, Part 3 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-3">here</a>, and Part 4 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-4">here</a>.</em></p><div><hr></div><h4><span>Benefiting more from current external expertise</span></h4><p><span>The &#8216;China Audit&#8217; team rightly spoke of the need to ensure that His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government benefits from non-government experience of the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC). PRC experts in the United Kingdom (UK) are not thick on the ground. Think tanks can afford very few PRC-focused staff, and have difficulty in offering them meaningful career progression. Funding is scarce and generally businesses are not keen to help out, either because they have no business in the PRC or because they do, and do not want to be associated with free-ranging expressions on the country.</span></p><p><span>Where HM Government does support think tanks, it tends to be project-based, which does little to help pay salaries and running costs. It may fail to give value for money. 18 months ago, the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) launched five tenders of &#163;100,000 to produce one report each. Far more could have been achieved by giving five think tanks a &#163;100,000 grant each, with a requirement to produce 5-10 reports relevant to government concerns (and still have money to finance more work from which HM Government might benefit). Time in preparing the tenders, both in government and think tanks, could be better spent producing useful material.</span></p><p><span>While there has been an increase in meetings between officials and outside experts, it does not appear to be systematic. The same is true of commissioning of reports useful to PRC issues across a variety of departments. Giving the Great Britain-China Centre, or a similar organisation with extensive contacts, a coordinating role to canvas requirements would take the burden off HM Government.</span></p><h4><span>Growing future expertise</span></h4><p><span>The PRC is not going to go away. Growing longer-term expertise from which HM Government can benefit must start now. Unfortunately, an obsession with speaking Mandarin is a hindrance, and the ministers in charge of the Department for Education (DFE) have consistently refused to contemplate changes.</span></p><p><span>Over the last ten years, the Mandarin Excellence Programme has spent &#163;26 million. During that time the number of students taking A Level Chinese language has halved; almost all students already speak a Chinese dialect. The reason is not hard to see. Particularly at A Level, students will avoid subjects where top grades needed for university entrance are difficult to attain. Those new to Chinese cannot compete with native speakers, for whom an A Level is an easy option.</span></p><p><span>One imaginative solution, long campaigned for, is to launch an A Level in Chinese civilisation without a language requirement. This follows the successful model of the classical civilisation A Level, which has helped to raise undergraduate numbers. The likelihood is that the same form of introduction would induce more undergraduates to study Chinese at university, where the language tuition is aimed at non-native speakers.</span></p><p><span>Those campaigning for this new A Level have done the hard preparation of a curriculum. They see no difficulty in getting the financial sponsorship to subsidise it over the first few years: top companies and university bodies such as the Russell Group have already expressed support. Yet, the DFE has consistently blocked the proposal. Incredibly, the curriculum assessment the DFE put out last November does not mention China nor Chinese in its 197 pages, except in one footnote.</span></p><p><span>&#8216;The audit showed that under the last Government there was&#8230;a profound lack of knowledge regarding China&#8217;s culture, history and &#8211; most importantly &#8211; language&#8217;, said David Lammy, then Foreign Secretary, in his June 2025 </span><a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-06-24/debates/63984F18-8D5A-47DF-9B98-9AE010A726BC/ChinaAudit"><span>statement</span></a><span>. HM Government has shown a profound lack of imagination in trying to correct that.</span></p><h4><span>A coherent China strategy requires better government structures</span></h4><p><span>In 2019, HM Government replied to the Foreign Affairs Committee </span><a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/612/612.pdf"><span>report</span></a><span>:</span></p><blockquote><p><span>The policy is underpinned by detailed cross-Whitehall implementation plans against which progress is monitored and directed through regular and frequent meetings of the China National Strategy Implementation Group (NSIG), led by the SRO [Senior Responsible Officer], reporting to the NSC(O) and through that body to the NSC.</span></p></blockquote><p><span>The National Security Council (NSC) rarely discusses the PRC, averaging</span></p><p><span>about once every two years. Senior officials also meet irregularly and infrequently. Very few at Director General level have any direct PRC experience. There should be quarterly meetings of the NSC on the PRC chaired by the Prime Minister, which would reconcile differences over PRC policy between departments. The NSIG has </span><a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/rising-to-the-china-challenge"><span>lost</span></a><span> momentum and relevance. In tandem with quarterly meetings of the NSC, there should be quarterly meetings of the NSC(O), that is of the top officials in departments, chaired by the National Security Adviser (NSA).</span></p><p><span>If this seems excessive, consider the amount of ministerial time spent on crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. The &#8216;urgent&#8217; too often crowds out the &#8216;important&#8217;, and as the head of the German security service </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/german-spy-chief-russia-is-storm-china-is-climate-change-2022-10-17/"><span>said</span></a><span>: &#8216;Russia is the storm, China is climate change.&#8217;</span></p><p><span>Similarly, science and technology issues require a collective consideration by departmental scientific advisers on more than an ad hoc</span><em><span> </span></em><span>basis. HM Government should establish a Scientific Advisory Committee to be a centre of expertise on science and technology security &#8211; the main area of threat &#8211; to coordinate the planning and implementation of protective measures across central and local governments, business, and academia. This would be the ultimate authority for deciding on Chinese investment, cooperation, and involvement in the British economy. It would also inform the Research Collaboration Advice Team in its work on ensuring that scientific and technological research in the UK is not fed into the Chinese Communist Party&#8217;s (CCP) military development programmes, as well as work on the National Security and Investment Act.</span></p><p><span>A coherent PRC strategy also requires ministers and officials to stay in post for far longer than is the current norm. There have been seven foreign secretaries in the last decade, and six ministers of state with responsibility for the PRC. By contrast, in the PRC, apart from the short-lived Qin Gang, Wang Yi has been foreign minister throughout that time. Officials often move jobs after as little as a year, compared to the three years or more of the past. A balance needs to be struck between benefiting from PRC expertise remaining longer in one post and spreading PRC knowledge throughout the system. Currently, promotion chasing incentivises fast rotation between posts.</span></p><h4><span>Conclusion</span></h4><p><span>HM Government&#8217;s elucidation of the implications of the China Audit has been &#8211; to be generous &#8211; sparse. For all Lammy&#8217;s lambasting of the previous government&#8217;s performance on the PRC, the current one has done little better on transparency or accountability. If the new Prime Minister wants Labour  to &#8216;continue to guide the UK&#8217;s approach to China&#8217;, the first step should surely be to work up a clear action plan to deliver FCDO, Whitehall, and wider British societal China expertise. The second would be to set up the structures and command lines to devise and oversee the implementation of a strategy.</span></p><p><span>This would not be expensive. It is a matter of better exploiting the PRC experience that HM Government already has, not least in the FCDO, and ensuring that officials who have picked up useful experience spend more of their careers on the PRC, and are sufficiently rewarded &#8211; in pay and promotion.</span></p><p><span>Funding think tanks and academics is also not expensive. The mentioned &#163;500,000 spent on five reports could have funded a PRC-focused researcher in each of the five think tanks. Furthermore, HM Government could have directed much of that research.</span></p><p><span>Similarly, for the longer term, the expense of getting the youth interested in China studies is not great. For example, those campaigning for a Chinese civilisation A Level have costed implementation for the initial years at &#163;6 million, and are confident that they can find outside sponsorship. Currently, the number of students studying Chinese in Britain is around 250. That number is not sufficient to &#8216;improve the UK&#8217;s capability to understand and respond to the challenges and opportunities China poses&#8217; in future.</span></p><h4><span>Recommendations</span></h4><p><strong><span>Improving &#8216;China literacy&#8217; within the civil service:</span></strong></p><ul><li><p><span>Future cuts in the civil service should take into account specific skills needed;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Mechanisms should be set up within the civil service to incentivise cross postings, which would spread PRC expertise more widely within departments;</span></p></li><li><p><span>The FCDO&#8217;s Supervisory Board and sub-committees should include an official with extensive experience of the PRC. That official should be responsible for ensuring PRC capability and FCDO structures congruent with agreed PRC goals, as well as championing the right approach from the rest of Whitehall and society;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Training on the PRC should be extended to more officials in departments other than the FCDO. More higher level officials should receive such training.</span></p></li></ul><p><strong><span>Fostering China knowledge and exchange in the broader community:</span></strong></p><ul><li><p><span>Increase financial support for think tanks and PRC experts in academia;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Establish a unified system for commissioning work from outside experts and for ensuring the results reach those in all departments with an interest in the topic;</span></p></li><li><p><span>The DFE should accept and promote an A Level in Chinese civilisation.</span></p></li></ul><p><strong><span>Ensuring the creation and implementation of a coherent China strategy:</span></strong></p><ul><li><p><span>The Prime Minister should chair quarterly meetings of the NSC on the PRC;</span></p></li><li><p><span>The NSC(O), chaired by the NSA, should meet at least as often, draw up plans on the PRC and ensure their progress;</span></p></li><li><p><span>HM Government should establish a Scientific Advisory Committee to be a centre of expertise on science and technology security to coordinate the planning and implementation of protective measures across central and local governments, business, and academia;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Ministers and officials should remain a minimum of three years in any PRC-related post.</span></p></li></ul><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The ‘China Audit’ one year on: Clarification, procrastination, or obfuscation?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Part 1: A capable and organised government]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-1</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-1</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles Parton]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 11:00:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>The Thinker | No. 06/2026</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1729329,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/205746616?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BCkE!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa74036a9-ea82-4cc4-83ec-1e260ac08678_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><em><span>This article is the first part of a mini-series analysing the &#8216;China Audit&#8217; one year after the publication of His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government&#8217;s </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-2025-security-for-the-british-people-in-a-dangerous-world">National Security Strategy</a><span>. Part 2 can be read </span><a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-2">here</a>, Part 3 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-3">here</a>, and Part 4 <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-china-audit-one-year-on-part-4">here</a><span>.</span></em></p><div><hr></div><p><span>Labour&#8217;s 2024 general election manifesto </span><a href="https://labour.org.uk/updates/stories/labour-manifesto-2024-sign-up/"><span>promised</span></a><span> to &#8216;improve the UK&#8217;s [United Kingdom] capability to understand and respond to the challenges and opportunities [the People&#8217;s Republic of] China [PRC] poses through an audit of our bilateral relationship.&#8217; A year later in June 2025, David Lammy, then Foreign Secretary, presented the results to Parliament, </span><a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-06-24/debates/63984F18-8D5A-47DF-9B98-9AE010A726BC/ChinaAudit"><span>declaring</span></a><span> that &#8216;the audit is less a single act than an ongoing exercise which will continue to guide the UK&#8217;s approach to China.&#8217;</span></p><p><span>On the anniversary of the &#8216;China Audit&#8217;, this mini-series of articles looks at how continuous and clear that guidance is. This first part considers how well prepared His Majesty&#8217;s (HM) Government and British society is to &#8216;cooperate, compete, challenge&#8217; &#8211; to use Labour&#8217;s slogan. No strategy (strategy, strategic framework, guidance &#8211; the name is not important) is possible if HM Government does not have the requisite China expertise and organisational structures.</span></p><p><span>A new Prime Minister and set of ministers have the opportunity to look again at the UK&#8217;s strategy for dealing with the PRC. They should start by ensuring that the &#8216;capabilities&#8217; are in place, not just for their time in office, but also for the longer term. Will they take it?</span></p><h4><span>Does Britain even need a &#8216;China strategy&#8217;?</span></h4><p><span>The PRC is an exception. In the case of the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, reduced trade and investment on top of overall differences made, and make, policy-making less complex, with fewer diverging interests in government and society. However, the UK has extensive links with the PRC, thus the size of risk and opportunity, the differences in values and interests, are on a different scale from other countries.</span></p><p><span>Strategic guidance is needed to ensure consistency and to reconcile inevitable contradictions between economic growth, national security, and climate change concerns. HM Government is not averse to strategies: a China Strategy was published in 2009, while the 2023 </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world"><span>Integrated Review Refresh</span></a><span> mentioned over 20 strategies (including for Russia and the Pacific) &#8211; but not one for the PRC.</span></p><h4><span>Outcomes of the China Audit</span></h4><p><span>There were to be four outcomes (discussed at a Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office [FCDO] briefing on 23rd January 2025 attended by the author):</span></p><ol><li><p><span>A public document about the China Audit and British interests. This would be limited in scope;</span></p></li><li><p><span>A non-public &#8216;Strategic Framework&#8217;, guiding government departments (ministries) in how to pursue the UK&#8217;s interests;</span></p></li><li><p><span>Clearer guidance to business, academia, Parliament, and society on how to engage with the PRC; and</span></p></li><li><p><span>A review of PRC expertise, both inside and outside government, consideration of how better to ensure that HM Government could benefit from outside expertise, and how to ensure longer-term resilience.</span></p></li></ol><p><span>This article and the one that follows examines the fourth of those aims, namely maximising PRC expertise both inside and outside HM Government. It also looks at what structures are necessary to ensure that understanding of the PRC and its policies are translated into action. Three areas are pertinent: the FCDO, which must ultimately &#8216;own&#8217; PRC policy; wider Whitehall, most of whose departments have concerns over the PRC; and broader society, which may inform HM Government and help to provide or train its officials.</span></p><h4><span>The FCDO: &#8216;Too few mandarins speak Mandarin&#8217;</span></h4><p><span>Lammy spoke of a new PRC &#8216;fast stream&#8217; in the FCDO. However, the present cuts being imposed (around 40% of home posts and 5% of those abroad) are not designed to preserve the China cadre. Redundancies are voluntary and incentivised financially. As often happens, the more able take advantage, knowing that they are employable outside HM Government. There has been no attempt to impose limitations upon those whose skills are in the highest demand. At least two of the FCDO&#8217;s most senior PRC experts have left.</span></p><p><span>Another effect of civil service cuts is as a brake upon interdepartmental exchanges. To be effective, officials in other ministries need to add PRC expertise to their mainstream professional skill set. However, the FCDO, given its fewer posts, is reserving them for its own officers. This prevents the spread of China expertise throughout Whitehall, mirroring a wider problem.</span></p><p><span>Each department manages its own human resources, headcount, and needs. There is no incentive to facilitate career paths that include postings in other departments aimed at acquiring expertise to benefit the civil service as a whole. Cross-postings are therefore few, and usually unattractive, because they may come at the expense of promotion, which remains in the gift of the official&#8217;s parent department.</span></p><p><span>There are no sinologists on the FCDO&#8217;s Supervisory Board, and none in the various sub-committees. One member has &#8211; perhaps dated &#8211; China experience from time serving as adviser to the then Governor of Hong Kong. A second member has served as the Deputy Head of Mission in Beijing, a role more concerned with the management of the embassy and the FCDO network in the PRC than the intricacies of policy and relations.</span></p><p><span>The question of who is responsible for PRC capability is crucial. This surely belongs to the FCDO: the clue is in the name, and indeed in Lammy&#8217;s lead in conducting the China Audit. The current restructuring inside the FCDO aims &#8211; or should do &#8211; to produce a policy machine capable of leading London&#8217;s relations with Beijing. That in turn requires a board-level member responsible for ensuring PRC capability and FCDO structures congruent with agreed PRC goals, as well as championing the right approach from the rest of Whitehall and wider society.</span></p><h4><span>Whitehall PRC expertise</span></h4><p><span>Lammy spoke of a &#8216;global China network and training over 1,000 civil servants on China policy in the past year.&#8217; There has indeed been an increase in PRC training, mainly through the Great Britain-China Centre, a body considerably funded by the FCDO. Perhaps half of the officials who attend its courses are from the FCDO. More need to come from other departments.</span></p><p><span>At the risk of repetition, the PRC&#8217;s policy challenges are cross-cutting. HM Government needs people who understand Chinese energy, currencies, data, and supply chains, hence the importance of rotation between departments.</span></p><p><span>There should be greater participation by senior decision-makers, both in the FCDO and other departments. Training should also be extended to regional governments, where understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its ways lags far behind that in the capital.</span></p><blockquote><p><em><strong>Charles Parton OBE </strong>is Chief Adviser to the China Observatory at the Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Research Fellow in International Security at RUSI.</em></p></blockquote><div><hr></div><p><em>To stay up to date with </em>Observing China<em>, please subscribe or pledge your support!</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><em>What do you think about this analysis? Why not leave a comment below?</em></p><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[When push comes to shove, do China’s ‘strategic partnerships’ carry real weight?]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Tangram | No 04.2026]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-tangram-04-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/the-tangram-04-2026</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Lena Stein]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 14:00:07 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><strong>This is the 13th Tangram from </strong><em><strong>Observing China</strong></em><strong>, where the leading China experts give a diverse range of succinct responses to key questions on the development of the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC).</strong></p></blockquote><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1287697,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/205506698?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oFEW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F338d2520-a6a3-4946-991a-4d5b3fc8c3bc_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>On 17th June 2026, the State Council of the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) released a sweeping new white paper: &#8216;</span><a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202606/17/content_WS6a326192c6d00ca5f9a0bab7.html"><span>More Just and Equitable Global Governance</span></a><span>&#8217;, positioning Beijing as the architect of a reformed, United Nations (UN)-centric international system. By championing the so-called &#8216;Global South&#8217; and calling for true multilateralism, the paper seeks to present the PRC not as a disruptor of the global order, but as a stabilising force in an increasingly volatile geopolitical era.</span></p><p><span>Yet, beneath this rhetorical commitment to global solidarity, the reality of Beijing&#8217;s international alignments faces scrutiny. The PRC&#8217;s vast and carefully curated network of &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; &#8211; most notably its enduring ties with Russia, its strategic engagements with Iran amid ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts, and its broader economic outreach to the developing world &#8211; is routinely tested by global crises.</span></p><p><span>Both Beijing and its partners frequently tout these relationships as evidence of an emerging, multipolar consensus, leveraging them to secure vital resources, circumvent trade restrictions, and counter the United States&#8217; (US) hegemony. However, in times of acute international crisis, the PRC has demonstrated a calculated pragmatism. Beijing has historically hesitated to cross critical economic and military red lines, striving to balance its commitments to its strategic partners against the overriding domestic imperative to forestall comprehensive economic decoupling from free and open nations&#8217; markets.</span></p><p><span>International analysts remain divided on whether this web of diplomatic alignments constitutes a genuine, resilient coalition, or merely a transactional fa&#231;ade that fractures under pressure. As such, for this edition of the Tangram, we asked five experts the following question: </span><strong><span>When push comes to shove, do China&#8217;s &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; carry real weight?</span></strong></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png" width="1456" height="246" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:246,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:869197,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2SiQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16f54352-cd8a-4a43-914a-9460067b5b3f_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div></div></div></div><figcaption class="image-caption">Did you know? The tangram (&#19971;&#24039;&#26495;) is an ancient Chinese dissection puzzle.</figcaption></figure></div><p><strong>Charles Parton OBE</strong></p><p><em>Chief Adviser, China Observatory, Council on Geostrategy</em></p><p><span>The PRC&#8217;s &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; should be thought of as pizzas and toppings. There is a base &#8211; a &#8216;partnership&#8217;, almost always spread with tomato &#8216;strategic&#8217;, and to which a range of topping adjectives can be added according to taste. Some toppings are more expensive or of higher value than others. Countries can start by adding &#8216;cooperative&#8217; and &#8216;friendly&#8217;, progress to &#8216;comprehensive&#8217;, and then move on to &#8216;all-weather&#8217;.</span></p><p><span>Toppings are not mutually exclusive: &#8216;all-weather comprehensive&#8217; is not uncommon. The pizzeria has updated its menu, for example, adding the topping &#8216;for the new era&#8217; and &#8216;community with a shared future&#8217;, whose flavour seems to be particularly appealing to countries of the Global South &#8211; the full phrase, &#8216;community with a shared future for mankind&#8217;, is of course a prime ingredient of thought on diplomacy by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).</span></p><p><span>Beijing likes to use these toppings for symbolism, signalling, and reward. &#8216;For a new era&#8217; suggests that global governance is changing, and that the country supports the PRC&#8217;s efforts to establish a different world order. Russia was the first to add this topping. Pakistan and the PRC are close, and since 2018 they have agreed to build a &#8216;closer China-Pakistan community of shared future in the new era&#8217;, combining two toppings. Often one of the outcomes of leaders&#8217; visits will be the announcement of the addition of a new topping.</span></p><p><span>Once ordered, a topping cannot be removed. The United Kingdom (UK) is the only country to have established a &#8216;</span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement-2015"><span>Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century</span></a><span>&#8217;. This was in 2015, on the establishment of the &#8216;Golden Era&#8217;. Poor relations since then have not led to demotion. Since the visit by Sir Keir Starmer, outgoing Prime Minister, to the PRC early this year, the phrase &#8216;long-term and consistent comprehensive strategic partnership&#8217; has been bandied about. It is not clear whether this is formally on the topping menu.</span></p><p><span>The PRC does not have allies (only with North Korea does it have an official alliance). It is a solipsistic power. It does not wish to be bound by obligations; rather, it prizes the flexibility of ill-defined partnerships. These toppings should be regarded as a form of propaganda, which might play on the vanity of some leaders, but in the words of Gilbert and Sullivan (in </span><em><span>Ruddigore</span></em><span>), &#8216;so it really doesn&#8217;t matter, matter, matter, matter, matter&#8217;. Seeking truth from facts or acts is a better guide to the PRC&#8217;s foreign relations.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://x.com/sariarhohavren?lang=en">Dr Sari Arho Havr&#233;n</a></strong></p><p><em>International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Geopolitical Adviser, Business Finland</em></p><p><span>The question contains its own error. &#8216;When push comes to shove&#8217; is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Article 5-type &#8216;real weight&#8217; test: it asks whether partners will fight, bleed, and hold the line. However, Beijing has never built its partnerships to pass that test. Judging them against free and open nations&#8217; alliances is like comparing apples to oranges. The honest question is not whether they carry weight, but what they are </span><em><span>for</span></em><span>.</span></p><p><span>The PRC&#8217;s partnership architecture is deliberately graded, non-binding, and entrapment-averse. Optionality is in the design. Beijing studied Soviet overreach and drew the obvious lesson: no mutual-defence tripwires, no clients it is obliged to rescue, no commitments that convert a partner&#8217;s crisis into its own. The absence of hard guarantees preserves freedom of manoeuvre and a narrative win over &#8216;Cold War blocs&#8217;. So, the weight depends entirely on the metric, negligible as collective defence, considerable as an instrument for eroding US primacy without firing a shot.</span></p><p><span>The &#8216;CRINK&#8217; &#8211; comprising the PRC, Russian, Iran, and North Korea &#8211; could perhaps be seen as the paradigm case. It is not an alliance but an alignment without obligation: a force multiplier for sanctions evasion, military-industrial sustainment, diplomatic cover, and the normalisation of revisionism. It works because no member is committed enough to become a liability.</span></p><p><span>Yet, deepening cooperation, which is particularly visible in the Chinese-Russian relationship, should not be ignored. That being said, while the Kremlin&#8217;s dependence on Beijing has become a structural submission, it is far from a matter of simple fidelity; the relationship runs deeper than merely what a junior partner accepts after exhausting its alternatives. Chinese-Russian shared ambitions are well-served by the arrangement, although the relationship&#8217;s sternest test is likely still ahead.</span></p><p><span>Here is the trap that Beijing has built for itself. The PRC wants to be a system builder without the costs of an alliance leader. However, partnerships that give little back in times of crisis invite hedging. Gulf states court Washington and Beijing simultaneously, and Central Asia plays every suitor. The very flexibility that shields the PRC from entrapment also caps the loyalty it can command. Partners drift if they cannot extract substantial returns, and the endgame of seeding an alternative order stalls under its own logic.</span></p><p><span>So do these partnerships carry weight? Yes &#8211; but a contingent, reversible weight, and that is exactly the vulnerability. Beijing&#8217;s great strength, that it can never be entrapped, is also its ceiling: The order that the PRC wants to build demands the very commitments it has spent decades refusing to make.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://x.com/TheEdwardHowell">Dr Edward Howell</a></strong></p><p><em>Lecturer in International Relations, University of Oxford</em></p><p><span>Mao Zedong once alleged that the PRC&#8217;s relationship with North Korea was &#8216;as close as lips and teeth&#8217;, where &#8216;if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold&#8217;. This characterisation, however, fails to capture the nuances in the PRC&#8217;s frosty past and present relationship with its now-nuclear neighbour of North Korea.</span></p><p><span>For over two decades, the PRC has been &#8211; and remains &#8211; North Korea&#8217;s principal economic benefactor, accounting for over 95% of North Korea&#8217;s external trade. Over the past year, trade levels have rebounded to near pre-pandemic levels, but Beijing remains frustrated at having failed to persuade Pyongyang to adopt a similar &#8216;socialist&#8217; economic model to its own.</span></p><p><span>After North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 &#8211; while the Six-Party Talks, hosted by the PRC, were ongoing (although North Korea suspended its participation) &#8211; Beijing called upon Pyongyang to denuclearise. Over time, however, the PRC&#8217;s tolerance for its nuclear neighbour has grown, especially since the 2020s. Beijing and Moscow supported the UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, owing to its expanding nuclear and missile programmes &#8211; the last of which was imposed in December 2017. Yet, like Russia, the PRC&#8217;s commitment to them has been flimsy.</span></p><p><span>In aiding North Korean sanctions evasion through illicitly facilitating coal and oil transfers and hosting tens of thousands of the country&#8217;s workers, today&#8217;s PRC now accepts a nuclear North Korea in all but name. Its relationship with North Korea has gone from what can be called &#8216;reluctant tolerance&#8217; to &#8216;unreluctant acceptance&#8217;.</span></p><p><span>This certainly carries weight. When Xi visited Pyongyang last month, there was no mention of North Korea&#8217;s nuclear programme, let alone denuclearisation. The PRC does not want to bear responsibility for the North Korean nuclear issue.</span></p><p><span>The PRC&#8217;s attitude to the newfound alliance between North Korea and Russia has often been incorrectly described as one of ire. It may be feeling emetic at North Korea having two treaty allies (of which it is one) and itself having only one in North Korea. Yet, were Beijing truly angry, it could stop enabling the Kremlin&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine by supplying dual-use technologies and cease helping Pyongyang to circumvent sanctions. It has done neither of these things.</span></p><p><span>The PRC&#8217;s priority on the Korean Peninsula has long been stability. Its red lines remain to ensure that North Korea does not do anything that goes against its interests or drags it into any unwanted conflict. Crucially, however, these uncertainties will not stop it from colluding with the Kremlin and/or Pyongyang to undermine the US-led international order. Here, the PRC is highly complicit, whether through its own geopolitical and economic coercion or its conniving with other rogue states. It is about time that free and open nations took it seriously.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://x.com/LiDanieRae">Dr Danielle Reeder</a></strong></p><p><em>Law, Defence, and Geopolitical Affairs Researcher</em></p><p><span>Naturally, there is a prerequisite question concerning which pressure points are being applied, and in which direction such tacit forces would seek to push the PRC.</span></p><p><span>The &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; that Beijing has made in the interest of advancing economic strength, as well as geopolitical dominance, are intrinsically linked to the belief that the US-led hegemonic order should be dislodged, or is in fact coming to an end. This bet is hedged against a successful record of the PRC increasing its share of global consumer markets, engineering intellectual property to supplant American technological dominance, and selectively undermining US sanction regimes.</span></p><p><span>At the base of Beijing&#8217;s strategic partnerships is the cohort of non-aligned states able to reinforce mutual and material gains, which shift global attitudes in perceiving Russia, Iran, and North Korea as errant states. As long as the Kremlin provides reliable energy sourcing and purchases military technology; as long as Tehran permits preferential shipping access and discounted crude; and as long as a placated Pyongyang serves as a wildcard deterrent against escalating military action in the Indo-Pacific, the PRC&#8217;s strategic partnerships will not be compelled into conciliatory realignment with free and open nations&#8217; interests.</span></p><p><span>However, these &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; are indeed transactional and limited. The strength of the PRC&#8217;s relationship with Russia at least will be tested by Beijing&#8217;s growing discomfort regarding over-reliance on Russian energy, and weariness of the Kremlin&#8217;s more casual attitude towards ensuring global market stability. Both the PRC and Russia will face leadership succession in the near future. Even if committed to maintaining the party line, any incoming regime will be eager to assert definition, which may or may not follow suit of an arrangement between Xi and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia.</span></p><p><span>Furthermore, the PRC&#8217;s own global ambitions threaten to weaken the integrity of its partnerships. Despite entering a new era of innovation, a number of Chinese industries still rely on state intervention and subsidies to compete unevenly in free markets, which could begin to overwhelm and frustrate trade partners. Although long anticipated, a move on Taiwan will demand a hard cessation of certain economic-based arrangements, particularly among European nations. The </span><a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/all-research/challenging-chinas-maritime-militia/"><span>increasingly aggressive tactics</span></a><span> of the PRC&#8217;s distant-water fishing fleet may become a sticking point for coastal partners in the Global South.</span></p><p><span>The PRC has benefited greatly from open, global exchange, but does not invite expanding investment at home, and will struggle to match the fiscal maturity of New York or London. Beijing may be able to disrupt the Washington consensus, but cannot sustain offensive military action without formal allies in defence. It may challenge US leadership, but it cannot replace it. Ultimately, the PRC&#8217;s &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; do carry weight to the extent of being able to evade the traditional containment strategies of the free and open international order, but its relationships possess fissures that will expand under the stress of overleveraged objectives.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong><a href="https://x.com/gracetheodoulou">Grace Theodoulou</a></strong></p><p><em>International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy</em></p><p><span>When it comes to diplomacy, Beijing is careful not to make any commitments that could see it dragged into an armed conflict. Boasting &#8216;partnerships&#8217; with well over 100 countries around the world, with varying degrees in depth and scope, the CCP employs characteristically obscure terminology for these agreements.</span></p><p><span>Chinese diplomatic nomenclature is not fully standardised, and different words can be added to these terms which would leave the average reader none the wiser. With Pakistan &#8211; Beijing&#8217;s closest security partner &#8211; for example, the PRC holds an &#8216;</span><a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202508/t20250823_11694904.html"><span>All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership</span></a><span>&#8217;, while with Russia it has a &#8216;</span><a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/08/content_WS681cbf2cc6d0868f4e8f25b3.html"><span>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era</span></a><span>&#8217;, which has included joint military drills. Regardless of the label, Beijing does not have any mutual defence treaties with other countries.</span></p><p><span>What many have noticed in the past year is that these partnerships offer little help from the PRC when the going gets tough. When Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was assassinated earlier this year, Beijing responded with little more than words of reproach, although American intelligence</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/13/us/politics/china-iran-weapons-trump-xi.html"><span> pointed</span></a><span> to Chinese supply of weapons to Tehran&#8217;s authoritarian regime earlier this year during the conflict. In fact, many of these &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217; appear to favour the PRC disproportionately. Tehran has seen little of the </span><a href="https://iramcenter.org/en/the-latest-status-of-the-25-year-comprehensive-cooperation-agreement-between-iran-and-china-737"><span>25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement</span></a><span> it signed with Beijing in 2021, which saw the PRC agree to invest US$400 billion (&#163;300 billion) in Iran over the next 25 years.</span></p><p><span>Rather, this deal gave Beijing the ability to purchase Iranian oil at discounted rates due to sanctions, with the PRC</span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-china-war-strategy-4e0132fc"><span> purchasing</span></a><span> roughly 90% of Iran&#8217;s oil exports. However, these only account for approximately 12% of total Chinese oil imports, leaving Tehran far more reliant on Beijing. Perhaps it is also worth noting that in April, both Russia and the PRC</span><a href="https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d355/d3552911"><span> voted</span></a><span> in favour of Iran during a UN Security Council meeting, vetoing a resolution calling for Tehran to cease attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. Beyond preserving Iran&#8217;s leverage in the ongoing conflict, the PRC also retained its status as an intermediary.</span></p><p><span>It is not helpful to try to find a more familiar equivalent of these &#8216;strategic partnerships&#8217;, and they should be understood as best they can in their own right. That being said, it will certainly be interesting to see what &#8211; if anything &#8211; Beijing does to protect its &#8216;</span><a href="https://cy.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202505/t20250511_11618830.htm"><span>ironclad friendship</span></a><span>&#8217; with Cuba, should Washington act on its</span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yrkl96xwvo"><span> threats</span></a><span> towards the Caribbean nation.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><strong>If you would like to explore any of the Council on Geostrategy&#8217;s PRC-focused research papers, <a href="https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/china-observatory/">click here</a> to visit the China Observatory.</strong></p><h6>The image at the top of this page has been generated using AI.</h6><div><hr></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Britain to ‘turbocharge’ trade with China]]></title><description><![CDATA[China spits fire at ethnic unity law pushback; Beijing hosted biological warfare training for Russia]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/britain-to-turbocharge-trade-with-china</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/britain-to-turbocharge-trade-with-china</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 11:30:07 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1396956,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/204639556?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!abAe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe5df4e06-71a1-44a1-8aa7-b5cdd9c06e64_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>Yesterday, two important measures came into effect regarding the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC), which I have covered over the past few months. First is the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, which Beijing adopted in March this year.</span></p><p><span>The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) </span><a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202508/29/content_WS68b165f0c6d0868f4e8f5282.html"><span>says</span></a><span> it is &#8216;to further strengthen </span><em><span>[sic]</span></em><span> the unity and cohesion of the Chinese nation&#8217;, and that the PRC&#8217;s ethnic minorities will benefit from it. However, human rights experts outside the PRC warn that it aims to erode their rights and rituals, with a view to forced assimilation.</span></p><p><span>The other, less controversial (to some) measure that came into effect was the tax on small packages entering the European Union (EU) from third countries, in a move seen to be targeting the PRC. </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/eu-slaps-3-fee-cheap-ecommerce-parcels-blow-shein-temu-aliexpress-2026-07-01/"><span>According</span></a><span> to the EU, 91% of all parcels valued at less than &#8364;150 (~&#163;130) &#8211; and thus eligible for not paying tax &#8211; which entered the largest multi-country single market in the world in 2024 were from the PRC.</span></p><p><span>Meanwhile, a high-level business delegation from the PRC is in the UK, with the aim to launch a platform to help British businesses expand in the Chinese market.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/britain-to-turbocharge-trade-with-china">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Britain expedites tax targeting Chinese e-commerce]]></title><description><![CDATA[CATL and Octopus Energy in a joint venture; Brussels considers tariffs on PRC hybrid cars]]></description><link>https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/britain-expedites-tax-targeting-chinese-e-commerce</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/britain-expedites-tax-targeting-chinese-e-commerce</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace Theodoulou]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:00:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Observing China is the essential newsletter to understand the UK-PRC relationship, explained in the context of global developments.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png" width="1456" height="1048" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1048,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1036606,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.observingchina.org.uk/i/203562987?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nvSf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79a1965b-0d2e-436d-8b4d-a7bcf7604cfc_1456x1048.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">This image was generated using Artificial Intelligence.</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>&#8216;We live in a world &#8203;of wolves now. We no longer live in a world of pink ponies and rainbows&#8217;, one European Union (EU) diplomat </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-leaders-strive-unity-china-trade-imbalance-2026-06-18/"><span>told</span></a><span> </span><em><span>Reuters </span></em><span>last week, as Brussels&#8217; goods trade deficit with Beijing surpassed &#8364;1 billion (approximately &#163;900 million) per day.</span></p><p><span>As Brussels becomes increasingly tough on Beijing&#8217;s trade practices, what will this mean for the successor of Sir Keir Starmer, who resigned as Prime Minister on Monday? Andy Burnham, Member of Parliament (MP) for Makerfield, is tipped to succeed Sir Keir. Given his previous position as Mayor of Manchester for nine years prior to returning to Parliament, we do not yet have significant insight into his foreign policy &#8211; although he does boast trade negotiation experience with Beijing.</span></p><p><span>What we do know is that Sir Keir&#8217;s successor will inherit the delicate reconstruction of the fragile relationship between London and Beijing forged by Starmer. Besides domestic debates about the prudence of this decision, Brussels&#8217; increasingly tough trade stance on Beijing, along with the intensifying competition between the United States (US) and the PRC, will be additional obstacles to navigate.</span></p><p><span>Last October, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Donald Trump, President of the US, reached a trade truce with some trepidation. Despite some recent trampling over the truce, Trump </span><a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3357787/and-apec-makes-4-trump-pencils-another-big-china-trip-us-midterms-loom"><span>appears</span></a><span> eager to continue meeting Xi, and this year may see up to four in-person talks.</span></p><p><span>Welcome back to </span><em><span>Observing China</span></em><span>.</span></p>
      <p>
          <a href="https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/britain-expedites-tax-targeting-chinese-e-commerce">
              Read more
          </a>
      </p>
   ]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>